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Abstract 
Zen is a coherent system of philosophically plausible ideas. But Zen is often 
misunderstood to be anti-analytical or illogical. This is due to its core concept ~ 
(siinyata; emptiness). It is an idea that our experience and knowledge do not 
correctly represent the way the world is. ~ (emptiness) is not, however, a 
nihilistic concept. Zen believes that recognising our limitation and identifying our 
miscomprehension enable us to grasp the way the world really is (~D; tathata). 
The denial of our ordinary knowledge is, therefore, key to attain m (bodhi; the 
enlightenment) and ultimately leads us to be liberated from ~ (dukha; suffering). 
This thesis therefore concentrates on negating our metaphysical beliefs that shape 
our fundamental world view. 
In order to make this thesis accessible to western readers who has little or no 
knowledge of eastern philosophy, I will pick up only conclusion from Zen and try 
to reach the same conclusion using arguments which western philosophers are 
familiar with. I hope this will demystify Zen and, in future it will be studies in 
other branches of philosophy and as a sub-category of eastern or world 
philosophy. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without 
prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged 
.. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
I: Zen and Metaphysics 
Zen is considered to be an unique form of Buddhism that has been widely 
employed in China and Japan. Zen is becoming more popular in western countries 
where Zen was unheard of fifty years ago. It is however, unfortunate that Zen is 
not truly studied by western academics. In the tradition of western academic 
philosophy, Zen is normally studied only under a sub-category of Eastern 
philosophy, despite the fact that it could offer interesting and valid accounts in a 
range of topics, such as in ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of the mind, 
political philosophy, philosophy of language, and so forth. A primal aim of this 
thesis is to present Zen in a terminology and manner that western philosophers are 
familiar with, in order to make Zen accessible to the western philosopher. By 
doing so, I hope that in the future, Zen can be studied not only under the category 
of eastern philosophy, but also in other branches of philosophy and beyond. 
One of the many reasons Zen is not studied in the west is because it is falsely 
believed that Zen is some sort of mysticism or religion whose ideas are too 
abstract and anti-analytical to be compatible with western philosophy. I agree that 
on the surface Zen teachings appear to be puzzling and illogical at the best, 
anti-analytical or utter nonsense, at the worst. The following are examples that 
trigger such sceptics: 
= The moon cannot be stolen = 
Ryokan1, a Zen master, lived the simplest kind of life in a little hut at 
the foot of a mountain. One evening, a thief visited the hut only to 
1 &:I;;Ryoukan(Japan;l758-1831) A Zen monk ofSoto school who had simple and 
down-to-earth life styles. He was known for his poems, calligraphy and love for all living things. 
There is a famous nursery rhyme that praise how he played with and looked after kids from a 
village near Mt. Kugami. 
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discover there was nothing in it to steal. Ryokan returned and caught 
him. 'You may have come a long way to visit me,' he told the prowler, 
'and you should not return empty-handed. Please take my clothes as a 
gift.' The thief was bewildered. He took the clothes and slunk away. 
Ryokan sat naked, watching the moon. 'Poor fellow,' he mused, 'I 
wish I could give this beautiful moon. ' 2 
= Nansen cuts the cat in two= 
Nansen3 saw the monks of the eastern and western halls fighting over 
a cat. He seized the cat and told the monks: 'If any of you say a good 
word [give an immediate expression of his Zen], you can save the cat.' 
No one answered. So Nansen boldly cleaved the cat into two pieces. 
That evening Joshu4 returned and Nansen told him about this. Joshu 
at once removed his sandals and, placing them on his head walked out. 
Nansen said: 'If you had been there, you could have saved the cat.' 5 
Why did .ll:l: (Ryokan) give away his clothes? Why did he not punish the thief, 
or at least teach the thief that stealing is wrong? Why did m.:JR (Nansen) kill the 
cat, even though monks are not supposed to kill even an insect? Why does the 
placing of sandals on a person's head signify true understanding of Zen? One 
thing people have to understand about Zen is that Zen ethics, aesthetics, theory of 
justice and philosophy of language are all natural outcomes of Zen metaphysics, 
Zen's fundamental view of the world. I believe that without understanding 
underlying metaphysical concepts of Zen, it is impossible to understand Zen at all. 
In other words, the above stories make no sense unless Zen's metaphysical view 
of the world is understood. This is why my thesis aims to unravel Zen's 
metaphysical view so that we can understand how it affects epistemology, ethics, 
2 Rep, Paul (ed.) (1957), Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, (London; Penguin Books Ltd.), p.23 
3 ifiJRfUi; Nan-ch'uan P'u-ytlan (China;748-834). Ch'an monk ofT'ang dynasty. He possessed 
depth knowledge in various Buddhist texts. 
4 il!lUfif:tit;Zhao-ZhouC6ng~sh~n(China;778-897). Nansen-Fugan's diSCiple. He is known for 
his spontaneous method of teaching, instead of strict disciplinary teaching method that was 
common in his time. 
5 The story was recorded in fir,IMJ (Gateless Gate). this exact translation is extracted from Rep, 
Paul (ed.) (1957) Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, (London; Penguine Book Ltd), p.l05 
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and so forth. The primal goal of this thesis is to establish Zen as a coherent system 
of plausible metaphysical thoughts and to combat the commonly held perception 
of Zen as an inconsistent collection of anti-analytical beliefs. 
By illustrating how important metaphysics is for the understanding of Zen, I 
would like also to bring much neglected metaphysics back to the centre stage of 
philosophy. Metaphysics is the study which aims to understand the fundamental 
nature and characteristics of reality and everything that exists. Metaphysics is a 
quest to fmd who or what we are, and what reality or the universe is. 
Unfortunately, metaphysics is sidelined in modern philosophy and also in people's 
everyday thinking. Metaphysics is regarded as far-fetched and irrelevant to other 
branches of philosophy and our everyday lives. I strongly disagree with such a 
belief. I think that without a metaphysical foundation, it is not possible to 
fruitfully tackle everyday questions as well as philosophical ones. It is not that no 
one holds strong metaphysical views, in fact everyone holds certain and often 
strong metaphysical belief or beliefs. The problem is that most metaphysical 
beliefs are so deeply (culturally or religiously) embedded in our consciousness, 
that people accept them without questioning them. For example, people hold 
metaphysical beliefs such as the distinction between mind and body, existence of a 
material (physical) universe, existence of time, causation, self as an individual 
entity. People hold these beliefs without contemplating on whether or not such 
beliefs are genuinely true or at least plausible. By introducing Zen metaphysical 
ideas that are different from commonly held metaphysical beliefs of the west, I 
would like to inspire people to re-examine their fundamental metaphysical beliefs. 
II: General definition of Zen 
Before I explain Zen's metaphysical position, it is important and necessary 
for readers who are not familiar with Zen philosophy to understand what Zen is. 
Zen is often described as Zen Buddhism, and it is considered to be a branch of 
Buddhism. However, Zen is different from the religious form of Buddhism that is 
popular not only in Asian cultures but also in the west. It is theJ;"efore impol1Wlt to 
clarify differences between Zen and the religious form of Buddhism which I 
hereby describe as the Popular Buddhism. Even though Zen was imported from 
8 
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China to Japan, due to historical, cultural, political and religious differences 
between China and Japan, Japanese Zen developed differently from Chinese Zen. 
I would like to concentrate on the Japanese form rather than the Chinese form of 
Zen, simply because I am more familiar with Japanese Zen than Chinese Zen. 
Despite the fact that both Chinese Zen and Japanese Zen are denoted by the same 
Chinese semantic character ":Ml ", in order to distinguish Japanese form and 
Chinese form, I use Japanese pronunciation "Zen" for the former and Chinese 
pronunciation "Ch'an" for the latter. 
Ch'an was invented in the seventh century A.D., some 1100 years after the 
death of Gautama Buddha, who is believed to have established Buddhism. During 
this 11 00 years gap, many changes and transformations had happened to 
Buddhism. Therefore, Buddhism in China around the seventh century was 
different from the original Buddhism. The motive for the invention of Ch'an was 
to reject all those changes that had taken place and to go back to the original 
teaching of Gautama Buddha. Among many changes that had occurred to 
Buddhism, two main things Ch'an aimed to reject were canonication and 
religionisation of Buddhism. Canonication of Buddhism was the most popular 
way in which Buddhism was practised around the time Ch'an was invented. The 
most popular way was comprised of chanting, memorising and studying of texts 
called ft (sfitras) and {f (vinayas). Such practices were popular because people 
believed that ft (sfitras) and fl (vinayas) were the direct teaching of Gautama 
Buddha, and they possess mystical power which enables the believer to attain m 
(bodhi; the enlightenment). Ch'an considered that such practices were not the true 
teaching of Buddhism, since there were several reasons to believe that neither ft 
(sfitras) nor fl (vinayas) were the original teaching of Gautama Buddha at all. 
The fust reason is the fact that all Buddhist texts were written at least 400 years 
after the death of Gautama Buddha. Transcriptions of Gautama Buddha's original 
teaching were not available because, like any other Indian philosophy or religion 
of his time, the teaching was handed down in oral form. The absence of written 
texts by Gautama Buddha meant that his ideas and words were lost, fragmented, 
distorted or misconveyed. In addition to these involuntary changes, with oral 
tradition, anyone can add his personal ideas, opinion and his interpretation of 
9 
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Gautama Buddha's teaching as direct words of Gautama Buddha by simply 
adding the opening line "Gautama Buddha said that. .. ". In order to maintain 
Buddhism true to Gautama Buddha's teaching, sanglti (*li.; gatherings of 
Buddhist practitioners to recite teaching together) were organised, in order to 
compare and correct what each follower of Gautama Buddha remembered or 
understood. Note that this sangiti still took the oral form of chanting/singing, 
therefore the outcome was again subject to misinterpretation and distortion. On 
the third sangfti, around the time of King Ashoka 6 around 250 B.C., 
disagreements concerning a vinaya (ff) resulted in schism of Buddhism. Because 
disagreements were not solved and different schools of Buddhism kept their 
versions of vinaya (ff), there is no way of knowing which was the genuine 
original teaching of Gautama Buddha. The second reason to believe that ft 
(sUtras) and ff (vinayas) are not true to the original teaching ofGautama Buddha 
is that a further schism of Buddhism took place as the result of its interaction with 
other religions and philosophies. Many ideas are absorbed from Indian 
religion/philosophy, later known as Hinduism. This is obvious from the fact that 
later Buddhist teachings contain many ideas that did not appear in earlier 
teachings. This, I believe, was an unavoidable process. Even though Buddhism 
originates in the teaching of Gautama Buddha, it is wrong to assume that he 
single-handedly invented a new system of thought completely alien to Indian 
religions and philosophies which existed in his time. What is considered to be the 
original teaching of Gautama Buddha itself contains many ideas from Indian 
religion/philosophy. In fact in India, Buddhism is often regarded as a branch of 
Hinduism. The absorption of different ideas created further disagreements within 
Buddhism. By the time Buddhist teachings of siltras (ft) and vinayas (ff) were 
finally committed to writing, these texts contained many different ideas that were 
not likely to be ideas of Gautama Buddha This is proven by the fact that there are 
inconsistencies even between earlier texts. The absorption of other ideas and 
divergence of teaching continued, even after Buddhism teachings were finally put 
6 Asoka (Ind. 272-231 B.C.) IJiiJJf.3: in Japanese and Chinese. The third king ofMaurya 
kingdom who succeeded to unite ancient India. He was a patron of Buddhism and ordered to elect 
inscribed pillars and to carve cliff faces that provide invaluable religious and historical insight of 
his time. 
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into written forms. Among these schism, two important movements that arose for 
Ch'an!Zen were Mahiiyiina (:~~fHkf&) and Miidhyamika school (lf!UJl~). 
Mahiiyiina (~JHkf&) is defined by the belief that anyone can attain bodhi (t!; 
the enlightenment) and become buddha (ikltt:) or bodhisattva (-!f.). This is the 
rejection of the tradition that bodhi (t!) is available only to bhilcyu (.ltli) and 
bhilcyunf (.ltli~), ordained members who underwent pravrajyii (tti ~),the act of 
leaving the ordinary world and adopting an ascetic life in a monastery. Mahiiyiina 
means "a big vehicle" which signifies its aim; to enlighten everyone rather than to 
keep the enlightenment exclusive to ordained members of a monastery. This is 
obvious from the importance of bodhisattva (-!f.) in Mahiiyiina. A bodhisattva is 
one who has attained bodhi (t!) yet remains among ordinary people in order to 
liberate (~JBt vimok~) people from suffering (!i=; duhkha) by making them 
enlightened. The second movement important for Ch' an/Zen is development of 
Miidhyamika school (lf!Q)}N) which was founded by Nagfujuna (.If) in the 
second century. Miidhyamika school is important for Ch'an!Zen because it 
developed the idea of g;g ( siinyata) which became a character defining concept of 
Ch' an and Zen. 
In China, Buddhism incorporated native Taoism and Confucianism. In Japan 
Buddhism absorbed Japanese native religion and philosophy7• Absorption and 
incorporation of foreign ideas into Buddhism means that there was no guarantee 
for contents of *I (siitras) and f! (vinayas) to be genuine teaching of Gautama 
Buddha. Ch'an argued that studying, memorising and chanting of *I (siitras) and 
fl" (vinayas) should be rejected because they are unlikely to be true teaching of 
Gautama Buddha, and therefore there is no guarantee that studying, chanting and 
memorising them would ever help people to attain t! (bodhi; the enlightenment). 
Instead of chanting, memorising and studying of *I (siitras) and fl" (vinayas) 
Ch'an favoured sitting meditation the way Buddhism was originally practised. 
Gautama Buddha himself rejected the idea that true understan~ing or the 
7 In Japan there are more philosophies and religions other than Shintoism (~im:). Shintoism is 
merely a formalised Japanese pantheism 
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enlightenment can be obtained by studying religious texts called Vedas8. Gautama 
Buddha believed that true understanding comes only from within. Moreover he 
believed that the true understanding or the enlightenment cannot be put into words 
and cannot be passed onto others. To attain the enlightenment, one has to mediate 
rather than studying texts. Ch'an's teaching therefore, is based solely on sitting 
meditation, the way Gautama Buddha (then Siddhartha Gautama) attained the 
enlightenment. In fact the word Ch'an was Chinese translation of Sanskrit word 
"dhayna" (meditation). Zen's rejection of texts and favour of meditation is 
illustrated by Snelling as follow: 
Ch' an was about a return to essentials. All the teachings, texts, 
practices, code of morality and behaviour, etc. etc., that sprang up 
around the basically simple teaching of [Gautama] Buddha were 
intended as aids to progress beyond: to Enlightened. But as the years 
went by, the diligent practitioner might become attached and trapped 
in them. Just as the bodhisattva Manjushri wields his Sword of 
Wisdom to summarily slice through the net of delusions, so the 
impulse behind Ch'an was to sweep all the training paraphernalia of 
Buddhism aside and to zero in on the heart of the matter: the direct 
insight that transformed Siddhartha Gautama into the Buddha beneath 
the Bodhi Tree at Bodh Gaya.9 
This attitude toward written texts is symbolised by a popular subject of ~~ 
(sumi-e; monochromatic ink painting), a Zen master tearing up a roll of sutras. 
This does not, however, mean Ch'an practitioners did not study ft (sUtras) and 
f.tt (vinayas) at all. In fact many Ch'an practitioners were deeply familiar with 
these texts. The Ch'an/Zen practitioner studies texts for their instrumental value. 
They considered *I (sutras) and ~ (vinayas) as ~ (abhidharmas). ~ 
( abhidharmas) are commentaries on ft ( sutras) and ~ ( vinayas) created by 
8 Vedas are Sanskrit texts of Hinduism dated around 1200 B.C. There are four collections of 
vedas; Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sarna Veda and Atharva Veda. 
9 Snelling, John. (1987), The Buddhist Handbook, (London; Century Hutchinson Ltd.), p.157. 
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followers of Gautama Buddha. In other words, Zen practitioners regards the texts 
not to be the original teachings of Gautama Buddha but commentaries written by 
his followers. Zen often draws a parallel between texts and a boat to illustrate the 
role of ft (siitras), ~ (vinayas) and it (abhidharma). Suppose I want to cross 
a river to get to the other shore. To cross the river, I need a boat, but, once I 
crossed the river the boat is no longer required. In the same manner, Ch'an 
considered ft (siitras), ~ (vinayas) and it (abhidharma) to be useful 
instruments, which guide those who seek the enlightenment to the right direction, 
but texts do not contain the ultimate knowledge of the enlightenment. 
The second change which Ch'an aimed to reject was religionisation of 
Buddhism. Until the birth of Ch'an, Buddhist teaching had been progressively 
religionised. The religionisation of Buddhism can be understood from three facts: 
1) anthropomorphisation of Buddhist concepts, 2) the deification of Gautama 
Buddha and bodhisattvas, and 3) the inclusion of many saints and gods of native 
religions as bodhisattas. Anthropomorphisation · of philosophical concepts was 
common practice in order to introduce complicated ideas for popular consumption. 
To make complicated ideas available to common people, the ideas were attributed 
to gods, dainties and other mythical beings in folklore or mythology of ordinary 
people. This was common practice employed by not only Buddhism but also by 
other religions and philosophy. For example, in Brahmanism, all encompassed 
ultimate reality Brahman (~) is often represented in a statue of a god. In principle, 
however, Brahman cannot be expressed in any form humans can comprehend, 
because whatever form or description we use is limited and it cannot express the 
all encompassed ultimate reality. In Buddhism, there are many examples of 
anthropomophisation. To give an example, there is a story Gautama Siddhartha10 
fought against temptations created by a demon 11 named Mara and his daughters 
(Ratf, Aratf and Trsnli). Etymologically mara means death, Rati is delight 
(pleasure), Arati is discontent and Trsna is craving. The story represents a concept 
that the enlightenment is overcoming the fear of death and no longer be controlled 
by the .pursuit ofdelight and craving or the feeling of discontentment. 
10 Gautama Siddhartha was a personal name of Gautama Buddha before he attained the 
enlightenment (bodhi). . 
11 Technically Mara is one of deva (god or supernatural being) 
13 
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The deification of Gautama Buddha and bodhisattvas is apparent from the 
fact that Buddhists worship sculptures of Gautama Buddha and bodhisattvas in the 
same manner as to worship religious idols. People worship Gautama Buddha and 
bodhisattvas because they believe that they are superhuman with supernatural 
abilities. Ch'an/Zen believes that Gautama Buddha and bodhisattvas were neither 
superhuman nor sons of God, so that worshipping them does not help people to 
attain ffi (bodhi; the enlightenment). The word 'fkll't: (buddha) simply means 
one who has attained t! (bodhi; the enlightenment) or one who possesses ~if!/ 
fti ;B= 12 (prajfia, the ultimate knowledge). The word {A Itt: (buddha) is not a 
proper name but it is a kind name13, it denotes not only the founder of Buddhism, 
Gautama Buddha, but also others who have attained the enlightenment. This 
means anyone can become 'fkltt: (buddha). I will discuss this later in more detail, 
but to state briefly, t! (bodhi; the enlightenment) does not make an individual 
sacred or divine (i.e. it does not make an individual superior or above ordinary 
people), and it does not grant any supernatural power. Above all, Ch' an/Zen 
rejected an idea that worshipping those curved figures would help people to attain 
the enlightenment. There is a famous Zen story about a conversation that took 
place between a Zen master and his pupil. When they were sheltering in an 
abandoned temple in the middle of winter, the pupil was astonished to see the 
master chopping a statue of Buddha and using it as firewood. The master sensed 
his pupil's surprise and told him that the statue is just a piece of wood and has no 
supernatural power. Moreover, even if it has a spirit of Gautama Buddha, he 
would be happy to provide warmth to his followers. 
In order to introduce Buddhism, Buddhist ideas were not only 
anthropomorphised and compared to native gods and sages, but also it absorbed 
native religion and philosophy that had already existed before the arrival of 
Buddhism. Before Buddhism was imported, China had ilftc (Taoist) and flf${ 
(Confucianism), Japan had ~il (Shintoism). These religions/philosophies had 
12 Both lli~ and fiJI denote the same Sanskrit wordprajflii. The foimer is a phonetic 
translation whereas the latter is a semantical translation of Sanskrit term prajflii. 
13 Proper name is a name designated to one specific individual or individual object, such as 
"Bertland Russell" or "Ludwig Wittgenstein". Whereas a kind name refers to a certain group or a 
member of the group, such as "apple", "mammal" and so forth. 
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their own sages and pantheistic gods, which native Chinese and Japanese 
worshipped. Buddhism incorporated these gods and mystical figures as ilfifi 
(bodhisattas). The merger of Buddhism with native religions helped Chinese and 
Japanese people to accept Buddhism, but it also altered Buddhism. By 
incorporating those native gods and sages into its teachings and presenting them 
as ilfifi (bodhisattas), it was natural for Chinese and Japanese to worship i.Ail't: 
(buddha) and i!fifi (bodhisattas) in the same manner they worship their native 
sages and gods. 
Ch'an/Zen rigorously rejected the canonisation and religionisation of 
Buddhism, because such moves lead to dogmatisation of Buddhist teaching. 
Ch'an/Zen believed that Buddhist teachings are not dogmas or articles of faith that 
have to be blindly accepted at the cost of suspending reason, critical judgement, 
common sense or experience. One should not accept everything that is said in 
texts, instead, one should only accept what he himself comes to conclude as a 
result of meditation. As the result of employing such attitudes, Ch'an/Zen rejected 
many ideas and beliefs that form the Popular Buddhism, such as reincarnation, 
Karmatic causation and rebirth, life-after-death, existence of heaven and hell, 
superhuman power of buddhas and bodhisatta, existence of mystical beings such 
as tfljl (pretas; evil ghosts), ~JJI (mara; demons), ~ (devas; gods) and lfliJ 
•• (asuras; titans). I will explain throughout the thesis why Zen rejects these 
ideas. Ch'an/Zen combated dogmatisation of Buddhist teaching not only by 
rejecting texts in favour of meditation, but also by introducing rationalisation. The 
rationalisation Ch'an/Zen employed is different from the rationalisation employed 
in western philosophy. I believe Because Ch'an/Zen employs rational process 
incomparable or alien to western philosophy, Ch' an/Zen is often regarded by 
western academics as irrational or anti-analytical. I will explain the rationalisation 
Zen employs in Chapter Three. Because Ch'an/Zen rejects dogmatisation and 
applies the rationalisation, it should be considered as a philosophy and not as a 
religion. This is where Ch'an/Zen differs from the Popular Buddhism. The 
PupUlar Buddhism has continued to dogmatlse ~d religionise its teaching, 
meanwhile Ch'an/Zen resisted such movements. This is why Ch'an and Zen must 
be distinguished from the Popular Buddhism that is an article of faith. Some 
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readers may object that not all forms of Buddhism have religious tendency (i.e. 
Ch'an and Zen are not only philosophical Buddhism). In fact, Buddhism which is 
academically studied employs rationalisation and rejects the religious aspects of 
Buddhism. The reason I concentrate on Zen is because academic Buddhism is too 
diverse to cover in this thesis, and Zen is unique and different from other branches 
of Buddhism. 
Despite its intention Ch'an/Zen failed to go back to the original teaching of 
Gautama Buddha. Ch'an and Zen are different from the original teaching of 
Gautama Buddha, because, as I mentioned, Buddhism, Ch'an and Zen were all 
influenced by foreign cultures, philosophies and religions. In fact, some scholars 
suggest that Ch'an/Zen was influenced more from iilc (Taoism) than from 
Buddhism. Because of this, in order to explain Zen, I believe Zen has to be 
explained in a much wider context of eastern philosophy than just Buddhism as 
such. This thesis, therefore, uses not only Buddhism texts but also refers to 
various Taoism, Confucianism Shintoism and other texts. 
III: Modem Zen 
One thing I have to make clear here is that Zen presented in this thesis is not 
commentary or interpretation of classic Zen. It is modem Zen inspired not only by 
classic Zen but also by western and eastern philosophy, science, psychology, 
martial art and so forth. Some may argue what I considered as modem Zen should 
not be titled as Zen, because it does not represent Zen as a whole, and also 
because in some places it contradicts with Zen's traditional views. I would dismiss 
such criticism on three accounts; 1) Zen is not a philosophy of the past but is and 
has to be a living and breathing philosophy which evolves with the ever-changing 
environment, 2) Zen is not a single idea, but it is an aggregate of various and often 
conflicting ideas, and 3) Zen's aim is to eliminate false ideas or views in order to 
liberate ourselves from !f ( duhkka, suffering). 
Zen is a dynamic living philosophy and not a static philosophy of the past. 
Zen continues to develop and expand by absorbing modem ideas. Social, political 
or economical environments we currently live in are different from the time in 
which those historical texts were written. Since the ultimate aim of Zen is to 
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liberate (WIMt; vimok~a) people from suffering (i!i; duhkha) in an ever-changing 
environment, Zen has to evolve as our surroundings changes. There is a difference 
between presenting modem living philosophy and philosophy of the past. If one 
presents philosophy of the past, such as Locke's philosophy, one cannot bring in 
new ideas or expand beyond what Locke wrote. If, on the other hand, one pursues 
modem philosophy, he can develop and produce new ideas. Those who engage 
with modem philosophy can invent their own ideas based on both past literatures 
and current knowledge so that there is no limit or horizon to restrict the expansion 
of their ideas. Zen this paper portrays is not a philosophy of the past, but a living 
and breathing philosophy which I believe to liberate people in modem society 
from suffering. Such Zen may contain ideas that did not exist in the classic Zen or 
worse contradict with traditional views. This thesis concentrates on modem Zen 
and not the classic Zen because the latter may be irrelevant to the society which 
we live in today. Moreover, being trapped by past ideas is exactly what Ch'an/Zen 
aims to avoid. To borrow Snelling's terminology, this is my attempt to wield 
Sword of Wisdom to make Zen what it is supposed to be. 
Secondly, the modem Zen is still Zen, even though it may not be consistent 
with the classic Zen, because Zen is an aggregate of ideas and it is not a unified 
single idea. It is the same way rationalism is an aggregate of various philosophical 
ideas and inconsistencies exist among them. For example, Descartes' philosophy 
belongs to rationalism, but it does not represent rationalism as a whole, since 
other rationalists such as Spiniza and Leibniz opposed to some of Descartes' ideas. 
The relation between Zen as a whole and the modem Zen and the relation between 
rationalism and Descartes' philosophy are that of a member and set. A member of 
a certain set does not have to be representative of every member in the set, since 
members of a set do not have to be identical to each other. For example, consider 
a set of numbers [1,4,9,16,25 ... n2]. By being square of natural number, 16 is a 
legitimate member of the set, but the number 16 is not equal to any other numbers 
in the set, and it does not share properties other than being a square of a natural 
num:her. In the ~e w~y, what I consider as the modem Zen is still Zen since it 
shares certain characteristics with other forms of Zen, but it does not mean it 
entirely agrees with other forms of Zen philosophy. 
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Thirdly, the primal rum of Zen is not the acquisition of truth but the 
elimination of suffering by discarding false understanding of ourselves and reality. 
There is one fundamental difference between western and eastern philosophy. 
Western philosophy emphasises the acquisition of truth or expansion of human 
knowledge. The very name philo-sophia (love of knowledge) illustrates this point. 
Whereas for eastern philosophy/religion such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taosim, 
and Ch'an/Zen, the aim of philosophical enquiry is liberation from i§= (duhkha; 
sufferings) that accompanying our lives. For eastern philosophies and religions, 
attainment of knowledge is merely a means to achieve liberation from i§= 
(duhkha). In Buddhism, three core doctrines [llYfim (catur-arya-satya; four noble 
truth), + =~& (twelve pratitya-samtpadas; dependent origination) and liii 
(five skandha; five elements)] all indicate that suffering derives from our 
ignorance and misunderstanding of the reality. Therefore by eliminating 
miscomprehension we can liberate ourselves from suffering. In this sense, the 
modem Zen I present in this thesis is Zen, because it aims to find the source of our 
ignorance and misunderstanding, in order to liberate ourselves from suffering. I 
will examine in Chapter eight how Zen ideas would helps to liberate ourselves 
from suffering. 
IV: Methodology 
So far I have defined what I aim to illustrate in this thesis. I now would like to 
turn to an issue of how I defend the plausibility of modem Zen. To test the 
plausibility of my Zen ideas, I will divide philosophy into a conclusion and an 
argument. Instead of using Zen argument to reaches the conclusion, I will use 
arguments from western philosophy and science to reach Zen conclusions. In 
other words, I pick up only the conclusion and not argument from Zen, and try to 
explain and defend plausibility of Zen conclusion in a fashion which western 
readers are familiar with, using western philosophical arguments. This is 
significantly different from traditional approaches to Zen and other eastern 
philosophical ideas. Most studies on Zen and other eastern philosophies normally 
take the following two kinds of approach. One is analysing eastern argument and 
conclusion within the domain of eastern philosophy. This approach is popular for 
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historical analysis of how certain ideas have derived and rui attempt to justify an 
interpretation of certain texts and concepts. Although this approach gives an 
in-depth analysis of eastern philosophy, it is not suitable for the purpose of this 
thesis. Because eastern concepts, terminology and manner of proceeding 
arguments are vastly different from that of western philosophy, this approach 
would alienates western readers who are not familiar with eastern philosophy. The 
second approach is a comparative study of eastern and western philosophies. It 
explains and defends eastern argument and conclusion by indicating similarities 
they possess to the western argument and conclusion. In Japan, Buddhist 
philosophy has been often compared to German philosophy from historical 
reasons. Firstly, Germany had already been exposed to and influenced by eastern 
philosophy thanks to Schopenhauer14 whose work was strongly influenced by 
ancient Indian text of Upanishad. This made it easy to carry out comparative 
studies. Secondly, in 1860s, many Japanese academics were sent to Germany to 
study medicine, science, philosophy and other academic subjects, so that Japanese 
academia were exposed to German philosophy. Although this approach makes 
eastern philosophy accessible to people who have no prior knowledge, I consider 
this to be inappropriate for the purpose of this thesis. This way of defending 
eastern argument and conclusion makes the plausibility of eastern ideas to be 
heavily depended upon western arguments. This puts eastern philosophy in danger 
of being denied because of its association to failed western philosophy. It is like 
the former is piggy-bagged onto the latter, so that if the latter fell, it takes the 
former with it. This is acute especially because eastern philosophers tend to 
compare Zen to classic western philosophies rather than to modem western 
philosophy that are currently regarded as plausible. Philosophy and science have 
progressed since classic literatures were written. Therefore some premises classic 
· arguments are based upon may no longer be valid. With development in 
philosophy and science since classic literatures were written what was once a 
14 Schopenhauer's work especially vol.4 chapter 53-71 of his The Wo.rld as Will and 
Representation is dediCated 'to Iridhm 'philosophy: He learned ea5tem phiiosophy from the 
orientalist Frederic Mayer and his understanding is based on Latin version of Upanishad translated 
by DuPeron from Persian version. However, his understanding of Indian philosophy was sketchy 
and contain many misunderstanding due to the fact that the Persian version and subsequent Latin 
version were inaccurate translation. 
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credible argument may no longer be convincing. 
Another thing I will avoid in this thesis is to rely heavily upon classic Piili 
and Sanskrit texts. Many literatures written about Buddhism or Zen aim to prove 
the legitimacy of their claims by demonstrating their consistency with various Piili 
or Sanskrit texts. I agree that it is useful to a certain extent to carry out an 
historical analysis of how Ch'an/Zen ideas were developed. I, however, believe 
that such approach to Zen is problematic on three accounts. One is that these 
approaches are exactly what Ch'an/Zen opposes. Those scholars who try to 
explain Ch' an/Zen referring to classic eastern literature are as much trapped in 
paraphernalia as pre-Ch'an Buddhists. I therefore believe that relying solely on 
classic arguments is a wrong way to defend plausibility of Zen. Secondly, as I 
mentioned earlier, Zen is neither dogma nor an article of faith, it is what each 
individual concludes or believes from his or her own reasoning. I refer to past 
literatures to explain where the modem Zen comes from but I avoid as much as I 
can the use of past literatures to boost its plausibility. Thirdly, trying to understand 
Zen by studying texts in chronological order (from Sanskrit or Pali cannons to 
Chinese and Japanese texts) leads only to confusion. As I have mentioned above, 
Zen is not the original teaching of Gautama Buddha, but mixture of Gautma 
Buddha's teaching, ideas of his followers, Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism 
Shintoism and so forth. Moreover, Sanskrit or Pali texts were often misunderstand 
or misinterpreted by the Chinese and Japanese. As a result, Chinese and Japanese 
texts that Ch'an/Zen derives from are often inconsistent or incoherence with older 
Piili and Sanskrit texts. It is, therefore, a mistake to try characterising Zen based 
on older texts. I believe a better way to understand Zen is to concentrate on recent 
literatures that are more relevant to current Zen. This is why I rely mainly on 
Chinese and Japanese texts, or Chinese/Japanese interpretation of Sanskrit texts, 
and only use Piili and Sanskrit texts as references. 
I believe my approach of rejecting classical arguments of Zen Buddhism is 
possible, and using it, I hope I can make Zen understandable to western readers 
who are not familiar wi~ eastern philosophy. If my approach were to be 
successful, readers would understand that Zen is not so different from the western 
way of thinking. Moreover, this is throwing Zen in the deep end, rather than 
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testing its plausibility in the comfort of its own home ground. Using such a 
method, the plausibility of Zen can be truly examined. This western approach to 
Zen would, I believe, not only help Zen to be accessible to western readers, but 
also gives fundamental structures to Zen philosophy which is notoriously elusive 
as Zen can lack proper structure and consistency. 
V: The structure of this thesis 
Although there are various ways to explain Zen's metaphysical view, in this 
thesis I will do so using the idea called ~ (siinyata), more specifically ~ 
(siinyata) of ~ ~ (nama-riipa). The Part One defines both ~ (siinyata) and~ 
'fg (nama-riipa) using western epistemology. Because of the nature of the idea ~ 
(siinyata), precise aims and methodology of this thesis cannot be fully explained 
until the end of the Part One. 
Once ~ (siinyata) of ~~ (nama-riipa) is defined, the rest ofthe thesis are 
applications of the idea upon various metaphysical topics. It is easy to prove 
plausibility of Zen by choosing a specific aspect of Zen that is conveniently 
similar to western philosophy. This kind of approach, however, does not prove 
Zen to be equally plausible to its western rivals. It actually fuels the common 
perception of Zen as an inconsistent collection of anti-analytical beliefs. To 
combat this common perception of Zen, I aim to apply ~ (siinyata) of ~~ 
(nama-riipa) upon as diverse metaphysical topics as possible. Because there is a 
word limit to the thesis, I will concentrate on the most fundamental topics: 
universal, particular, space, time, substance, causation and determinism (sorts of 
topics covered in an introductory book of metaphysics). 
Chapter Three and Four make up Part Two titled"~ (siinyata) of Intrinsic 
Divisions", which deals with two kinds of divisions that we used to make sense of 
our experience and knowledge. The two kinds of divisions are division between 
different classes, kinds, species and categories and division between individuals. 
Chapter Three looks into the objective legitimacy of qualitative divisions that 
natural kinds suggest. Chapter Four questions the legitimacy of numerical identity 
of an composite object. The Part Two aims to conclude that the reality is beyond 
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binary discrimination (~~IJ; vikalpa) of A or not-A. 
Topics the thesis looks into in Part Three are space (three-dimensional space), 
time, substance and causation. These topics are not necessarily covered by classic 
Zen literatures, but I provide how the concept of ~ (siinyata) can be applied to 
these topics. Chapter Five borrows arguments from modem physics to elucidate 
the idea that reality may not be spatio-temporal. We just perceive the world to be 
spatio-temporal without reality actually being spatio-temporal in its true nature. 
Chapter Six attends to the question of what sort of substance is or are there. 
Classically the question of substance concerns mental substance and physical 
substance. If the concept of ~ (siinyata) is taken seriously, Zen believes neither 
mental substance and physical substance are genuine substance, but they are 
merely two distinct ways for us to comprehend substance. Non-spatio-temporality 
of the reality demonstrated in Chapter Five and Six leads to the concept of 
causation different from our commonly held belief. Chapter Seven examines this 
concept of causation according to ~ (siinyata). As I mentioned earlier, the aim 
of this thesis is to make Zen way of life or behaviour understandable by clarifying 
the underline metaphysical view. Chapter Eight investigates how Zen's 
metaphysical ideas influence the ordinary way of life and ethics, mainly 
concentrate on the liberation (f4¥Mt vimoksa) from !f (duhkha; suffering). Those 
whose interest in Zen is purely metaphysical may ignore Chapter Eight, but my 
purpose of writing this thesis is actually to show how metaphysical ideas 
influence and improve our everyday life. I hope in the future I will have an 
opportunity to expand topics dealt in Chapter Eight to write a thesis about the 
everyday application of Zen metaphysics. 
VI: Concerning language 
As readers may have noticed that I use a particular way of stating Buddhist 
and Ch'an/Zen terms, which is a combination of Chinese semantic characters and 
their Sanskrit equivalent. Most English books and articles written on Buddhism or 
on Ch'an/Zent -use Roriian:ised Sanskrit, Prui, Cliinese or Japanese, without 
Chinese semantic characters. In my experience these widely-used ways of 
describing Ch' an/Zen concepts are problematic. Even though Ch' an/Zen terms 
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were etymologically originated in Pali and Sanskrit words, they include uniquely 
Chinese and Japanese nuance. This is, as we have seen, due to influences of native 
philosophy and religions of China and Japan upon Buddhism and also to 
misinterpretation and miscomprehension of precise Buddhist terms. Therefore it is 
necessary to distinguish original Pali or Sanskrit words and phrases from 
Chinese/Japanese interpretations of words and phrases. This is why I cannot use 
Romanised Sanskrit or Pali alone to describe Ch' an/Zen concepts. The commonly 
used alternative is to use Romanised Chinese or Japanese. This, however, creates 
inconveniences for Chinese and Japanese speakers. The first problem is that the 
same Ch'an/Japanese terms can be pronounced differently in Japanese, Cantonese 
Chinese and Mandarin Chinese. For example, ~' Chinese letter for sfulyata is 
pronounced in Mandarin Chinese "kong" and in Japanese "kuu". This means that I 
used "kuu", the Japanese pronunciation for ~ (sfulyata), Chinese readers would 
experience great difficulties understanding what it is, and they may misapprehend 
concept I am referring to. The second problem of using Romanised Japanese is 
that pronunciations of different semantic characters are sometime identical in 
Japanese language. For example, ~ (emptiness), '*? (to eat), Jl'f (cavities in 
the body), ~ (a bit for a horse) all shares the identical pronunciation, "kuu". 
Therefore if I wrote "kuu", Japanese readers would not understand which kuu I 
mean. 
In order to overcome these problems, I use Chinese semantic characters for 
Ch'an/Zen concepts and Sanskrit or Pali for the original meanings. For Chinese or 
Japanese readers, it may be practical to write Ch'an/Zen concepts using Chinese 
semantic letters, in order to distinguish them from original Sanskrit/Pali meanings, 
but this creates a problem for those who do not read Chinese characters. This 
forces me to use Sanskrit words to accompany Chinese characters. This helps 
western readers as well as Chinese and Japanese readers. For western readers, this 
creates a compatibility with texts available in the west. Most books and articles on 
Buddhism use Sanskrit or/and Pali. Especially Buddhist or Eastern philosophy 
dictionaries available in the west use headings with Sanskrit or/and Pali. For 
Chinese and Japanese readers, accompanying a Chinese letter with a Sanskrit 
equivalent clarifies its origin. 
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To summarise, the Buddhism concept in general is written with Romanised 
Sanskrit. And when applicable, they are accompanied by Chinese/Japanese 
translation in Chinese character. Ch'an/Zen concepts are written with Chinese 
semantic character followed by Sanskrit. But in some occasions, when I want to 
emphasise a meaning, I will write English accompanied by either Chinese 
semantic characters or/and Romanised Sanskrit. When I mention a Japanese or 
Chinese concept that has no Sanskrit equivalent, I use either Romanised Chinese 
or Japanese pronunciation. In order to distinguish Japanese and Chinese 
pronunciation, I use Ch; for Chinese and Jp; for Japanese. 
Names are particularly difficult. Until very recently, in China and Japan, all 
names of Asian philosophers were written using Chinese characters and 
pronounced differently in China and Japan. Therefore it is inevitable to include 
names in Chinese characters. I will try as much as I can to include pronunciation 
in both Japanese and Chinese. Names of contemporary authors are written using 
Romanised pronunciation according to ISBN catalogues and Philosopher's Index. 
It has to be noted again that although for western readers Sanskrit words I use 
to describe Zen concepts contains Chinese or Japanese nuance and not their 
original Sanskrit meanings. The same thing is applicable to names of texts. For 
example "Madhyamaka-siistra (W!:Jl~~)'' and W!:J:l~~ (Madhyamaka-siistra), the 
former is the original Sanskrit version whereas the latter is the Chinese translation 
of the same text (the latter may contains things that were not in the former). 
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Part 1 
~ (Siinyata) 
25 
~ (SOnyata) 
The basic metaphysical position of Zen can be swnmarised into one word ~ 
(sOnyata; emptiness). Zen states that everything is ~ (slinya; empty) and ~ 
(sOnyata) is a fundamental characteristic of everything. ~ (sOnyata) is the key to 
understand IZB~i\1§ (catur-arya-satya; Four Noble Truth), .=:5*~P (tri-laksana; 
three marks of reality) and other concepts that defme Zen in particular and 
Buddhism in general. The aim of this thesis is to present Zen's metaphysics by 
describing what we assume to be true aspects constituents of the reality such as 
particular, universal, substance, space, time and causation to be ~ (sOnya). In 
order to do so, Part One explains and defends the concept of ~ (sOnyata) itself. 
The concept of ~ (sOnyata) is often studied within a narrow context of an 
Indian philosopher Nagrujuna1 (glt). In this thesis, however, I would define the 
term in a much wider sense. As Nakamura2 , Fujita3 , Kajiyama4 and others 
repeatedly demonstrated, there is evidence that the idea existed in texts that 
predated Nagfujuna. They argued that the idea had been gradually lost after 
Gautama Buddha's death till Nagrujuna brought it back as a core concept of 
Buddhism. Moreover, Zen's idea of ~ (slinyata) derived from not only 
Buddhism but also i!~ (Taoism), so that it is a mistake to define the term only 
according to Nagrujuna. These are why I would like to defme the concept in much 
wider contexts than the way Nagfujuna used. 
It is difficult to define the full meaning of ~ (sOnyata). There have been 
many failed attempts to capture its full meaning. The difficulties lay in the fact 
that ~ (sOnyata) seems to embrace diverse views that can be interpreted as 
1 Niigilrjuna ft$f(South India; the second century C.E.) Although little is known about his life, it 
is generally accepted that he was one of the founders of Mahayana school of Buddhism (:t:JJHk 
fJc). One of core literatures for Zen, Prajiiii-piiramitii Sutra (-ti~Hif~'l)ft) is said to be 
originated to him. 
2 Nakamura, Hajime.(l981), W~ (J:.) {kfJc.l.m 6~("Emptiness" Buddhist Philosophy Vo/.6), 
Part 2 "The historical origin". He discuss the concept ~ (emptiness) to be found in Suttanipiita 
verses 1065, Theragiithii verse395 and other texts predated Niigiirjuna. 
3 
·Fujita,, Koutasu. (1982), fm£~i4-1::1Jit.Q~J("Emptiness in original Buddhism") in W~fJc 
,mm 7 ~(Buddhist Philosophy Vol. 7), (Tokyo; Bukkyou-shisou-kenkyu-kai). 
4 Kajiyama Yuichi (1992), f~Ar'J~ (Introduction to Emptiness), (Tokyo; Shunnjusha), Ch-1. 
He quoted Suttanipiita verses 756-757 and Samyutta Nikiiya XXII, 95.15, to indicate that existence 
of the concept predating Niigilrjuna. 
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anti-realism, relativism, pragmatism and realism. How is it possible to combine 
these diverse views under a single concept? I believe that the answer lies in the 
role of ffi5 (bodhi; the enlightenment) which implies the double standard that 
exists in Zen. For someone who has not attained ffi (bodhi), ~ (sfulyata) is a 
negative and sceptic concept that our mundane knowledge (:tiil; maho) does not 
reflect the way the world really is, or our inability to comprehend things as they 
are. Whereas for those who have been enlightened, ~ ( sfulyata) is a positive and 
productive concept which support a possibility for humans to attain fi 1! 
(prajfia; the supreme knowledge). In my opinion, many attempts to defme ~ 
(siinyata) have faced difficulties because they failed to recognise this 
double-standard and try to explain ~ (siinyata) in a single all encompassed 
definition. Since Zen for the unenlightened and Zen for the enlightened are like 
two sides of the same coin, it is not possible to paint them with a single stroke. It 
requires two separate strokes to cover the coin. 
The first chapter explains and defends the negative sense of ~ (sfinyata). By 
carefully analysing why the unenlightened are not capable to comprehend the 
reality, it is possible to understand what m (bodhi) is and how the enlightened 
view the world. This is why I will use the first chapter to defend the negative 
sense of ~ (sfinyata; emptiness) before explaining the positive sense in the 
second chapter. 
5 I translate "bodhi" to Japanese as M (satori) rather than .§tf1 (kenshou). The latter has strong 
Buddhism connotation whereas the former has much wider use and applicable to Taoism, 
Shintoism and other nonreligious concept. Since Zen is not pure Buddhism and had strongly 
influenced by native religion and philosophy of Far East, I feel appropriate to use the former. 
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1 
Negative ~ (sunyata) 
For the unenlightened, the statement "everything is ~ (siinya; empty)" 
expresses epistemological scepticism that ~ jf (moha), knowledge of the 
unenlightened, does not correspond to way the reality is. This is because Zen 
recognises everything the unenlightened experience or comprehend to be KJ 
(maya; illusion). There are many other terms which express this scepticism which 
the negative ~ (siinyata) implies. To list a few; our apprehension of the world is 
described as DifiJ (viparyasa) which is literally translated as "a wrong way of 
looking at things" or "seeing the opposite of what it really is". As a result, 
everything we experience or understand is ~~~ (abhata; false idea) and any 
theory we hold is mliifB (prapafica; false theory). The problem of i1 (maya; 
illusion) is that not only do we not possess knowledge of reality as it anyway is, 
but we falsely believe our experience and knowledge to be genuine. For Zen, not 
understanding reality is not a serious problem. The serious problem is that we are 
not aware that we hold false ideas about reality. Zen thinks that this false belief in 
our ability to apprehend the reality is the cause of all i§ 1 (duhkha; suffering). 
Buddhism traditionally explains how i1 (maya; illusion) and false belief 
arises using i!~ (pratitya-samutpada; the Dependent Origination) and M ifl 
(anatman; Non-Self). Unfortunately, these traditional explanations are not 
approachable to western readers who have no knowledge of eastern philosophy. I 
1 IZ!U!i J.\ fi (shiku-hakku). Four, kinds and eight kinds of suffering; Four fundamental kinds are 
fi (dukha) of ~ (jiiti; to be born), ~ (jarii; aging), ~ (illness) and ~ (marana; death). In 
addition to the above four there are ?JHI~fi (to meet someone whom one hates), tf:j]IJ8fi 
(to parting from loved ones), *~~fi (to long for something one does not have) and li)l;lfifi 
(to have attachment to five aspects of mind). 
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will, therefore, defend the negative ~ ( siinyata) using two interwoven concepts 
that I found to be compatible with western philosophy; ~fii (samsara) and ~ ~ 
(nama-tiipa). An argument for the epistemological scepticism of the negative~ 
( siinyata) can be formulated as follows; 
1) Our experience and knowledge is limited to the realms of ~fii 
(samsara). 
2) mtfii (samsara) is composed of iJ (maya; illusion). 
Therefore 
3) All our experience and knowledge are iJ (maya; illusion). 
~ ~ (nama-tiipa) is a key concept which explains and proves the above two 
premises, thereby it is a key to the negative sense of ~ (siinyata). It proves mtfii 
(samsara) is everything we can comprehend, and it explains why we cannot 
apprehend things as they really are. Before analysing plausibility of each premise, 
let us clarify what mtfii (samsara) and ~ ~ (nama-tiipa) are. 
l.l.Definition of ilfi (samsira) and fi ~ (nama-rupa) 
1.1.1. mtti (samsara) and -~ (nirvana) 
To understand what ~ti (samsara) is, we have to look into its counterpart 
~~2 (nirvana) as well. It is very important here to narrow down definitions of 
~. (nirvana) and mt fii (samsara), because there are diverse and often 
conflicting interpretations for the two. 
As Tillich3 pointed out, the interpretations of the two concepts by the Popular 
Buddhist are similar to the Christian idea of heaven and earth. Samsara is 
regarded as earth where we, the unenlightened, live, whereas Nirvana is heaven 
2 In Japanese and Chinese, Nirvana can be translated either as ~- (Jp; jakumetu) or ~~ (Jp; 
nehan).-The 'difference between the two is that the former is semantical tiaSlation whereas' the latter 
is the phonetical one. For this reason, even though the latter is more commonly used, I employ the 
former in this thesis. 
3 Tillich, Paul, (1963), Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, (N.Y.; Columbia 
Univ. Press), 
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which is inhabited by the enlightened. One of the reasons to consider them to be 
heaven and earth derives from the Four Noble Truth (catur-arya-satya; llB~fim) 
and the Wheel of Life (bhava-cakra; fftli). The first noble truth defines samsara 
in terms of duhkha (=i!i; suffering); existing in samsara is duhkha (suffering) or 
samsara is the realm of duhkha. According to the Wheel of Life, an individual 
transmigrates from one being to the next in a continuous cycle of reincarnation 
according to karma(~) that is determined by moral conduct in the previous life4• 
This continuous reincarnation takes place in the realm of samsiira, so that we are 
stuck eternally in a continuous cycle of duhkha (suffering). The third and the 
fourth Noble Truth state that there is a way to escape from the continuous cycle of 
dukha (suffering). The only way to escape is the attainment of bodhi ('!'!; the 
enlightenment). Bodhi (bodhi; the enlightenment) liberates an individual from this 
world (samsiira) and transfers him to heaven (nirviina). 
Although this heaven-and-earth interpretation by the Popular Buddhism is 
widely accepted, it faces difficulty in explaining the life of Gautama Buddha. 
Gautama Buddha attained the enlightenment under the Bodhi tree at Bodh Gaya, 
yet rather than going immediately to heaven (nirvana) he remained in this world 
(samsara) to spread his teaching. In other words, he did not reach heaven (nirvana) 
even though he attained bodhi (the enlightenment). In order to explain this 
inconsistency, the Popular Buddhism recognises two kinds of nirvana; 
residual-nirvana (sopadisesa-nirvana; ~*~!I) and non-residual nirvana 
(anupadisesa-nirvana; M *~!I). The former arose when he attained the 
enlightenment for the first time beneath the Bodhi tree. The residual nirvana 
entitled him prajnii (till; the supreme knowledge) and guarantees him to go to 
the latter kind of nirvana when his existence in samsara was terminated. In other 
words, he did not reach the latter kinds of nirvana till death at Kusinara. Despite 
distinguishing two kinds of nirvana, the heaven-and-earth interpretation is widely 
denied, since there is much literal evidence to state otherwise. For example, in 
4 A morally wrong conduct in the previous life results in reincarnated into a life as a creature of 
lower caste which is accompanied by the greater suffering. 
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Madhyyamaka Karikii5 (if!IJUfi&Bb) 
Nothing of samsara is different from nirvana, nothing of nirvana is 
different from samsara. That which is the limit of nirvana is also the 
limit of samsara; there is not the slightest difference between the two. 6 
Also, Lankiivatara-sutra7 (~i1JDft) states that; 
Again, Mahamati, what is meant by non-duality? It means that light 
and shade, long and short, black and white are relative terms, 
Mahamiti, and not independent of each other; as Nirvana and Samsara 
are, all things are not-two. There is no Nirvana except where there is 
Samsara; there is no Samsara except where there is Nirvana; for the 
condition of existence is not of a mutually exclusive character. 
Therefore it is said that all things are non-dual as are Nirvana and 
Samsara.8 
These statements clearly reject the popular Buddhist interpretation which sees 
nirvana and samsara as two distinct domains of heaven and earth. It is, however, 
too short-sighted to conclude that there is no difference at all between nirvana and 
samsara. As Loy correctly identified; 
. . . there must be some difference between them, for otherwise no 
distinction would have been made and there would be no need for two 
words to describe the same state ... There is only one reality - this 
world, right here - but this world may be experienced in two different 
ways. Samsara is the "relative" world as usually experienced ... 
5 A text oflater Madhyarnaka school written by Siintaraksita (iiiilm; 725-784). 
6 MiidhyyamaluiKiirikii, XXV; '19~20. 
7 One of important sutras in Mahayana Buddhism. One of its teaching"-!¥!~~ (not a word 
was preached)" is believed to influenced Ch'an/Zen's idea that the ultimate truth cannot be put into 
a word. 
8 Lankavatara Sutra, ll,28 
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Nirvana is the world as it in itself ... 9 
mU~ (samsara) is "a relative reality" or "a human world10" which we experience 
as reality and it has to be distinguished from ~ ~ (nirvana), the 
mind-independent reality. It is relative because it is mind-dependent and 
mind-coordinated. What we experience as reality is relative to us because it is an 
image or a reflection of the mind-independent reality upon our minds, so that it 
cannot exist without anyone or anything perceiving or experiencing it. This is why 
mtti (samsara) is often described as ~ 1.\ (samskrta) "conditioned" or "created" 
by us the percipient. ~~ (nirvana) is, on the other hand, the mind-independent 
reality since it does not ontologically depend upon existence or operation of the 
mind (i.e. it exists regardless of whether or not there is anyone or anything 
observing or experiencing it). 
This interpretation of ~ ~ (nirvana) and i1.i ti (samsara) as the 
mind-independent reality and relative reality is compatible with both the textural 
rejections of the heaven-and-earth interpretation and the necessity to distinguish 
the two. ~~ (nirvana) is not the next world distinct from mtti (samsara). ~ 
~ (nirvana) and mtti (samsara) are both here and now. Yet it is practical to 
distinguish them since Zen thinks the way we experience the world is not 
necessary the way the mind-independent reality anyway is. For mtti (samsara) is 
not necessary an accurate representation of ~~ (nirvana), we must recognised 
them to be distinct. 
I admit that Zen's beliefs on the existence and the role of~~ (nirvana) are 
controversial. Firstly, there is no conclusive reason to reject solipsism, the idea 
that there is no mind-independent reality at all. In fact some Buddhists in early 
Yogacara School11 endorsed a solipsistic principle of "vijifianavada" (cognitive 
representation only), there is no mind-independent reality beyond or behind the 
9 Loy, David. {1983), "The difference between samsiira and nirvana," in Philosophy East and 
West, vol.33·; p~355. 
1
° Cooper, David (2002), The Measure of Things, (Oxford; Clarendon Press), p.l 
11 Yogiicara school is one of the oldest branch of Buddhism that emerged around the fourth 
century. Among many philosophers in the school the solipsistic idea can be found in Maitreyiiniitha, 
Asaftga in his early works and Vasubandhu. 
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world which we experience. Although it is traditional to interpret vijifianavada as 
a solipsistic concept, currently there are scholars12 who take Yogacara Buddhism 
to be epistemological idealism 13• At least this thesis is about Zen and not the 
Yogacara school, so that the discussion of whether the latter kind of Buddhism is 
solipsism or epistemological idealism is not important here. The fact that only 
Yogacara school is advertised to question the existence of the mind-independent 
reality, proves the point that other schools of Buddhism, including Zen, do not 
even question the existence of the mind-independent reality. 
Even if we assume the existence of the mind-independent reality (il«lt 
nirvana) beyond and behind the relative reality (mtti; samsara), there is a further 
problem. It is possible that the latter has nothing to do with the former. Such 
possibility is illustrated by technological advances in virtual reality or computer 
generated imaging. In virtual reality, what we experience as reality is totally 
fabricated, so that whatever we experience is not at all related to an actual 
surrounding. Again Zen does not expressively deny such possibility. Zen simply 
assumes the connection between ifii~ (nirvana; the mind-independent reality) 
and mtti (samsara; the reality as we comprehend). I will examine Zen's idea of 
how mtti (samsara) arises from il«~ (nirvana) in the next section. Regarding 
the existence of il«. (nirvana; the mind-independent reality) and its connection 
to mtti (samsara), I can only leave them as two unfounded yet necessary 
assumptions, because alternatives lead to a philosophical graveyard. If there is no 
mind-independent reality behind and beyond the reality as we comprehend or/and 
what we experience or comprehend has nothing to do with the mind-independent 
reality, then all philosophical and scientific enquiries aiming to understand the 
absolute truth are ultimately pointless. 
Once we establish mtti (samsara) as the relative reality and il«• (nirvana) 
12 King, Richard, (1994), "Early Yogacara and its relationship with the Madhyamaka school," in 
Philosophy East and West, Vol.44, p.659-683. Hirabayashi & Iida, Shotaro (1977), "Another look 
at the Madhyamika vs. Yagacara contraversy concerning existence and non-existence", in 
Lancaster, L. (ed.) (1977), Prajfliipiiramitii and Related Systems. (Berkley, U.S~A.; Uruv. of 
California Press), p.341-360. 
13 It gives no mention of whether there is or there is not the mind-independent reality beyond and 
behind what we perceived as reality. It is the idea that all we can experience and have knowledge 
of are relative reality, reality which is mind-dependent, mind-coordinated and mind-cooperated. 
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as the mind-independent reality, it is easy to draw parallel between the negative 
~ ( sfulyata) and western scepticism. Western scepticism is composed of two 
premises. The first is that we have no direct contact with the external world but 
only with mental image of the world. The second is the mental image does not 
necessarily reflect the mind-independent reality as it is. Because there is no 
adequate justification to believe that mental-representation actually corresponds to 
the mind-independent reality, we cannot make any claim to know the 
mind-independent reality. The same argument can be formulated using Zen's 
terminology as followed; 
1) Our experience and knowledge are limited to mtfi (samsara), 
and not ~- (nirvana). 
2) mtf.ii (samsara) does not necessary reflect the way the it«. 
(nirvana) actually is. 
Therefore 
3) We cannot claim to possess knowledge of the way it«• 
(nirvana) is. 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, Zen explains these claims using ~ ~ 
(nama-riipa). We have no access to ~~ (nirvana) because our experience and 
knowledge are limited to ~ ~ (nama-riipa). mt.f.i (samsara) does not accurately 
reflect ~~ (nirvana) because ofwhat I call "the tyranny of ~~ (nama-riipa)". 
So what is ~ ~ (nama-riipa) and how does it explain the above two premises? I 
will defme the term ~ ~ (nama-riipa) according to Zen psychology on the 
process of how experience and knowledge arise. 
1.1.2. ~~ (nama-riipa) 
According to Zen, all our experience and knowledge originate in ~fl (six 
indriyas). They are llifl, (cak~us-indriya; eyes), lft& (srotta-indriya; ears), a 
fJI (ghrana-indriya; nose), % fJI Gihva-indriya; tongue), jt fJI (kaya-indriya; 
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body) and B:ti (mana-indriya; mind). ti (indriya) is often translated to English 
as "sense organ", but since it includes B: (mana; mind), the term should be 
understood as "origin from which all our experience and knowledge arrive". The 
inclusion of B: (mana; mind) as one of the six origins can be easily understood 
by the fact that not all experience and knowledge derives from the five sense 
organs. For example, memory, emotion and imagination do not necessary require 
interaction between the five sense organs and the external world. From 7\tl 
(six-indriyas) arise six corresponding kinds of bare sensation called 7\ il 
(six-vijifianas); they are 61 il (cak~us-vijifiana; visual sensation), :Q: ;I 
(srotra-vijifiana; auditory sensation), •• (ghrana-vijifiana; olfactory sensation), 
~- (jihva-vijifiana; glossal or gastoric sensation), ~- (kaya-vijifiana; tactile 
or bodily sensation) and B:il (mana-vijifiana; inner sensation). These 1\il (six 
vijifianas) are distinguished not only by their sources but also by six different 
kinds of attributes they correspond, that are known as 1\:l;i (six vi~ayas). They 
are ~:l;i (riipa-vi~ayas; shape, form and texture14), §:l;i (sabda-vi~yas; sound), 
if:f;i (gadha-vi~ayas; smell), ~:l;i (rasa-vi~ayas; taste), M:ll (sparsa-vi~ayas; 
texture and shape) and j!:f;i ( dharma-vi~ayas; state of mind). According to Zen, 
what we directly be aware of are not these 1\il (six vijifianas) but something 
that are called liM (five skandha). a (skandha) is commonly translated as 
"aggregate" or "constituent" of an individual, and normally associated with the 
idea of R (self; atman). The close inspection, however, reveals that it is also 
what we are directly aware or conscious of. The first of the five is ~ ii 
(riipa-skandha) which is consciousness or awareness of the external world that 
arises mainly from interaction between the five sense organs and the external 
world. Other four ii (skandha), on the contrary, are directed toward inner state 
which mainly originate from the mind (fi':; mana). The latter four are ~-
14 The Chinese/Japa1,1ese character '@. (riipa) literally means "colour" but it is too. narrow for the 
its usage. If is--als~ 'oft~n tiansl~ied ~ "form", but this -tnlnslatimi applied more to '@.fi 
(rfipa-skandha) which will be discussed shortly. As one of :lj (visaya) it referred to simple visual 
attributes such as "colour" and "shape". This point is emphasised by Vasubandhu (1981), 
Abhidarmakosa and Bhazya,(Varanasi; Bauddha Bharati Publication), I, I 0 a. 
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(vedafia-skandha; emotion), ~ II (samjfUi-skandha; imagination), ft a 
(samskara-skandha; motivation) and il a 15 (vijftana-skandha; analytical 
thinking or apprehension). I have to emphasise the word "mainly" here because 
five sense organs can give rise to not only ~a (riipa-skandha) but also the latter 
four kinds of a (skandha). For example, the smell of certain perfume can trigger 
emotion and the memory of a person. In the same way our state of mind 
influences how we perceive external world. We do not just see colour, but we also 
experience some emotion or idea with visual experience. It is easy to understand 
that colours often have some emotional attachment. For example, we perceive 
pink to be a girly colour, bright pastel colours are cheerful while dark blue is a 
calm colour. 
~ ~ (nama-riipa) is the object or content of these .n.a (five skandhas). In 
other words, .n.a (five skandhas) are experience of ~ ~ (nama-riipa). The 
relation between the two is similar to that of ~- (six vijiftana) and ~il (six 
vi~aya). As we have seen earlier, the former is the perception of the latter. For 
example, ]J: il (srotra-vijiftana; auditory experience) is experience of §:Jl 
(sabda-vi~aya; sound). In the similar way, li.B (five skandha) are experience of 
!6 ~ (nama-riipa). a (skandha) refers experience itself whereas !6 ~ 
(nama-riipa) is object or content of such experience. 
The difference between !6 ~ (nama-riipa) and ~:Jl (six vi~ayas) is subtle 
yet very important for understanding Zen psychology. The fundamental difference 
is that what we directly experience and have knowledge of is !6 ~ (nama-riipa) 
and not ~il (six vi~ayas), or we can only comprehend ~:l:.ft (six vi~ayas) as or 
through 16~ (nama-riipa). For example understanding the spherical shape of an 
object can derive from two different kinds of sensory experience. I can attain the 
visual attribute (~:Jl; riipa-vi~ayas) of the object by looking at it, or attain the 
15 As some readers may noticed that ~ (vijifiana) appears again as one of five fl (skandha). 
M.~anings o.f the term h~ve Jo be. gis~inguished according to in which context the word ~ 
(Vijff'lfu,aj is u~ed. The common definition of the term is in the context of f1 (skandha) is as 
discriminative from of knowledge or knowledge that derives as result of discriminative analysis. 
Whereas in the context of ~- (six-vijifianas), it means bare sensation or state of mind which we 
cannot directly be conscious of. 
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tactile attribute (I! it ;sparsa-vi~ayas) of the object by touching it. Despite 
differences in sensory attributes, resulting ~ 'fS (nama-Iiipa) are one and the 
same, namely that the idea "the shape of object is spherical". This difference 
indicates that what we directly experience or comprehend is not even a sensory 
attribute (it; vi~aya), but a concept (~'fS; nama-Iiipa) that is an effect of:t.i 
(vi~aya). This indicate that all our experience and knowledge is limited not only to 
aspects of mind but specifically ~ 'fS (nama-Iiipa). 
"Nama-Iiipa" is often translated as "mind and body", and such translation is 
persistent. Classic commentaries such as Dfgha Nikiiya16, Anguttara Nikiiya17 and 
Sutta Nipiita18 seem to use the term to mean "mind and body". Similarly, the 
latest translation19 of IEJ~IIIM (Shobogenzo) use "matter" to mean "Iiipa". 
This idea is strongly related to interpreting five skandas as constituents of a 
human individual rather than something we directly experience or have 
knowledge of. Like Cartesian dualism, some Buddhist thought individual to be 
composed of mind and body. So that Iiipa-skandha belongs to body whereas other 
four skandhas are attributed to the mind. Correspondingly, rilpa is related to the 
body since it derives from the five sense organs, whereas niipa derives from mind. 
But as Rear0 suggests, this "mind-body" interpretation is based on the narrow 
and oversimplified idea of relating Iiipa-skandha to body and other four skandha 
(often categorised together as aiiipa-skandha) to mind. In other words, Iiipa refers 
to things we experience through the five sensory organs, whereas nama 1s 
something that originates in the mind and not the five sensory organs. 
16 Digha Nikiiya Wfliii~fttflSU, I, 223, and II, 212 
17 Anguttara Nikiiya Wfliii~ftifl:i:tfflt I, 83 
18 S'i_tt_a)'{ipiita,l, 13 & 35 
19 Nishijima, Gudo & Cross Chodo (tras.) (1994), Master Dogen s Shobogennzo, (Surrey; 
Windbell), p.25-3l. 
20 Reat, N Ross, ( 1987), "Some fundamental concepts of Buddhism psychology" in Religion, 
Vol.l7, p.l7. 
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[Table 1.1.] 
caksus (visual experience) 
srotra (auditory experience) 
ghriina (olfactry experience) 
jihvii (gustatory experience) 
kiiya (tactile or bodily experience) 
mana (mental or inner) ------- nama (mind) 
But as we saw earlier in examples of emotion and colour, and scent and memory, 
there is no such definite distinction between mental and physical experience. Both 
nama and rfipa can originate from any or mixture of six kinds of bare experience. 
The table above should be therefore revised as followed; 
[Table 1.2.] 
caksus (visual experience) 
srotra (auditory experience) 
ghriina (olfactry experience) "'S::::~~==~~~ riipa (body) 
jihvii (gustatory experience) 
kiiya (tactile or bodily experience) 
mana (mental or inner) nama (mind) 
Instead of translating it as "mind and body", Zen understands it to be "word and 
concept". Chinese/Japanese translation of nama-rfipa illustrates this point. Nama 
is translated as ~ which means "name", rupa is translated as 1S which is 
understood as "form21 ". Relating to the translation of nama-rtipa as word and 
concept, Buddhism, Taoism, and their subsequent Zen see a close connection 
between language and thought, or between verbalisation and conceptualisation. 
Concept defmes word so that there is no word which has no concept associated to, 
as well as things we can conceptualise are normally given names. Moreover, their 
similarity is explained by the fact they are both products of one and the same 
process of 7.}-,grj (vikalpa), distinguishing or differentiating into two opposing 
categories of A or not-A. 
21 Although ~--· (riipa) is commonly translated~ "form", I preter J1()Uo lllle_the,tenn since it can 
be corifused with iliat ~{Platonic sense. Folm l.n Piatonic sense is Universai -te~plate ~hlch 
particulars exemplify or materialise in various degrees, and importantly it exits independent of 
existence and operation of mind. ~ (riipa), on the other hand, is aspect of mind, thereby 
mind-dependent. 
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For Zen, ~ '@. (nama-tiipa) plays two important roles regarding what we 
experience and comprehend 
1) ~ '@. (nama-tiipa) as a content and constituent of experience and 
knowledge. 
2) ~ '@. (nama-tiipa) as a tool according to which experience and 
knowledge are formed. 
As we have seen above, ~ '@. (nama-tiipa) denotes what we can directly 
experience or comprehend. I will explore this sense of ~ '@. (nama-rtipa) in 
section 1.2.1. The second role of ~ '@. (nama-rtipa) is that it works as a template 
or a framework according to which we can simplify and sorting out what we 
experience and comprehend. Since we humans are capable of learning, what we 
have experienced and comprehend influence what we subsequently experience 
and comprehend. For example, by learning music theory it become easier to read 
scores and play instrument. Section 1.2.2 explores how ~ '@. (nama-tiipa) 
influences our perception and knowledge and sometimes prevent us from 
comprehending the world as it actually is. 
I am aware that my interpretation of Buddhist psychology regarding vijniina, 
vi~aya, skandha and niima-rupa is not necessarily compatible with the 
conventional understanding of these terms. There are diverse positions concerning 
what they are and their relation to each other. To give some examples, Mahayana 
school traditionally recognises eight vijiiiinas rather than six, and some schools of 
Buddhism include an extra sixteen elements to six indriyas. My understanding of 
indriyas, vijniinas, vi~ayas, skandhas and niima-rupa is based on l!~ (Dogen's) 
interpretation of M :ef 'L' *I (Prajfia-paramitii-sutra) in his j£ ;!; Ill ill 
(Shobogenzo) 22 which discusses the emptiness of these elements. My 
interpretation is also compatible with the psychology of Buddhism described by 
Conze23 (and later Loi4) but more importantly it is compatible with modem 
psychology regarding the process of perception. 
22 D6gen's ShOlirigenzo, 11,71-73 . 
23 Conze Edward. (1962), Buddhist Thought in India, (London; Gerge Allen & Unwin). 
24 Loy, David, (1983), "The difference between samsara and nirvana," in Philosophy East and 
West, vol.33, p.356. 
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1.2. Zen scepticism 
1.2.1. No direct access to iiM (nirvana) 
The first premise for the negative~ (sfulyata) is the claim that we have 
direct access only to mtti (samsara) and not iiM (nirvana). In other words, 
what we experience or (believe to) know as reality is in fact an image or reflection 
of reality upon our minds and not reality as it anyway is. This claim is based on 
the fact that our experience and knowledge are ultimately composed of ~ ~ 
(nama-tiipa). The previous section explained Zen's belief that all we can directly 
be aware or conscious of are limited to liii (five skandha) and their contents 
~ ~ (nama-tiipa). This section aims to prove ~ ~ (nama-tiipa) belongs to the 
relative reality (mtti; samsara) and not the mind-independent reality (iiM; 
nirvana), by demonstrating the relativity or mind-dependency of ~ ~ 
(nama-tiipa). The relativity and mind-dependence of ~ ~ (nama-tiipa) can be 
illustrated by the relativity of :1\:~ (six vijifianas) and :1\:il (six vi~ayas). It is 
easy to understand that $. il (dharma vi~aya) belongs to mind and not 
mind-independent reality. We, however, often falsely assume the other five il 
(vi~aya) to belong to the mind-independent reality. This idea that we falsely 
believe that physical attributes are innate to objects themselves is not alien to 
western philosophy. Russell beautifully illustrated this point in the following 
remark; 
We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is 
cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the 
hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not greenness, 
hardness, and coldness that we know in our own experience, but 
something very different. The observer, when he seems to himself 
to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, 
observing the effect of the stone upon himself. 25 
What we experience, such as greenness, hardness and coldness are not necessarily 
25 Russell, Bertrand (1940), An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, (London; Allen & Unwin), p.5. 
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true attributes or properties that belong to the object or to the mind-independent 
reality. Instead, they are subjective effects of reality upon our minds. This means 
that sensory experience is not an experience of reality but experience of the 
subjective effect of reality. 
[Table 1.3.] Attributes and their effects 
'@; ( riipa-vi~aya); red colour of an object 
Ml (spacla- vi~aya) pain 
it (Silbda- vi~aya) sound of a falling timber 
'* (rasa- vi~aya); taste of salt 
if (gadha- vi~ya) smell of vanilla 
light reflected off the object 
stimuli to nerve of insufficient 
circulation of blood 
compression of air and other medium 
biochemical reaction to sodium 
chloride 
existence of airborne vanilla particle 
We often mistake these qualities on the left hand side to belong to objects 
themselves. But if we think carefully, we understand that they are not innate 
properties of an object or of the world as it really is. The object is not red when it 
is placed in darkness or under coloured light. Pain does not exist in a wound, but 
in our head, this is clear from the fact that a brain-dead patient does not feel pain, 
even though the nerve is sending pain signal from the wound. From these 
examples, it is obvious that Ail (six vi~ayas) are not properties and attributes 
that belong to the mind-independent reality (ill.; nirvana), but its effects upon 
our mind. In other words, Ail (six vi~ayas) belong to relative reality in our 
mind (mt~; samsara) and not the mind-independent reality. Because !61S 
(nama-riipa) derives from Ail (six vi~ayas), and the latter is already 
mind-dependent or relative, then it is obvious that !61S (nama-riipa) is also 
mind-dependent and relative. 
Because what we can experience or have knowledge of are composed· of !6 
1S (nama-riipa) and they belong to mt~ (samsara) and not ~- (nirvana), we 
must conclude that our experience and knowledge are limited to mt~ (samsara). 
1.2.2. Discrepancies between mtl5 (samsara) and ~- (nirvana) 
We understood so far what we have direct access to is limited to mtl5 
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(samsara; the relative reality) and not ~:J;l (nirvana; the mind-independent 
reality). But this does not immediately lead to epistemological scepticism. Even if 
we cannot have direct access to ~- (nirvana), as long as miti (samsara) 
accurately reflects the way ~~ (nirvana) is, then having knowledge of the 
former is the same as having knowledge of the latter. However, Zen thinks that is 
not the case. This section examine why discrepancies exist between the two. 
According to Zen, the source of the discrepancies between miti (samsara) 
and ~- (nirvana) is functions of ~~ (nama-riipa; concept). Not only do we 
falsely believe what ~ ~ (nama-riipa) refers to existence in the 
mind-independent reality, but also ~ ~ (nama-riipa) distorts our experience and 
comprehension. D.T. Suzuki compares this process with what he called ''tyranny 
oftools"26• We invent or construct many ideas, concepts and names that are useful 
for us to deal with complex affairs of reality. But, they often turn tyrannical and 
start controlling the way we think or behave. Suzuki gives the example of modem 
machinery. 
this strange process is especially noticeable in modem life. We 
invent many machines, which in turn control human affairs, our 
human life. Machines, especially in recent years, have inextricably 
entered our life. We try to adjust ourselves to the machine, because 
the machine refuses to obey our will once it's out of our hands.27 
Zen thinks that concepts, words and ideas are like these tools, they enable us to 
simplify the complex affair of reality, but they often turn tyrannical. To describe 
this process I use a phrase "the tyranny of ~~ (nama-riipa)". 
In order to understand how ~ ~ (nama-riipa; concept) influence and create 
discrepancy between }!.f'i.i (samsara) and ~~ (nirvana), I distinguish two 
interwoven yet distinct faculties of mind. One is the faculty of experience, and the 
other is the faculty of reason. I recognise these two facul!ies to be distinct because 
26 Suzuki, D.T. (1998), Buddha of Infinite Light, (Boston, U.S.A; Shambhala Publications Inc.) 
f?43. ~is is revised ve:s~on of talk he gave to American Buddhist Academy in 1958. 
Suzukt, D.T; (1998), tbtd, p.45. 
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we do not necessary believe what we perceptually experience to be the way the 
world is. For example, even if I had visual experience of seeing an elephant 
wearing a tutu in my living room, unless there is strong evidence to support my 
visual experience of the elephant, I would not claim to know that such an elephant 
exists in my living room. In such process, the faculty of reason informs me that 
seeing the elephant is an illusion or hallucination. Moreover, there are several 
kinds of knowledge, such as mathematical and logical knowledge, which does not 
directly involve the faculty of experience. In order to accommodate such cases, I 
artificially distinguish two faculties by defining experience to be an inadvertent 
process whereas reasoning is a conscious or intentional process. Psychologists28 
would disagree on such a clear distinction I have drawn between the faculty of 
experiencing and the faculty of reasoning. Psychological studies show that it is 
impossible to separate the faculty of experience and the faculty of reason. The 
reason I distinguish these two faculties is not a psychological one, but a 
philosophical one, as well as simply a matter of convenience. Such division is 
common practice in epistemology. This can be understood from the title of a 
famous paper by Gettier "Is justified true belief knowledge?"29• In epistemology, 
experience is understood to be the process of forming belief, whereas reasoning is 
a process of upgrading belief into knowledge. The frrst part of this section (section 
1.2.2.1) deals with how ~ 1! (nama-riipa) influences and distorts subconscious 
or the involuntary process in the faculty of experience. Then the second part 
(section 1.2.2.2) looks into the ability of the faculty of reason; whether it is 
possible for us to correctly distinguish true perception from false one or ~ 1! 
(nama-riipa) mar this ability. 
1.2.2.1. The faculty of experience 
We use our sensory organs to comprehend our physical external world. My 
eyes inform me whether grass in my garden is green or brown, a pain in my 
stomach tells me that I ate something rotten, scents that my nose picks up alerts 
28 To give some examples: Neisser, U. (1976), Cognition and Reality (San Francisco; 
W.H.Freeman), Eysenck, M.W. & Keane, M.J. (1990), Cognitive Psychology, (Hove, Sussex: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Association). 
29 Gettier Edmund L. (1963) "Is justified true belief knowledge?" in Analysis Vol.23, p121-123. 
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me that toast is burning in the kitchen, my tonw 
instead of sugar in my coffee, and from the loss · 
·· _..., realise that I put salt 
•• !...,. 
a cold night. The question is how reliable are t11 ... ~ _ _ 
revealing the way the external world is. I will examine three argumenl.;) ~ 
idea that perceptual experience reveals the true nature of the external world as it 
really is. Arguments I present are: 
a) The limitation of our senses. 
b) Overpowering subconscious cognitive process that distorts content of our 
experience; and 
c) The possibility of pseudo-sensory experience. 
1.2.2.1 a. The limitations of our senses 
Our sensory organs are, unfortunately, limited in their abilities. In terms of 
vision, human eyes can only perceive within the narrow portion (390nm-700nm) 
of the electromagnetic radiation spectrum. Moreover, we cannot see an object at a 
great distance or an object which is too small for our naked eye. Other sense 
organs are also limited in their capacities. Our auditory sense is more limited than 
our vision. We can only hear sound between 20 - 20,000Hz, and we cannot 
discern different noise. For example we cannot hear the TV when there are people 
talking in the same room. Our skin cannot tell temperature change within 1 or 2°c, 
and we do not register slight damage to our body unless nerve impulses caused by 
the damage exceed our neurotransmitter threshold. Our nose and tongue cannot 
identify small amounts of chemicals that exist in the air or in food we consume. 
It is true that, using external instruments, we are able to go beyond the 
limitation of our own senses. An infrared camera enables us to go beyond the 
highest human limit of visible rays and also makes it possible for us to see in the 
dark. Using Hubble telescope, we can see a greater distance than we could 
imagine 40 years ago. A microphone can pick up minute sounds or sounds above 
or below the frequency human ears can detect. Although these instruments expand 
the limits of our perception, there are and always will be further limits. 
Improvement of telescopes enables us to see further distance in the universe, but 
we can never see the entire universe. There always will be sound that occurs too 
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far away, which a microphone cannot pick up. 
Moreover, although an instrument can expands the domain in which we can 
experience, it does not solve the true limitation of our perception. The true 
limitation of our perception is that our sense organs can pick up only limited 
aspects of reality. We experience the world in terms of five aspects; vision, sound, 
smell, taste and touch. This has serious implication for our ability to understand 
the way the world really is. "The Flantlander" argument illustrates this point. 
Suppose there are people who live in a two dimensional world which exists within 
the three dimensional space. When a conic object moves through three 
dimensional space, penetrating the two dimensional world, Flatlanders (two 
dimensional people) perceive it only as growing ellipse which disappears when it 
reached a certain point. 
[Fig.l.l.] Flatlanders 
0 0 
3-D world 
Flatlander 's 
perception 
Because Flatlanders have only two-dimensional perspective, they would not 
understand how this grow-and-disappear-ellipse phenomenon occurs. If this 
happens time and time again, Flatlanders may come up with false theory of the 
grow-and-disappear ellipse rather than a theory of how three-dimensional oQjects 
penetrate two-dimensional space. We may be in the same position as these 
Flatlanders regarding our sensory perception. We can only experience limited 
aspects of the world which our sense or scientific instruments can reveal. And 
there may be many other aspects beyond the five we can perceive which we are 
not aware of. This idea appeals to many modem scientists who try to explain 
counter-intuitive quantum phenomena. They argue that the reason we cannot 
explain quantum phenomena is because there are unknown dimensions or forces 
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that operate in quantum level which cannot be comprehended as the extension of 
the five human senses. 
The danger of the limitation is not only about our inability to experience the 
mind-independent reality as it anyway is, but it creates rooms for the tyranny of 
16 fS (nama-Iiipa) to operate to create discrepancies between the reality as it 
anyway is. If there is no limitation of the sense, we are able to experience things 
as they are. But unfortunately this is not the case. Like the flatlanders, we have to 
guess or assume what may be going on at the level which we cannot experience, 
and that creates the possibility for us to make a wrong guess. In the next section, 
we will look at how such mistakes are made at the subconscious level. 
1.2.2.l.b. Overpowering subconscious cognitive process 
Cognition is often described as top-down mental process of ideas and 
concepts influencing our experience. This process has to be distinguished from the 
bottom-up process of perception. According to Gibson30, perception is a process 
of 'picking-up information' without referring to other inner processes. Cognition 
is, on the other hand, a process of sorting the information (sense data) by referring 
to other faculties of the mind. Marr31 defined cognition as a computational 
process, and perception as activity of collecting 'raw sensory form' which the 
computational process of cognition works on. Cognition is not merely sorting out 
raw sensory data, but in Ayer's words, it is a process of 'going beyond immediate 
sensible perception'32, because through the process of cognition, we experience 
properties which are not present in bare perceptual experience. For example, if I 
look at a painting by Monet, what my perception reveals is colour patches in a two 
dimensional canvas. But what I experience is not only colour patches, but a 
three-dimensional image of a bridge, trees and water lilies. This illustrates that the 
process of cognition is related to ideas and concepts we possess added to raw 
sense data derived from perception. 
Cognition is a useful and necessary process for our understanding of the 
30 Gibson,J.J.(1966), The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, (Boston, U.S.A; Houghton 
Miffiln> 
31 Marr, David (1982), Vision, (San Francisco, U.S.A; W.H.Freeman), p.29ff 
32 Ayer, A.J. (1973), The Central Questions of Philosophy, (London; Weidenfeld & Nnicolson), 
chapter.4 & 5, p.68-lll. 
46 
Negative ~ (sfulyata) 
world. In fact without it, it is almost impossible to carry on our normal life. For 
example, raw visual sense data that derives from the retina is two dimensional. 
Only through the process of cognition we can create a three-dimensional image of 
our external world. Without spatial awareness of our environment, we cannot walk 
anywhere because we would be walking into various objects. Studies on depth 
perception revealed how concepts(~ 'fS; nama-Iiipa) influence cognitive process. 
To understand the relation between concepts (~'{!; nama-Iiipa) and its role in 
cognition many studies are carried out on infants. Studies on infants are important 
because babies have not yet acquired many concepts or ideas that would influence 
their sensory experience. What studies on infants show is that, although infants 
have spatial awareness based on binocular vision33 , when a two-dimensional 
image, such as a photograph or a painting of a group of objects is presented, the 
infant cannot understand spatial relationships between objects. Looking at the 
following picture, we understand that the antelope is the one the hunter is trying to 
spear and not the elephant. But without possessing concepts concerning the sizes 
of humans, elephants and antelopes, it is possible to assume it is a small elephant 
the hunter is trying to spear. 
[Fig.1.2] Hudson's antelope and elephane4 
I 
I I 
r~ ... -_ __,I! 
-----~---' 
This proves two important points. The first is ~ 'fS (nama-Iiipa; concept) is 
something we form or acquire through learning. The second is how different ~ '{! 
(nama-Iiipa; concept) lead to different sensory experience. This means an identical 
sensory input can lead to different kinds of experience depending on different ~ 
1! (nama-Iiipa; concepts) percipient possesses. 
33 Infants can understand the spatial relation-between different objects based on slight differences 
between image from left eye and image from right eye. 
34 Extracted from Hudson, W. (1960), "Pictorial depth perception in sub-cultural groups in Africa" 
in Journal ofSocial Psychology, vo.52, p.l83-208 
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Although the process of cognition is normally useful to us, it can sometimes 
backfire and over-interpret raw sense data and cause incorrect impressions of our 
external world. Looking at the following two sets of drawing, we understand how 
overpowering cognition works. 
[Fig. 1.3 .a.] 
~<------>~ Linex 
)>---------<< Liney 
[Fig.l.3.b] 
In the figure 1.3 .a, even though line x and y are the same length, we experience 
otherwise. In the figure 1.3.b, although there is no triangle in the middle, we still 
see a white triangle. These visual illusions are created by the process of cognition. 
We subconsciously recognise visual clues and add incorrect information to our 
visual experience. Cognition is useful and necessary process in experiencing 
things, and !61S (nama-riipa) has important role in the process. But in the 
process of cognition, !61S (nama-riipa) can turn tyrannical and prevent us from 
experiencing the world as it really is. This is the first problem of cognition; the 
process of cognition can distort raw sense data, so that our sensory experience of 
the world does not accurately reflect the way the world really is. 
The second problem of cognition is that because it is a subconscious process, 
our conscious volition have no control over the process. This point can be 
illustrated by ambiguous figures, such as duck/rabbit drawing and a picture of 
Leeper's ambiguous lady. 
48 
Negative~ (sOnyata) 
[Fig.1.4.] Duck/rabbit and Leeper 's ambiguous lady35 
Can you see duck and rabbit? Can you see an old witch and a young lady? 
Although we rationally understand that each figures contains two different images 
(duck and rabbit, and young woman facing away and old witch with a crooked 
nose), we cannot see both images simultaneously. This is because our 
subconscious chooses which figure to see and our conscious mind cannot 
overpower the choice the subconscious makes. This proves that the subconscious 
process of cognition is an overpowering conscious process, so that we cannot 
consciously turn off cognition even if it distorts experience. 
There are two arguments that object this claim. The first is an argument that it 
is possible for us to turn off the influence of cognition at will. If I ask someone to 
describe his visual experience of a painting "Clair de Lune" by Chagall, he can 
describe it as ' a picture of a couple under the night sky with a clear moon' . But he 
can also describe it as a mere collection of colours (e.g. 'upper visual field is blue 
with a spot of yellow, lower part is mainly red except the left hand side which is 
blue, and the middle area is a mixture of different colours'). The second statement 
is certainly cognition-free, in the sense it is a description of his bare sensation. 
Strawson, however, dismisses the possibility of genuine cognition-free sensory 
experience. Strawson argues that the person is not having cognition- free 
experience, although what he claims to experience seems to be cognition-free. 
An Observer, gazing through his window, may perhaps, by an effort 
of will, bring himself to see, or even willessly fmd himself seeing, 
35 Copied from Gross, Richard D. (1992), Psychology - The Science of Mind and Behaviour-, 
(London; Hodder & Stoughton), p.242. 
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what he knows to be the branches of the trees no longer as branches 
at all, but as an intricate pattern of dark lines of complex directions 
and shapes and various size against a background of varying shades 
ofgrey.36 
What Strawson is saymg here is that even though the observer's sensory 
experience is not cognition free, he can consciously analyse his sensory 
experience using his mental faculty of reason and estimate what his sensory 
experience would be like if there is no cognition involved. This can be easily 
proven by the following experiment. Suppose there is a philosopher who claims 
that cognition-free sensory experience is possible. We ask him to tum off the 
process of cognition and to describe his visual experience. When he starts 
describing his sensory experience, throw a cricket ball as hard as possible towards 
his head. Because visual spatial understanding is the result of cognition37, if he is 
truly having cognition-free sensory experience, he would not react to avoid the 
ball. I can safely assume that the experiment would proves he is not having 
cognition-free experience since he will avoid the ball. This illustrates that what 
seems to be cognition-free sensory experience is not genuinely cognition-free. 
The second argument which supports cognition-free experience is related to 
the sensations of pain, itchiness, hunger, cold and warmth. It argues that having a 
concept or experience of these sensations does not influence the intensity of 
sensory experience. Suppose that three days ago I burnt my fmger for the first 
time in my life, so that I acquired a concept of pain. If I bum my finger today, 
whether I have experienced burning pain before or not does not change the 
intensity of the pain I feel. Moreover, a new born baby and an adult feel similar 
acuteness and intensity of colour and light. Studies carried out by Bornstein38 and 
36 Strawson, P.F. (1988), "Perception and its objects" in Dancy J (1988), Perceptual Knowledge, 
(Oxford; Oxford Univ. Press), p.98. 
37 J:lare s,~nsqry per~t;P!iqn Qf.such experience is a .patch of red area in visual field mpidly 
increasing in diameter. Depth recognition derives from identifying depth cues. 
38 Bomstein, M.H. (1988), "Perceptual development across the life cycle", in Bornstein, M.H.& 
Lamb, M.E. (eds.), Perceptual, Cognition and Linguistic Development, (Hove; Lawrence Erlbaum 
Ltd;), Ch19, p.401-19 
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by Packer et al39 show that a baby can distinguish colours and intensities of light 
as accurately as a normal adult. This contradicts the claim I made above that ~ 'fS 
(nama-riipa) we acquire influence cognition therefore an adult how obtained ~ 'fS 
(nama-riipa) experience the world differently from an infant. It is, however, a 
shortcoming to make a claim that these sensory experiences are cognition-free. 
There are mental factors such as attention and expectation which can alter the 
intensity or degree of sensory experience. One can learn to influence the intensity 
of sensory experience. We can cope with certain pain when we know what sort of 
pain and when the pain is coming. Or when one's attention is spent elsewhere, one 
can seem to forget about toothache or headache, even though the pain is still there 
regardless of whether the attention is spent elsewhere or not. These illustrate that 
even though pain as bare sense data is cognition-free, sensation of pain one feels 
would be influenced by cognition. This can be explained easily according to Zen 
psychology. As I mentioned earlier, what we directly experience are not 1\Bl 
(six-vijiiianas) but 1iii (five skandha). Even if ~BI (kaya-vijiiiana; bodily 
sensation) are identical, a resulting fg a (riipa-skandha) can be different 
according to ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) the percipient possess. 
[Eq.l.l] 
vijinana + nama-rupa A = rupa skandha A 
VIJmana + nama-rupa B rupa skandha B 
I agree that not every sensory expenence is altered by the process of 
cognition, and there are some exceptions. I believe experiences of colour and 
intensity of light are two of these exceptions. This, however, does not harm my 
argument about the tyranny of ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) upon the faculty of experience, 
because of the third problem. 
The third and final problem of cognition is that because cognition is a 
subconscious process, the faculty of experience alone cannot distinguish which 
sensory experience is distorted by the process of cognition and which is not. 
Going back to the parallel lines and the invisible triangle, we understand them to 
39 Packer, 0., Hartmann, E.E. & Teller, D.Y., (1985), "Infant colour vision; the effect of test field 
size on Rayleigh discriminations", in Vision Research, vol.24, p.l247-60. 
51 
Negative ~ (siinyata) 
be visual tricks because the faculty of reason opposes the faculty of experience. I 
will discuss the ability of the faculty of reason to distinguish cognition-distorted 
experience and genuine experience. Before that, let us consider the problem of 
pseudo-sensory experience which is a direct consequence of the inability of the 
faculty of experience to distinguish genuine and cognition-distorted experience. 
1.2.2.l.c. Pseudo-sensory experience 
The problem mentioned above was the problem of cognition-distorted 
experience. What I mean by pseudo-sensory experience is the experience that 
does not actually derive from sensory organs, but falsely appears otherwise. A 
difference between cognition-distorted experience and pseudo-sensory experience 
coincides with the difference between illusion and hallucination. Illusion is 
misapprehension of sensory input that derives from our sensory organs, whereas 
hallucination does not require these sense organs. The latter is apparent or alleged 
perception of an object not actually present, in other words a fabrication of the 
mind. Descartes argued that sensory experience is not reliable because we cannot 
deny the possibility that what we experience is either a dream or an hallucination 
created by a powerful demon. 
How often, asleep as night, am I convinced of just such familiar 
events - that I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire -
when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! ... As I think about this 
more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by 
means of which being awake can be distinguished from being 
asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling 
only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.40 
There is a similar case of false perception known as "a brain in a vat',..1• Several 
neurological experiments show that a direct electric stimulus to the brain triggers 
sensory experience. Although neurophysiologists have not yet composed a 
40 Descarte, R. Meditations of First Philosophy, 1.19. I use the translation by Cottingham, John 
(1986), Meditation of First Philosophy, (Cambridge; Cambridge Univ. Press) 
41 Nozick Robert. (1980), Philosophical Explanation, (Oxford; Oxford Univ. Press). 
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convincing sensory experience, it is theoretically possible in the future to create 
virtual reality by direct electric stimuli to the brain. Since a brain itself cannot 
distinguish between electric pulses derived from sensory organs and ones derived 
from electrodes, it is not possible for the percipient to tell the difference between 
genume sensory experience and pseudo-sensory experience derived from 
electrodes. 
Even though the cases of the evil demon and the brain in a vat may be too 
far-fetched, there still exists a problem that can be exhibited by a simple everyday 
experience. We all have experienced one time or another that we thought we heard 
someone call our name, although no one actually did. We cannot distinguish 
pseudo-sensory perception and genuine one, since as far as sensory experience is 
concerned, there is no difference between genuine sensory experience and 
pseudo-sensory experience. 
1.2.2.2. The faculty of reason 
Arguments in the previous section concluded that the faculty of experience 
cannot be a reliable source of our knowledge, because what experience reveals is 
fmite aspects of reality which is possibly distorted by ~ ~ (nama-rfipa) in the 
process of cognition, or in the worst case, pseudo-sensory experience. This 
unreliability of the faculty of experience, however, does not directly lead to 
epistemological scepticism. If the faculty of reason grants us an ability to deduce 
truth from the distorted sensory experience or an ability to distinguish genuine 
sensory experiences from false ones, it is theoretically possible for us to obtain 
knowledge of the mind-independent reality. This section looks into a possibility 
for the faculty of reason to provide us with such abilities, and aims to conclude 
that the tyranny of~~ (nama-rfipa) prevents such a possibility. 
In order to examine how the tyranny of ~ ~ (nama-rfipa) prevents the 
faculty of reason to provide such abilities, this section look into arguments against 
scientific realism. Scientific realism is an idea that scientific method bestows upon 
us an ability to deduce truth from empirical evidence and an ability to recognise 
true theory as true and false theory as false. I will explore the reliability of 
scientific method, because it is commonly believed that scientific method is the 
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most reliable or at least a more reliable method than the way we normally apply 
the faculty of reason. If I can come to a conclusion that even scientific method 
does not provide us with the ability to distinguish genuine experience from pseudo 
experience and to deduce the way the world really is from sensory experience, 
then our mundane knowledge cannot be knowledge of the world as it really is. 
Arguments for and against scientific realism focus on two separate yet interwoven 
issues. One is the forming of the scientific theory, and the other is the verification 
of the scientific theory. I concentrate on the latter issue which concerns the 
reliability of scientific method to distinguish true theory and false theory. I do so, 
because even if we possess the ability to form true belief, unless we have some 
independent method to confirm truth value of the theory, we cannot claim to 
possess knowledge. I will divide the arguments for and against into two categories, 
analytical studies on scientific method and socio-historical observation of science 
and the scientific community. Although, there are many theories in philosophy of 
science that discredit the scientific method, I focus on just three: 
under-determination of theory by data, pessimistic meta-induction from past 
falsity and relativity in choice of scientific theory. 
1.2.2.2.1. Analytical argument against scientific realism. 
Under-determination of theory by data is, according to Boyd, 'a single, 
simple, and very powerful epistemological argument that represents the basis for 
the rejection of scientific realism'42• It argues that a theory's compatibility with 
evidence cannot be used as a criterion to judge the truth value of the theory. 
According to Duhem-Quine43 thesis, a scientific theory (T) does not normally 
lead to a prediction (P) on its own, it always requires an auxiliary hypothesis (H). 
Auxiliary hypotheses are background assumptions or underline principles that are 
not necessarily manifested in a theory. It is necessary for a scientist to accept 
certain auxiliary hypotheses since an individual scientist does not have enough 
42 Boyd, Richard, (1984), "Current status of scientific realism" in Leplin (ed.) (1984), Scientific 
Realism, (Berkley, U.S.A.; Univ. of California Press), p.42~ · 
43 The idea was originally declared by Duhem, P. (1962) in his The Aim and Structure of Physical 
Theory (N.Y.; Atheneum). Then the idea was modified by Quine, W.V., (1961) in his "Two dogmas 
of Empiricism" (1953) reprinted in his From a Logical Point of View, (N.Y.; Harper & Row, 
p.20-46). 
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time and resources to check every fact related to the topic of this interest. For 
example, to understand composition of Neptune, a scientist has no time to assess 
theories in inorganic chemistry, spectroscopy, Newton's law of gravitation, etc. He 
has to assume them to be true. In this sense, auxiliary hypothesis can be 
understood as ~'@. (nama-riipa), since it is an idea or concept which enables us 
to simplify and to sort out experience and knowledge. The problem of auxiliary 
hypotheses is that identical empirical evidence (E) can give rise to different 
theories (Tl and T2) depending on an auxiliary hypothesis. 
[Eq. 1.2] Duhem-Quine thesis 
H1t2 
(T1&H1)-+P 
(T2&H2)-+P 
E & H1-+ T1 
E & H2-+ T2 
This means that no empirical evidence can be used to falsify or justify the 
legitimacy of any theory, since "any theory can be reconciled with any recalcitrant 
evidence by making a suitable adjustment in our other assumption [auxiliary 
hypothesis] about nature'M. Compatibility of a theory with empirical evidence is 
important to scientific method, since what is defined as scientific method is 
verifying the truth value of theory against the accumulation of empirical evidence 
under a controlled environment. If empirical evidence is not a reliable criteria to 
judge the truth value, then scientific method cannot be used to judge truth value of 
theory. 
There is a powerful objection against the under-determination of theory by 
data, which is called 'no-miracle argument'. Worrall outlined 'no-miracle 
argument' as follows: 
It would be a miracle, a coincidence on a near cosmic scale, if a theory 
made as many correct empirical predictions, as say the general theory 
of relativity or photon theory of light without what that theory says 
about the fundamental structure of the universe being correct or 
44 Laudan, Larry. (1996), Beyond Positivism and Relativism, (Oxford; Westview Press), p.36. 
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'essentially' or 'basically' correct.45 
No-miracle argument is based on the mathematics of probability. Suppose a false 
theory T which is accidentally compatible46 with empirical evidence El. If a 
probability for the theory T to be accidentally compatible with El is 5%, then the 
probability for the theory T to be accidentally compatible with not only El but 
also two further events (E2 and E3) is mathematically 5% x 5% x 5% = 0.0125% 
(multiple of probabilities for the theory to be compatible with each three events). 
This indicates that the more events are referred to the theory T, the less probable 
for the theory T to be accidentally yet repeatedly empirically adequate. Therefore, 
if the theory T is repeatedly compatible with various evidences, it is less likely 
that its compatibility is purely accidental. This counters the under-determination 
of theory by data which denies empirical adequacy as a criteria to judge truth 
value of scientific theory. No-miracle argument claims that empirical evidences 
can be used as an criterion to judge the truth value of scientific theory, providing 
that there are fair amounts of evidence in order to reduce the possibility that 
theory is accidentally compatible with evidence. 
No-miracle argument is strengthened further by an argument called 
conjunction argument which was forwarded by Putnam47. In science, there are 
many examples of conjunctions of two or more mutually-independent theories 
which produce a new empirically adequate theory. If anti-scientific realism is right 
(in the sense that the success of a theory is merely accidental), the possibility for 
the resulting theory to be empirically adequate is very slim. The possibility of this 
happening is equal to probabilities of the original theories of being accidentally 
empirically adequate multiplied by the resulting theory also to be empirically 
adequate. It is most unlikely that any accidentally empirically adequate theory can 
successfully satisfy such minute odds. 
The focal point of this section is a question of whether or not is it possible for 
45 Worrall, J. (1989), "Structural realism" reprinted in Papineau, D, (1996) The Philosophy of 
Science, (Oxford; Oxford Univ. Press), p.l40 
46 The theory T does not at all correspond with mechanics of why and how E I occurred, yet it is 
compatible with empirical evidence of what occurs. 
47 Putnam, H. (1975), Mind, Language and Reality; Philosophical Paper Vol.2, (Cambridge; 
Cambridge Univ.Press). 
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us to judge truth value of our belief or theory using the accwnulation of empirical 
evidence. Under-determination of theory by data claims that because any theory 
or belief can be justified using whatever empirical evidence depending of 
auxiliary hypothesis, a theory's compatibility with empirical evidence cannot be 
used as a criterion to judge its truth value. What no-miracle argwnent and 
conjunction argwnent propose is that, although compatibility with a limited 
nwnber of empirical evidences alone cannot prove or disprove truth value of the 
theory, the inclusion of the further success of the theory would improve the ability 
to judge truth value of the theory. Some scientific realists add further criteria of 
measuring success, such as the absence of ad hoc argwnent, simplicity, and so 
forth. These further criteria strengthen the reliability of the scientific method, 
because the more criteria the more difficult for false theory to be successful. If we 
can apply the same principle to not only scientific theory but also everyday beliefs, 
theoretically, the faculty of reason should enable us to measure truth value of 
every day belief based on its success, even though the degree of reliability may be 
somewhat lower. 
1.2.2.2.2. Historical evidences against scientific realism 
The previous section concluded that because the truth value of a theory is 
proportional to the success of the theory, by employing success of theory as 
criteria, scientific method enables us to measure and determine the degree of 
approximate truth. This seems to guarantee reliability of the faculty of reason 
concerning scientific method. There are, however, two problems with the 
reliability of scientific method. Firstly, reliability of the scientific method is based 
purely on probability. This means that although it is highly unlikely, scientific 
realists cannot deny a remote possibility for false theory to be accidentally 
successful. The second problem arises from socio-historical studies of science that 
reveal two things. 
a) There are many cases of successful theory that turned out to be false. 
b) Often theory choice is determined not by the success of the theory 
but by social dynamics of the scientific community. 
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The former objection is simply a list of past successful theories which turned out 
to be false. This kind of argument against scientific realism is known as 
pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity. The latter is a study of what 
determines theory choice other than the success of the theory. The latter kind is 
often known as value laden theory of science or social influence on theory choice. 
1.2.2.2.2.a. Pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity 
Historical studies on past scientific theories indicate that there is no link 
between the success of a theory and the truth value of the theory. There are many 
examples of successful theories that have turned out to be false. A famous 
example of this sort is that of ether theory. Although there is no such substance as 
ether, ether theory is considered as the most empirically successful unified theory 
in the history of physics so far. Ether theory is considered the most successful, 
because a wide range of physical or chemical phenomena were explained by ether. 
Caloric ether was used to explain thermodynamics. Fresnel successfully predicted 
diffraction and polarisation of light, using a theory of optical ether. Ether was used 
to explain even some medical conditions. If success and truth value of theory are 
proportional to each other as scientific realism claims, then ether theory could not 
have been so successful. The fact that ether theory was successful despite it was 
false theory proves that there is no apparent connection between success and the 
truth value of a theory. Moreover, because past theories were always proven to be 
false, historical studies on science implies that current theory will eventually turn 
out to be false. In other words, history of science implies that success of current 
theory does not guarantee the theory to reflect the way the world is, and it is likely 
that in the future it will be proven false. 
1.2.2.2.2.b.Social influence upon theory choice. 
Socio-historical studies on science indicate that theory choice is not 
necessarily based on its successfulness, instead it is influenced more from social 
convention or the social dynamics of the scientific community. In other words, 
even thought no-miracle argurtient and conjunction argument guarantee success of 
theory to be an reliable indication for the truth value of a theory, if theory choice 
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is not necessary made based purely on the success, less successful theory can be 
chosen over more successful theory. What this implies is that even if there is the 
relativity between success and truth value of theory, there is no guarantee that 
currently accepted theory reflect the reality. 
According to Kuhn48, the history of science is not a steady progress toward 
truth, but consists of occasional paradigm shifts and maturing of scientific 
theories within each paradigm. Although his definition of "paradigm" is 
ambiguous, the term is normally understood as an unquestioned set of scientific 
and metaphysical beliefs or assumptions that make up a framework within which 
scientific theories can be tested, evaluated and revised. Like auxiliary hypothesis, 
paradigm is !6 fS (nama-riipa) as a tool; concept or a network of concepts which 
enable a scientist to carry out a detailed study of a specific topic without 
evaluating related theories and underline principle. What makes Kuhn's view 
unique is his claim that paradigms are incommensurable; when there are two 
paradigms we have no way of knowing or measuring which one reflects reality 
better. Kuhn argues that paradigm choice is made according to social consensus 
rather than successfulness of paradigm as a scientific realist supposes. 
Longino's book Science and Social Knowledg/9 illustrates how values, other 
than successfulness of a theory, influence theory choice. Longino recognises two 
kinds of value; constitutive value and contextual value. Constitutive values are 
what I so far described as successfulness of the theory such as empirical adequacy, 
simplicity and breadth of the theory, whereas contextual values are funding, social 
consensus, and other socio-cultural values. Longino recognises two ways 
contextual value influences science; weak and strong influence. The weak 
influence is relating to funding. Scientific enquiry require a money, thereby 
funding is a key to the success of research. Scientists, therefore, are reluctant to 
upset those who financially support the research. Especially company scientists 
are unwilling to provide a negative result regarding a product of their own 
company. What is interesting is that academic institutes which are believed to be 
independent and do not represent interests of commerce are no longer independent. 
48 Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions-red-, (Chicago; Univ. of 
Chicago Press). 
49 Longino, H. (1990), Science as Social Knowledge, (Princeton; Princeton Univ. Press) 
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Currently most funding for research in university come from commerce, therefore 
even academic scientists are reluctant to provide research results which contradict 
the interest of the benefactor. Ziman50 called such a university a "post academic 
university". This corruption of independent judicator of scientific theory is 
widespread. For example in the United States, even a government body did not 
provide independent judgement51 • The weak influence does alter the outcome of 
scientific enquiry, but it does not necessarily influence the belief of a scientist who 
carries out research. Strong influence, on the other hand, alters even scientist's 
belief. The idea is often known as social constructionists account of science. 
Barnes and Bloor 52 argues that the social position of scientists influence 
acceptability of theory. For example, when there are two theories with equal 
constitutive values, the scientific community chooses a theory by a well-known 
scientist rather than a theory proposed by an unknown scientist. This is exactly 
what happened to Huygens when he proposed the wave theory of light almost 
simultaneously to Newton who suggested light was a stream of particles. Despite 
its superior explanatory power, Huygens' wave theory of light was overshadowed 
by Newton's particle theory, simply because Newton had an unprecedented 
influence on the scientific community. There is an another kind of strong 
influence called "ideology critique". Richardson53 argues that scientific theory 
can be rejected or accepted not because of it constitutional value, but because of 
the social value or ideology it supports. The most obvious case was Galileo's 
model of the solar system. His theory was rejected and he was even prosecuted, 
just because his theory contradicted the commonly-held view backed by the 
religious authority. In this case, the theory of celestial motion was chosen on the 
50 Ziman, John. (2003), "New Instrumental Roles of Science" in Science and Engineering Ethics, 
Vol.9, p.l7-21. 
51 In United States, there is an ongoing case of a ballistic missile sensor developed by TRW. In 
mid-1990s, Pentagon's Missile Defence Agency carried out test on the sensor which claims to 
distinguish simulated nuclear warheads and dummy (decoy) warheads. Pentagon sent results to 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology for verification. Theodore Postol, physicist and weapons 
expert who works in MIT, claims that MIT intentionally fail to expose original tests to be flaw, 
since MIT receives vast funding from Pentagon. 
52 Barn~~. IJarry & Bloor, Daviq. (1982) "Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of 
knowledge" in Rationality and Relaiivism, Hollis, M & Lukes, S. (eds.) (Cambridge Mass; MIT 
Press) 
53 Richardson, Robert C. (1984), "Biology and Ideology; The interpretation of science and values" 
in Philosophy ofScience, vol.51, 0.396-420. 
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basis of compatibility with established religious view of the world at the time and 
not compatibility with observational data. The ideology critique was not just past 
tendency for science to ignore empirical evidence. Even in the current climate, 
any theory that supports sexist or racism is often rejected outright without any 
objective verification. For example, several states in U.S.A. refuse to teach 
Darwinian theory of evolution in biology class in favour of Christian creationist's 
belief. 
How auxiliary hypothesis, paradigm and contextual value influence the 
faculty of reason illustrates how the tyranny of !61S (nama-riipa) makes it 
impossible for us to comprehend the mind-independent reality as it anyway is. 
Although useful, sometimes accepting a socially accepted fundamental view of 
the world hinders understanding of nature. In the past, !61S (nama-riipa) such as 
Empedocles' five fundamental elements5\ Newton's laws of motion and ether 
prevent scientists from understanding things as they are and led them to false 
theories. Although analytically, the problem of under-determination of theory by 
data can be overcome by no-miracle argument and conjunction argument, 
socio-historical studies prove that we cannot correctly judge truth value of a 
theory because of the tyranny of !61S (nama-riipa). 
Scientific method is believed to be the most reliable method because it is 
objective and not influenced by unfounded assumption and personal or/and social 
opinion. But as we have examined, even in science theory choice is influenced 
directly or indirectly (through paradigm or auxiliary hypothesis choice) by 
personal or/and social opinion. This makes scientific knowledge to be no better 
than mere opinion, belief and subject to faith 
1.2.3.!61S (nama-riipa) and our inability to comprehend m'&M (nirvana) 
So far in this chapter, I examined two arguments which lead to 
epistemological scepticism that we are not capable to comprehending ~ M 
(nirvana). The two arguments are; 
54 Empedocles of Acragas thought that everything in the universe is a compound of fire, air, water 
and earth. The similar view was held in India and China, too. 
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1) What we can experience and have knowledge of is limited to mtii 
(samsiira) and we have no direct access to~- (nirvana). 
2) mtfi (samsiira) does not accurately correspond ihlil (nirvana). 
Regarding the second premise, ~ fS (nama-riipa) played an important role. ~ 
fS (nama-riipa) is a useful tool for forming experience and knowledge, but it can 
turn tyrannical and dominate and structure our comprehension and creates 
discrepancies between mtfi (samsiira) and ~~ (nirvana). In the faculty of 
experience ~ fS (nama-riipa) distorts what we experience by influencing the 
process of cognition to over-interpret sensory inputs or gives rise to 
pseudo-experience. This itself would not be problem if the faculty of reason could 
provide abilities to deduce truth from incomplete sensory experience and to 
distinguish genuine experience from distorted one. Unfortunately, however, the 
faculty of reason cannot provide neither. In the faculty of reason, ~ fS 
(nama-riipa) is a template, framework, auxiliary hypothesis or paradigm using 
which we make sense of what we comprehend. Because choice of ~ fS 
(nama-riipa) is influenced by human convenience and interest, there is no 
guarantee that it provide reliable foundation upon which we can built and verify 
our experience and knowledge. As the result we end up with ~ fS (nama-riipa) as 
a content or constituent of mtfi (samsiira) which does not accurately reflect the 
way ~- (nirvana) actually is. 
1.3. ~ (sunyata) 
1.3.1. A paradoxical statement of the negative ~ (siinyatii) 
So what is ~ (siinyatii), and how is it related to our inability to comprehend 
ihl:Jl (nirvana)? ~ (siinyatii) is often translated as "nothingness", but Chinese 
and Japanese has a different word for nothingness which is 111 (pronounced 
"mu"). It is important for Miidhyamika school and Zen to distinguish it from ~ 
(sfulyatii). Nothingness is described using single negation (not exist) whereas 
emptiness is expressed as a combination of four contradicting statements called 
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RBiiJ (catus-kotikai5• In this thesis, instead of all four statements, I will use the 
following formula which states the essence of RBiiJ (catus-kotika); 
a) A is Mt (nothing); ., 3 x (x =A). 
b) A is ~ {empty); 3 X {X =A) & ., 3 X {X =A) 
The classical logic would simply dismiss the formula b) as nonsense, since it is 
obviously paradoxical. Classical logic considers the formula b) as paradox 
because it allows only two possibilities; either x which A refers to exist or not to 
exist. Zen would agree with classical logic that the formula b) is paradoxical. But 
Zen thinks the paradox illustrates a very important point. To understand the role of 
the paradox, we have to go beyond the literal meaning of the formula b) and to 
analyse the intention of its usage. The paradox is used to demonstrate that A is an 
empty noun or an empty concept that does not correspond to anything in ~­
(nirvana). If A is an empty noun or concept, then neither "A exists" nor "A does 
not exist" has any truth value. Suppose we replace A with the nonsensical word 
"mbhaaa", then neither "mbhaaa exists" nor "mbhaaa does not exist" is true. But 
as Gangadean correctly identifies in his paper56, the paradox does not mean A is 
nonsensical, like "mbhaa" is. A may be nonsensical regarding ~- (nirvana; the 
mind-independent reality), but it has a meaning in mt~ (samsara; the relative 
reality), because A refers a ~ 'fS (nama-riipa), a constituent of mtfi (samsara) 
and a tool which is used to simplify the complex affair of reality. "A is ~ 
(siinya)" means that A is ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) and it is applicable only to mt~ 
(samsara) and not to ~- (nirvana). 
Why does the paradox prove such points? The answer lies in a fact that A, ~ 
55 Four statements are 
1;3x (x =A), 
2; -,3x (X =A), 
3; 3x (x.=A} & ., 3x (x =A} and 
4;-.,3x (x =A} & ., {.,3x (x =A}). 
A exists. 
A does not exist. 
A exists and A does not exit 
A does not exist and it is not true that A 
does not exist 
56 Gaugadean, Ashok Kumar. (1979), "Formal ontology and the dialectical transformation of 
consciousness", in Philosophy East and West, vol.29, p.21-48. 
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'fS (nama-riipa), is defmed by a boundary or division between A and not-A. For 
example, the concept or word "apple" is defined by a boundary between what is 
apple and what is not. Only by understanding the boundary we can use the 
concept or the word "apple". To apprehend who "Nelson Mandela" is, we have to 
be able to distinguish who is and who is not Nelson Mandela. If we cannot 
distinguish who is and who is not Nelson Mandela, then we cannot claim to know 
the meaning of "Nelson Mandela" or who Nelson Mandela is. To understand a ::B 
'fS (nama-Iiipa), we must understand a boundary or an identity condition (what 
makes object x but not y to be A). This process of comprehending things by 
applying a boundary that defines ::B 'fS (nama-riipa) is called ~~IJ (vikalpa). 
Chinese characters ~~IJ (vikalpa) literary means to separate, to discriminate and 
to distinguished. It is the process of separating into two categories, A or not-A. If, 
as this chapter has demonstrated, ::B 'fS (nama-riipa) is essential for forming 
knowledge, then understanding the boundary between A and not-A (i.e. the ability 
for us to ~~IJ (vikalpa)) is crucial for forming knowledge. 
Madhyamika school and Zen think the boundary that defines ::B 'fS 
(nama-rupa) is not applicable to a;)jl (nirvana) because it is not intrinsic to aM 
(nirvana). This belief is demonstrated by a much-used quote; 
The tathagata (the enlightened) understand dharma (the way the 
reality is) to be madhyama-ratipat (middle way) by escaping from 
dualistic understanding. 
Escaping from hi-value understanding means that the mind-independent reality 
(a;}jl; nirvana) is beyond the distinction of A or not-A. This is the core idea of 
Madhyamika school (!flU~), the middle school. If the boundary between A and 
not-A were intrinsic, only one of A or not-A can be true, and not possible for both 
A and not-A to be true aUhe same time. For the combination, A and not-A, to be 
51 UtiJiiJ-a-ft~. + =~ (vol.12), r::.*;::iEifiU, =~. p.86, Samyutta-Nikaya (riJiiJ-a-ft~J;l;$~). 
vol.2, p.76 and Mahavatsu (::.*;:$),III, p.448. 
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true, the division between A and not-A must not be intrinsic. This derives from a 
Buddhist concept of asvabhiiva (MEl 11). It is an idea that everything lacks 
svabhiiva (self-essence or intrinsic nature). Everything we experience and 
comprehend is not intrinsic to reality since it is samskrta (~.t\). As I briefly 
mentioned samskrta earlier in this chapter, it means "conditioned" or "created" by 
us human. In this context it means that the identity condition for nama-rupa is not 
intrinsic to the mind-independent reality (nirviina) but it is a product of human 
invention. 
What the formula " 3 x (x =A) & -. 3 x (x =A)" aim to question is not whether 
object x which A refers exists or not. Instead it is about whether A inheres in the 
object x or A is a mere concept(~~; nama-Iiipa) which we project upon x. The 
fact that Zen and the Madhyamika school believe the formula to be an accurate 
description of truth indicate that they believe in the latter; A is not intrinsic to x. 
This is why, in Zen, Yc (tathata; suchness) "therefore indicates the world as it is 
unscreened and undivided by the symbols and definitions ofthought."58 
In 7::. ~ fb. ~ (Mahayana Buddhism), ~ ~ (nama-Iiipa) to be M 13 11 
(asvabhiiva) and ~ at, (samskrta) is often explained using fa~ ~ 
(pratftya-samutpiida). There are many literary evidence to connect ~ (siinyata) 
with *I~ (pratftya-samutpiida ). 
*-t~tJ{)=&O)~ .. t.>nt.>nfcJ:~t:~<o i-tLicJ:i&~ "t:~-:>"C .. i-tLfcJ: 
9fJt.>"1:,t:fJ~'t:~Qo 59 
Pratltya-samutpada is sunyata, they are different names for madhyama 
Candrakirti ( FJ ~) also commented on the close connection between Miidhyamika 
school whose central principle is sunyatii (~) and pratltya-samutpiida (ti~). In 
Madhyamakiivatiira 60 , he identifies Miidhyamikiih, those who follows 
Miidhyamika school with those who thinks everything is product of 
58 ' . . -. . ' -.- .. . . . . . 
WattS, Alan W. (1957), The-way ofzen, (N.Y.; Mentor-Book), p.75. 
59 Wlflllt~ (Madhyamaka-sastra), XXIV, 18 
60 Madhyamakiivatara ~ .Aiflllt~. p.386, line4-7. It is a widely used text ofMadhyamika school, 
written by Candrakirti. The translation of the title means The Entry to the Middle Way. 
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pratitya-samutpiida. 
There is a tendency to interpret pratitya-samutpada as causation or causal 
connection, especially regarding so-called twelve causal links ( + = ~ ti ). 
Gaudama Buddha, supposedly, attained enlightenment when he fully realised the 
truth ofthe twelve causal links which demonstrates how ignorance (MB~; avidya) 
gives rise to aging and death(~~; jara-marana), two chief elements of suffering 
(~; duhkha). The causal links are expressed in a simple form of "idam sati ayam 
bhavati" which translate as "when this exists then that arises". This phrase implies 
''this" to be a condition for ''that" effect to happen. This is why pratitya-samutpada 
is often understood as causation. Moreover, historically such interpretation 
coincides with Indian tradition of believing in existence of karma (M;), causal 
connection between deeds in this life and position in the next life he or she will be 
born in. Nagfujuna61 fiercely criticised those who interpreted pratitya-samutpada 
as causation. For Nagfujuna and his followers, pratitya-samutpada IS 
comprehended as mutual dependency (idampratyayat; ~ 11 iii ff) and not as 
causation. If x and y are in the relation of pratitya-samutpada, y does not have to 
be caused by x. This is obvious from several examples. Candrakirti worte; 
r ~tl,fJ(N.>~t:~ .. fJ'nfJ<N.>~o N.>t::fJ't~tJ<N.>~t:~f::~tJ<N.>~fJ< 
~<~N.>~62 0 J 
"This exists thus that exists. It is like there is short only when there is 
long." 
"Long" is not caused anyway by "short", but defining "long" requires its 
opponent "short". A favourite example used again and again in different texts63 is 
61 According to Chinese Buddhist ail (Ch; Jf-ZAng) who is better known as S*f~8ili (Jp; 
Kajyou-taishi) in Japan, Wtflia~ (Madhyamaka-siistra) is a text in which Nii.garjuna clarified the 
differences between • ® (pratltya-samutpiida) as ~ 1L ~ ff (idampratyayat; mutual 
dependence) and as ~~ (hety-phla; causation). The first twenty five chapters discuss fi® 
(pratltya-samutpiida) as mutual dependence, and last two chapter ~ompare!f Jt with fi ~ 
(ptatltya~s~6Ju~a~j as ,~~ (h1tJ-phJ~; C~Usatlon) - . . , . . . 
62 Madhyamalciivatiira W AtPM~ .. p.10, line 7. 
63 WeiDa~ (Catuhsataka), f~ft!Jfift~ (Mahaprajfiapiiramitopadesa-siistra) vol.32, 
Bodhicaryiivatiira, IX, 114. etc. 
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a relation between a father and a son. Suppose two people F (father) and S (son). 
The existence of S is in a sense, caused by F, whereas F is not caused by S (S 
would not have existed ifF had not existed, but it is possible for F not to have a 
child). But for the person F to be a "father", the existence of Sis required, as well 
as F for S to be a "son". It has to be noted here that the mutual dependence 
discussed here is not an ontological one. It is about what things are recognised as;. 
as something "long", "short", "father", "son", etc. 
Unlike other branches of Buddhism, Zen does not mention the close 
connection between ~ (silnyatii) and ti~ (pratftya-samutpiida). Nakamura64 
thought this was due to mistranslation by Kumarajiva65 (!laleRit). Kumarajiva 
translated pratftya-samutpiida as ~a (cause-effect) or as ~ a 5~ (laws of 
cause-effect). Because Chinese and Japanese Buddhists understood it as 
cause-effect and not mutual dependence, the relation between pratftya-samutpiida 
and ~ (sfulyata) was not widely discussed in Ch'an/Zen. This, however, does 
not mean the relation between gg ( sfulyata) and mutual dependence is alien to 
Chinese and Japanese. Surprising, the same idea was developed by Taoist 
completely independent from the development of pratftya-samutpiida in India. In 
iifiiDl (Tao-Te-Ching) we can find a passage; 
When everyone recognizes beauty as beautiful, there is always ugliness; 
When everyone recognizes goodness as good, there is already evil; 
"To be" and "not to be" arise mutually; 
Difficult and easy are mutually realized; 
Long and short are mutually contrasted; 
High and low are mutually posted; ... 
64 Nakamura Hajime (1981) fik~JiU!! 6 - ~ (..t)J (Buddhism Philosophy Vo/.6- Siinyatii), 
(Kyoto; Heirakuji Publishing House), p.l5l-153 
65 Kumiirajiva (344-413) One of most influential ,6uddhist ID()nks wh() br()ught Buddhism from 
central~ Asia to chiDa: He transiated many. unportani Indian Buddhist texts into Chinese. His 
translations include Bti'ft (Prajf'liipiiramita-sUtra), fP.PitilUilft (Saddharmapundarika-sUtra), 
*lllft (Vunalakirti-nirdesa-siitra), flfl~J (Madhyamaka-siistra), fe~J (CatuhSataka), fj\: 
fi Jl~J (Mahiiprajf'iiipiiramitopadesa-siistra), and so forth. 
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Before and after are in mutual sequence. 66 
Like the paradoxical statement of "A and not-A", the above statement indicates 
that Taoism also thinks A and not-A is mutually dependent because any division 
between A and not-A is a products of human invention. Sunyatii ( ~ ), 
pratftya-samutpiida (it~), asvabhava (. 13 tt) and asamskrta (iii' a) all 
describes the same thing that 4S ~ (nama-rupa) is defined by human values and 
social consensus and it is not determined by the way the ~~ (nirvana) actually 
is. What this means is that 4S ~ (nama-riipa), everything we experience and 
comprehend, belong to mt•~ (samsara) and not ~~ (nirvana). In other words, 
~~ (nirvana) is devoid of everything we experience and comprehend. 
1.3.2. Everything is ~ (sfinya) 
We have so far examined what ~ (sfinyata) is and its plausibility. This 
section looks into what sort of thing Zen consider to be ~ (sfinya). There is one 
Zen Buddhist text above all others makes an extent list of things that are ~ 
(siinya). The texts is fti;fftC,,g (Prajiia-paranita-sutra) which is sometime known 
as Heart Sutra. The second paragraph starts as followed; 
Rupa is not different to siinyata, sfinyata is not different to riipa, riipa 
is just sunyata, sfinyata is just riipa. The same [ sfulyata] applies to 
vedana-skandha, samjfia-skandha, samskara-skandha and 
vijfiana-skandha. 
The passage states that all 1i.a (five skandhas) are~ (sfinya) and they do not 
belong to ~~. Then, the sutra continues to identify, 1\81 (six vijiianas), 1\m 
(six indriyas) and 1\il (six visayas) to be ~ (sfinya) as well. 
66 ifHiia (Tao-Te-Ching), 2. I use a version quoted in Watts, Alan. (1957), The Way of Zen, 
(N.Y.; Mentor Books), p.ll6. 
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:m:i!&~ t:p ... MU.IIJl:ll ~ ~- .. MU~. -~~ft&5! .. MII.II:W-P.J ¥: .. Mil 
.:W-
.. .in the state of siinyata ... there is no eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and 
mind [six indriyas that arise experience), there is no form, sound, 
smell, taste, bodily sensation, nor any laws of nature [ six visayas; 
attributes of what we experience], there is no sphere of visual 
attributes and no sphere of mental attributes. 
These passages state that every content or constituent of our experience and 
knowledge is ~ (siinya). In other words, they indicate that everything we 
experience and comprehend belong to mtfi (samsara) and not ~- (nirvana). 
The sfitra then talks about ~ (siinyata) of various ~ ~ s (nama-rfipas) that 
function as tools. 
There are neither appearing nor disappearing, neither dirty nor pure, 
neither increasing nor decreasing. 
The passage denies all hi-value or oppositions between A or not-A. They are all 
~ (siinya). they are =If~ (samskrta), products of human invention and MEl tt 
(asvabhava), not intrinsic to il\l• (nirvana). The sfitra mention only six 
oppositions, but different texts denies different sets of oppositions. For example, 
Nagfujuna recognised eight. Three additional divisions are between same and 
different and temporal and permanent. Regardless of different numbers of 
oppositions, they are all criticisms against all of our bipolar understanding of 
sorting things into A or not-A. Other things the sfitra describes as ~ (sfinya) are 
the ignorance (MBA; avidya), aging (::f!"; jara), death (JE; marana), the Four Noble 
Truth (llB~ai; catur-arya-satya) and so forth. They all indicat~ ~ (sfir!ya) of ~ 
. .. ~-·~ ·. '-?-·''·"'. . . .. _ .. ., --. .- ·• . . 
~ (pratitya-samutpada) which I will discuss in Chapter Seven. Basically the 
sfitra states every possible ~ ~ (nama-rfipa) to be ~ (siinya); including both 
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~ 'fS s (nama-rfipas) as contents of experience and knowledge and ~ 'fS s 
(nama-riipas) as tools according to which experience and knowledge are formed. 
1.4. Conclusion. 
This chapter examined our inability to comprehend illjjjl (nirvana) and ~ 
(slinyata). They simply means the same thing. We are not capable of 
comprehending ill it (nirvana) because ~ 'fS (nama-rfipa), the content or 
constituent of our experience and knowledge, is ~ (sOnya). ~ (slinyata) is the 
idea that division which defines ~ 'fS (nama-rfipa) is ~ ~ (samskrta) a product 
of human convention and not reflecting § 11 (svabhava), intrinsic nature of iJ6f 
jJjl (nirvana). I recognised that both the inability to comprehend iJ6fjjjl (nirvana) 
and ~ (slinyata) of ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) are results of the tyranny of ~ 'fS 
(nama-riipa). Because our sensory and mental capacities are limited, ~ 'fS 
(nama-rfipa) is a useful tool for simplifying what we experience and comprehend. 
It works as a template to sort things out into simple A or not-A categories or works 
as paradigm or auxiliary hypothesis to provide a foundation or a framework upon 
which a theory and understanding can be formed. But it can turn tyrannical and 
not only dominate and structure our thought but also creates illusion (i'J;maya) 
and makes us see things in a wrong way (!!iif!J; viparyasa). 
The relation between the inability to comprehend iJ6f jJjl (nirvana) and 
tyranny of ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) is circular. The tyranny prevent us from 
apprehending iJ6fjjjl (nirvana) as it actually is, but at the same time the cause of 
the tyranny is our inability to comprehend iJ6fjjjl (nirvana). Since we are not 
capable to comprehend iJ6fjjjl (nirvana) as it is, it cannot be iJ6f• (nirvana) that 
determines the meaning and extension of ~ 'fS (nama-rfipa). The tyranny occurs 
because ~ 'fS (nama-rfipa) does not correspond to the way iJ6fjjjl (nirvana) 
actually is. We cannot understand the way iJ6f• (nirvana) actually is using such 
~'fS (nama-rfipa). 
To understand this circular process is very important for the purpose of this 
thesis, because, as I will discuss in the next chapter, it will liberate us from not 
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only ~ (maya) and IHIIJ (viparyiisa) but also from !f (duhkha). 
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2 
Positive ~ (sfinyata) 
2.1. Possible consequences of the negative m (siinyati) 
We have so far examined the negative sense of ~ (siinyata). The negative 
interpretation of "everything is ~ (sOnya)" implies scepticism that everything 
we experience or comprehend is iG (maya; illustion) and MifiJ (viparyasa; 
misapprehension). This negative interpretation of ~ (siinyata) seems to imply 
nihilism. And there are scholars such as Poussin1 and Dasgupta2 who assume 
Madhyamika and Zen to be such. But as Garfield points out nihilism is "in a 
straightforward sense, sick3." If we regard all concepts and knowledge to be an 
illusion (ia; maya), then we lose any regularity and a standard necessary for us to 
carry out everyday life. For example, when someone asks whether it is raining 
outside or not, the nihilist always has to reply "I do not know" even though he can 
see outside through his window. Instead, for Buddhism, scepticism is "a form of 
philosophical therapy, to cure us of the cognitive and emotional ills born of 
extreme metaphysical, moral, or epistemological positions. 4" So what is ~ 
(siinyata) supposed to cure, what is the positive implication of the scepticism? Zen 
thinks ~ (siinyata) cures i1 (maya) and MifiJ (viparyasa) and brings about ti 
It (prajfia), the ultimate knowledge. The obvious question is how can such 
conflicting positions be combined? As I stated in the introduction of the Part One, 
the key to solve this problem is ffi- (bodhi), the enlightenment. For the 
1 Poussin, Louis de la Vallee, "Buddhism", p.l86 
2 Dasgupta S. (1930), History of Indian Philosophy Vol. 1, (Cambridge; Cambridge Univ. Press), 
f· ~!field, Jay L. (1990), "Epoche and Siinyatii: Slepticism East and West," in Philosophy East 
and West, vol.40, p.286. 
4 Garfield, Jay L. (1990), ibid. p.285. 
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unenlightened, everything is ~ (sfinya) means experience and knowledge are il 
(maya) and liii!J (viparyasa). Whereas for the enlightened, everything is ~ 
(sfulya) leads to liberation from !(] (maya) and liftiJ (viparyasa) and attainment 
of !ff It (praji'ia). So what is i! (bodhi) and how does it make possible for us to 
overcome il (maya)? 
2.1.1. m (bodhi) and tilt (praji'ia) 
The Popular Buddhism often assumes i! (bodhi) to be some mystical 
superhuman experience of omniscience. What inspires such interpretation of m 
(bodhi) is extraordinary ability of the enlightened to pay attention to even 
insignificant details. This ability is not, however, the result of omniscience but of 
what is called "every minute Zen". Zen believes that there is no same moment 
twice, therefore, every moment is a precious moment and one should never waste 
time and chance. This is an idea behind the motto of the Japanese tea ceremony 
-M-~ (this time is the last time to meet). We have to pay attention to every 
thing we do, because it is the only chance we have, and we cannot go back in time 
and try again. Soyen Shaku taught his students; "Watch what you say, and 
whatever you say, practice it. When opportunity comes do not let it pass, yet 
always think twice before acting. "5 This is why the enlightened one can recall 
things they have experienced much better than us the unenlightened. The 
following story illustrates this point: 
=Every-Minute Zen= 
Zen students are with their masters at least ten years before they 
presume to teach others. Nan-in was visited by Tenno, who, having 
passed his apprenticeship, had become a teacher. The day happened 
to be rainy, so Tenno wore wooden clogs and carried an umbrella. 
After greeting, Nan-in remarked; 'I suppose you left your wooden 
clogs in the vestibule. I want to know if your umbrella is on the 
right or left side of the clogs.' 
5 Rep, Paul. (1957), Zen Flesh Zen Bones, (London; Penguin Books), p.36. 
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Tenno, confused, had no instant answer. He realized that he was 
unable to carry his Zen every minute. He became Nan-in's pupil, 
and he studied six more years to accomplish his every-minute Zen.6 
If ffi- (bodhi) is not a mystical omniscience experience, what sort of experience is 
it? Some suggests ffi- (bodhi) is comprehension without influence of ~ '@. 
(nama-Iiipa). As we learned in the Chapter One, although ~ '@. (nama-Iiipa) is a 
useful tool for forming and making sense of experience and knowledge, it can turn 
tyrannical and creates Kl (maya). Therefore the way to stop Kl (maya) is 
getting rid of the influence of ~ '@. (nama-Iiipa). Gangadean described ffi-
(bodhi; the enlightenment) as a transformation which he calls "transformational 
dialectic." 
[It] purports to move consciousness beyond any and all conceptual 
structures, beyond any form of discourse, beyond any natural or 
philosophical language, beyond any ontology. 7 
What he described as conceptual structure, form of discourse and so forth are 
exactly what ~ '@. (nama-Iiipa) provides. Nakamura 8 makes comparison 
between the enlightened mind and a mirror to describe the relation between 
liberation from ~ '@. (nama-Iiipa) and comprehension of if,;l. (nirvana). Only a 
clean mirror can reflect things accurately, and a mirror would not accurately 
reflect what is in front of it if the mirror were already clogged by marks, colours 
and so forth. In the same way, only a mind which is not clogged by ~ '@. 
(nama-Iiipa) can accurately correspond if,;l. (nirvana). This interpretation of ffi 
(bodhi) as liberation from ~ '@. (nama-Iiipa) seems to coincide with some of 
6 Rep, Pa~l. (1957),j!Ji<f~,p~4~· .. ··.· ... , . . 
7 OangadeaiJ., ASiiokKumar. (1979), "Formal ontology and the dialectical transformation of 
consciousness", in Philosophy East and West, vol.29, p.22. 
8 Nakamura Hajime (1981), r-tA~.m~J6 -~ (l:)~(Buddhist Philosophy Vo/.6 --Sunyatii), 
(Kyoto; Heirakuji Publishing House), p.65 
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Zen's mottos such as ~iiJi5i9 (anabhilapya), ~.ll:X!¥ 10 (Jp; furyii-monnji) 
and .R •tTJ.i 11 (Jp; shikan-taza). They all describe that the absolute truth cannot 
be put into words. If absolute truth is beyond the capability of ~ fS (nama-riipa), 
then m (bodhi) must be the ability to go beyond capability of language. This 
interpretation, however, faces a serious difficulty. The difficulty is the 
impossibility to get rid of ~ fS (nama-riipa) from experience and knowledge. As 
we have seen in the section 1.1.2, ~ fS (nama-riipa) is strongly related to 
experience and knowledge in two ways; as a content and constituent of experience 
and knowledge and as a tool according to which experience and knowledge are 
formed. Since we are not capable of experiencing Jflji£ (nirvana) directly, what 
we can experience and have knowledge of are inevitably ~ fS (nama-riipa) as 
the content. There is nothing other than ~fS (nama-riipa) we can experience and 
comprehend. ~ fS (nama-Iiipa) as the tool is also impossible to get rid of. As we 
learned in Section 1.2.2.1.b, cognition, the process of how ~ fS (nama-riipa) 
influences experience, is not something we can intentionally switch off. This 
means that the influence of ~ fS (nama-riipa) cannot be eliminated, at the faculty 
of experience. In the faculty of reason, it is not possible to form and verify theory 
and belief without some framework or foundation that ~ fS (nama-Iiipa) as a 
paradigm or auxiliary hypothesis provide. This leads to a conclusion that even if 
one has attained m (bodhi), it is not possible to prevent ~ fS (nama-riipa) from 
influencing our experience and knowlegde and causing the tyranny of ~ fS 
(nama-riipa) to make our experience and knowledge to be iJ (maya) and !mif!J 
(viparyasa). 
For Zen, m (bodhi) is CQnsidered to be a much more down-to-earth 
experience rather than an omniscience experience or comprehension without ~ 
9Japanese words ~iii~ (Jp; fukasetsu) can be translated to three Sanskrit words anabhilapya, 
nirabhiliipya and aviicya. It describe the concept of ~ (sfinyata) that the absolute truth cannot be 
captured by any language. 
10
''No word can be_ describe anything". It is Ch'an/Zen's belief that m. (bo<fhi) cannot be 
achl~~ed th~~gh te~:-b~cailse words cannot capture the way ~Jl (nirvana) ~ctllally is. 
11 
"Just sitting". This is the principle motto of Japanese Soto school of Zen. It is an idea that 
ultimately only through sitting meditation we can discover Buddhahood that exists in everyone of 
us. 
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'{g (nama-Iiipa). In Zen, ffi (bodhi) is understood as simply as truly awakening 
to the fact that everything is ~ (siinya). Zen believes such an awakening 
experience enables the enlightened to defeat !J (maya) and IHIIJ (viparyasa). 
This claim seems to contradict what we learned in Chapter One and what I stated 
above that our experience and knowledge are inevitably!] (maya) and !miiiJ 
(viparyasa). The key to solve this contradiction is recognising two kinds of !] 
(maya) and UiiiJ (viparyasa) the unenlightened suffer from. The first kind is the 
direct result of the tyranny of ~ '{g (nama-Iiipa). ~ '{g (nama-Iiipa) works as a 
tool like a template or a framework according to which we can simplify and 
sorting out what we experience and comprehend. But since ~ '{g (nama-Iiipa) is 
ii lt. (samskrta) and it does not reflect the way ~;,;! (nirvana) is, any 
experience and knowledge that is formed using ofthe ~~ (nama-Iiipa) as a tool 
inevitably does not reflect the way ~;,;! (nirvana) is. This is why what we 
experience and comprehend are i1 (maya) and HiiiJ (viparyasa) that do not 
correspond to ~- (nirvana). Zen thinks this kind of !] (maya) and HiiiJ 
(viparyasa) is not a serious problem. The true problem is the second kind of !] 
(maya) and HiiiJ (viparyasa) which the unenlightened suffered from. The second 
kind is !J (maya) and HiiiJ (viparyasa) of believing the opposite of the first 
kind. The unenlightened falsely believe ~ '{g s (nama-Iiipas) to accurately reflect 
~- (nirvana), and using such tools it is possible to comprehend ~- (nirvana) 
as it actually is. The unenlightened suffer from not only the first kind of !] 
(maya) and DiiiJ (viparyasa) but also the second kind, so that they are not aware 
of the fact that their experience and knowledge are !] (maya) and U iiiJ 
(viparyasa). It may not be possible to overcome the first kind of !] (maya) and 
DiiiJ (viparyasa), but it is achievable to eliminate the second kinds of !] (maya) 
and DiiiJ (viparyasa). This is what t! (bodhi) does. ffi (bodhi), which is the 
comprehension of ~ '{g (nama-Iiipa) to be ~ (siinya), liberates us from the 
false belief in our experience and knowledge to genuinely reflect ~;,;! (nirvana). 
ffi (bodhi) makes us realise that we actually do not understanding anything about 
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J.iiJ;X (nirvana; the mind-independent reality). 
2.1.2 Positive consequences of tft (bodhi) 
m (bodhi) as a simple realisation of everything we expenence and 
comprehend to be i1 (maya) and UiltJ (viparyasa) does seem nihilistic and not 
positive. So why is tft (bodhi) regarded as bliss or the goal of practicing Zen? It 
is bliss and the goal of Zen, because the realisation enables the enlightened to 
make peace with~'@, s (nama-rtipas) and liberate us from ~ (duhkha). 
For the unenlightened, ~ '@. (nama-rtipa) is a tool that controls experience 
and knowledge and causes i1 (maya) and UiltJ (viparyasa). Whereas for the 
enlightened, ~ '@. (nama-riipa) is ~ (siinya) yet it is a useful tool for 
simplifying what we experience and comprehend. To expand the metaphor of a 
tool, in order to clarify Zen's position comparing to realism and nihilism, realists 
falsely believe that the tool does what it is supposed to do (i.e. using which they 
can comprehend .iJ;X (nirvana)). Or at least, realists believe it is possible to 
obtain a perfect tool, using which they can comprehend .iJ;X (nirvana) as it 
really is. They therefore suffer from the fist kind of i1 (maya) and Uii!J 
(viparyasa) as well as the second; their experience and knowledge are i1 (maya) 
and 1ft ii!J (viparyasa), but they falsely believe otherwise. Nihilism is the 
opposition of the realism stated above. Nihilists recognise that the tool not only 
fails to do what it is supposed to do but also it turns tyrannical and gives a false 
sense of security. In order to avoid both kinds of i1 (maya) and 1ft ii!J 
(viparyasa), nihilists refused to use the tool and give up any attempt to 
comprehend -~ (nirvana). The enlightened neither seek a better tool nor reject 
the existing tool. He is content to use the existing tool as he is fully aware that he 
can never attain the perfect tool that corresponds exactly the way .iJ;X (nirvana) 
is. The difference between nihilism and realism on one hand and the enlightened 
on the other is that the former assume "in order for words and statement to be 
meaningful or true, they must correspond to an independent, unconditioned 
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realm 12", whereas the enlightened understand ~ fS (nama-riipa) to be ~ ~ 
(samskrta) and MEI11 (asvabhava). The understanding of~'!. (nama-riipa) to 
be ~ (siinya) removes false hope or illusion about ~ fS (nama-riipa), so that the 
enlightened can use it as it actually is. One possible interpretation to why the 
enlightened can be content with ~ fS (nama-riipa) is that the enlightened use ~ 
~ (nama-riipa) to describe VItti (samsara; the relative reality) and not i\l-
(nirvana; the mind-independent reality) which is beyond the capability of ~ ~ s 
(nama-riipas). This interpretation, however, contradicts some statements by the 
enlightened that describe how calm nirvana is. For I am not an enlightened one, 
unfortunately I cannot say exactly why and how enlightened make peace with ~ 
~ (nama-riipa). 
The second and more important positive consequence of realising all 
experience and knowledge to be i1 (maya) and MfitJ (viparyasa) is that it 
enables the enlightened to be liberated from i!i (duhkha). In Zen, i!i (duhkah) 
is defmed as the feeling of dissatisfaction and unfulfillment of craving and desire. 
But how does realisation of everything to be ~ (siinya) and all experience and 
knowledge to be i1 (maya) and llfltJ (viparyasa) enables the liberation from i!i 
( duhkha). The answer lies in the Buddhist concept of -~ (pratitya-samutpada). 
-~ (pratitya-samutpada) explains how M B~ (avidya), unawareness of our 
experience and knowledge to be i1 (maya) and lifltJ (viparyasa), leads to i!i 
(duhkha). i!i (duhkah) is a result of the false belief in existence of R (atman; 
self as an individual independent being) and existence of objects and comfort 
which an individual craves and desires for. Like any other thing which the 
unenlightened believe to exist in ill~ (nirvana), the self (individual) and the 
objects of desire are both ~ fS (nama-riipa) that are ~ (siinya). In other words, 
there is nothing (or no one) that possess cravings and desire and there is nothing 
an individual craves and desire for. The unenlightened suffer from i!i (duhkha) 
because chasing things that do not exist in the first place only leads. to failure. 
Because i!i (duhkha) is the result of falsely believing that an individual who 
12 Cooper, David (2002), The Measure of Things, (Oxford; Clarendon), p.303 
78 
Positive m (siinyata) 
craves and object he craves for exist in iilJl (nirvana}, the realisation that they 
are m (siinya) annihilates 15= (duhkha). By realising that these things to be m 
(siinya) a person would no longer feel desire and craving for them. 
2.1.3. m (bodhi) as true realisation 
If t! (bodhi) simply means understanding !6 ~ (nama-rtipa) to be m 
(sfinya), then any readers of this thesis can claim to be the enlightened one. But 
unfortunately, this is not the case. One important aspect of t! (bodhi) is that it 
has to be a true realisation of m (siinyata) and it must be distinguished from 
intellectual understanding or analytical comprehension. According to Takagami 13, 
Zen recognises three kinds of understanding; 1m !1: (sruta-prajf'Ui), ,~ !1: 
(cinta-praji'Hl} and •• (bhavana-prajfia}. IllS (sruta-prajfia} is second-hand 
understanding; understanding derived from reading or listening to others' 
experience of m (bodhi). J[t it ( cinta-prajfia} is understanding based on 
analytical reasoning. These two kinds of understanding constitute intellectual 
understanding. These have to be distinguished from the third kind of 
understanding called •• (bhavana-prajfia} which is the "true realisation" of ~ 
(sfinyata). •r~ (bhavana-prajfia} is understanding that arises from within. The 
difference between the three can be illustrated by different ways of figuring out 
how a passion fruit tastes. We can ask people who have tasted it or we can analyse 
chemical components (fruit acid, fructose, vitamin-C, etc.) to fmd out what it 
tastes like. But these methods do not provide true understanding of the taste of a 
passion fruit. The only way one can truly understand its taste is by actually tasting 
it. Actually tasting a passion fruit gives true understanding of its taste. In the same 
way •• (bhavana-prajfia} is true realisation beyond intellectual understanding. 
The other reason which •• (bhavana-prajfia) has to be distinguished from 
intellectual understanding is that only through • it (bhavana-prajfia}, the 
liberation from 15= ( dukha) is possible. Even if one intellectually understood that 
both self as an individual that possesses desire and' craving and art object which he 
13 Takagami, Kakushou. (1933), Wtiti'rC.'*IifiU!i~ in rUUi!.~Jf~- IOJ, (Jit:ii{; .IJlflU), 
p.l38. 
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craves and desires for are ~ (sfinya), he could still feel craving and desire. 
Whereas if one understood these things to be ~ (sfinya) in the sense of iljll 
(bhavana-prajfUi), he would not feel any craving or desire thereby liberated from 
1!f (duhkha). This is similar to the understanding of forbidden love. Suppose you 
feel desire toward a friend's wife or girlfriend. Even if you intellectually 
understood that it is wrong to desire her, it would not stop the emotion. In the 
same manner, even we analytically understand both subject (self that feels desire) 
and object (what self feel desire for) are ~ (sfinya), we cannot stop feeling the 
craving and attachment, thereby not being liberated from 1!f (dukha). 
Since I have not yet attained ffi- (bodhi), I do not know what experience of 
iiJil (bhavana-prajfia) is like other than it is beyond intellectual comprehension. 
Neither can I defend the possibility of iljil (bhavana-prajfia). The only reason 
for me to believe in the possibility is because of various stories talking about the 
Zen masters being liberated from ~ 1! (nama-riipa) and 11!i (dukha). 
Unfortunately I have to leave these questions regarding iljil (bhavana-prajfia) 
unanswered. 
The intellectual understanding of everything we experience and comprehend 
to be ~ (sfulya) is not t-lf (bodhi). ffi- (bodhi) is "true realisation", ilj!l 
(bhavana-prajfia), of everything to be ~ (sfinya). This may suggest 00!1 
(sruta-prajna) and mil (cinta-prajfia) to be totally unnecessary. This is why 
many critiques wrongly consider Zen to be anti-analytical, at the best, 
cheap-intuitionism or anti-intellectualism at the worst. Contrary to this widely 
held view, Zen thinks analytical enquiry is a necessary process in order for one to 
truly realise ffi (bodhi; the enlightenment). Analytical enquiry itself does not 
reveal the world as it really is, but it is the necessary preparation stage for the 
' 
attainment of ffi (bodhi). I will discuss this point in the next section. 
2.1.4. The three levels of comprehension 
So far I have analysed What f¥ (bodhi) is and the positive consequence of 
t! (bodhi). In this section I examine how and what process it takes for the 
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unenlightened to attain t! (bodhi). Understanding the process is important 
because it clarifies the purpose and methodology of this thesis, that sustaining all 
metaphysical beliefs is the necessary step toward attaining t! (bodhi). The 
process of how a person can change from the unenlightened to the enlightened is 
demonstrated by a famous statements made by a Chinese Zen master Wei-hsin14• 
When he was asked about his experience of attaining t! (bodhi) he explained it 
in a following manner; 
Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen, I said 'Mountains 
are mountains, waters are waters.' 
After I got an insight into the truth of Zen through the instruction of a 
good master, I said 'Mountains are not mountains, waters are not 
waters.' 
But now, having attained the abode of final rest, I say 'Mountains are 
really mountains, waters are really waters.' 15 
To understand Wei-hsin's statements we must understand that there are two senses 
of mountain in his statements; one is a definite description (Mountain-d) and the 
other is a general term (Mountain-g). Roles and functions of a definite description 
and a general term are different. A role of the definite description is to pick up a 
certain particular, and it is possible to replace it with an indexical term such as 
"this" or "that". The general term, on the other hand, cannot be replaced with a 
simple indexical term, because it refers ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) which includes 
various concepts such as "a natural elevation of earth surface", "some are 
volcanic", "Chinese believes some mountains are sacred", "view from the top is 
normally spectacular" etc. A general term refers ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) a template 
using which we can label different geological structures into two categories; 
mountains or not-mountains. 
The first stage is the unenlightened stage. As an unenlightened, Wei-hsin 
14 WOO\tl~ (Ch'ing-yUan Wei-hsin; Ch) (Siegen lshin; Jp) Chinese Buddhist monk in T'ang 
d~ty. 
1 Extracted from Abe, M. (1985), Zen and Western Thought, (Honolulu; Univ. ofHawaii Press.) 
p.4 
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suffered from both kinds of {) (maya) and liiftl (viparyasa). He hold the first 
kind of {) (maya) and liiftl (viparyasa) that ~ ~ (nama-rfipa) reflects the 
intrinsic nature of )hi;;x (nirvana). This leads to the second kind; false belief in 
our ability to comprehend )hi;;x (nirvana) using ~ ~ (nama-rfipa). Because of 
these false beliefs, his understanding was trapped by ~ ~ (nama-riipa). He 
could understand things only by sorting out into mountain-g or not-mountain-g 
· and water-g and not-water-g. This is why he identified the geological structure, 
mountain-d with ~ ~ (nama-rfipa), mountain-g. 
The second stage is a sceptic stage in which he recognised that he could not 
understand anything about ~~ (nirvana) using ~ ~ (nama-riipa). He realised 
that identifying mountain-d with mountain-g leads to {) (maya) or li iftl 
(viparyasa), because certain truth about mountain-g were not applicable to 
mountain-d. In other words, he comprehended that mountain-d should not be 
identified with mountain-g. In this sense he almost attained ffi- (bodhi), since he 
was able to comprehend ~ ~ (nama-riipa) to be gg (siinya) and recognise two 
kinds of {) (maya) or liifll (viparyasa) that the unenlightened suffers from. But 
unfortunately, he had not truly realised ~ ~ (nama-riipa) to be gg (sunya). He 
may have intellectually grasped ~ (siinyata) in the senses of Ill ~ 
(sruta-prajfia) and m ~ (cinta-prajfia) and not m terms of • ~ 
(bhavana-prajfia). He had not yet made peace with ~ ~ (nama-riipa) because his 
understanding was still trapped by ~ ~ (nama-riipa); he did not know any other 
way to understand things other than dividing things into mountain-g or 
not-mountain-g. This is proven by Wei-hsin's second statement which is a simple 
negation "x is not-A". If this had been m (bodhi), the true realisation of ~ ~ 
(nama-rfipa) to be ~ (siinya), the second statement would had taken a form of 
the paradoxical statement of"x is A and not-A". 
The third stage is the enlightenment stage. He truly realised gg (slinyata) of 
~.~ . (nama-rfipa) and had no .illusion to what a ~ ~ (nama-riipa) is. This 
enabled him to use mountain-g to describe mountain-d. The first and the third 
statement appeared to be identical, but how he understood mountain-g was 
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different. In the first stage, he was unaware that mountain-g is ~ (sfinya), 
whereas he was fully aware of this fact in the third stage. The first statement 
simply meant mountain-d is mountain-g whereas the third statement means both 
moutain-d is mountain-g and mountain-d is not-mountain-g are equally true 
regarding ~- (nirvana), but as the matter of social consensus and convenience, 
he called it mountain-g. 
The alternative way to understand the third statement to Zen idea of mtliA. 
11) (Jp; chokushi-jinnshinn; direct pointing). It is the idea to interpret Wei-hsin's 
third statement as "mountain-d is mountain-d", in other words it simply meant 
"this is this" (i.e. the mountains he saw in front of him was nothing more or less 
that what he saw). The "direct pointing" is a preferred method used by many Zen 
masters to transmit his understanding of ~ (sfinyata). 
Outside teaching; apart from tradition. 
Not founded on words and letters. 
Pointing directly to the human mind. 
Seeing into one's nature and attaining Buddhahood. 16 
The direct pointing is a way to avoid relating our understanding with ~ fg 
(nama-riipa). By stating simply "this is this", there is no room for the tyranny of 
~ fg (nama-riipa) to set in. 
What is important to notice is the existence of the sceptic stage between the 
unenlightened and the enlightened. In Madhyamika schools and consequently in 
Zen, it is widely believed that attainment of ffi (bodhi) is only possible by 
rejecting everything we believe to know. In other words, only through a sceptical 
attitude toward our experience and knowledge it is possible to attain ffi (bodhi). 
As I quoted Garfield in the beginning of this chapter, scepticism is considered to 
be the cure for our false understanding of reality. The previous section de,alt ~th 
three different kinds of understanding and concluded that intellectual 
16 Watts, Alan W. (1957), ibid., p.93. 
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understanding of ~ (siinyata), which composed of MB (sruta-prajiia) and ~ 
B ( cinta-prajfia), is not m (bodhi). But these two kinds of understanding are 
essential for reaching the sceptical stage. In Chakrabarti's words, Nagarjuna and 
followers of Madhyamika believe "the answer dawns on you through silence 
following a reasoned refutation of all metaphysical views" 17 • The phrase 
"reasoned refutation" indicates denial of metaphysical views using Ill S 
(sruta-prajfia) and ~- (cinta-prajfia). The analytical enquiry into our experience 
and knowledge enables us to reach the sceptic stage and consequently preparing 
us to reach tft (bodhi). Takagami makes a comparison between intellectual 
understanding and a boat to explain the relation. Buddhism famously refers 
attainment of tft (bodhi) as "to reach the other shore (!IJfli.*; paramita)". A boat 
is required in order for us to get to the other shore, but importantly, once we have 
reached the other shore, the boat is no longer needed. There is no need to carry 
round the boat on the other shore, and carrying it only hinders the progress we can 
make on the other shore. In the same manner, rejection of what we believe to 
know through intellectual analysis is needed for the preparation to reach m 
(bodhi), but intellectual understanding does not reveal the true understanding of 
m (bodhi). 
There are different opinions among Buddhists about the process of 
transformation from the unenlightened stage to enlightenment stage. Many 
Ch'an/Zen masters believe the transformation to be sudden and without the 
sceptic stage, whereas others, Wei-hsin among them, believe in a gradual 
transformation which contains the sceptic stage. I think that even ~hough some 
attainment of m (bodhi) appear to be sudden, the second stage existed without 
the person realising it. According to Hadamard18, no inspiration or understanding 
derives suddenly without the period of wondering or struggling to find solution. 
He explains that even what appear to be sudden inspiration and apprehension are 
always preceded by a subconscious incubation period of ideas. The only reason 
17 Chakrabarti, Arindam (1995), "Metaphysics in India" in Kim, Jaegwon & Sosa, Ernest (eds.), A 
Companion to Metaphysics, (Oxford; Blackwell), p.3l9. 
18 Hadmard, J. (1945), An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, 
(Cambridge M.A.; Princeton University Press). 
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we perceive some inspiration and understanding to be sudden is that the preceding 
thought process was carried out not consciously but in subconscious without us 
being aware of it. Hadamard uses many examples mainly from the field of 
mathematics but also from science to prove this point. Let me put two of his 
favourite examples, the way Poincare discovered Hook's function and group and 
Kekule's discovery of the structure of carbon. Poincare discovered similarities 
between transfomations of Hook's function and of non-Euclid when he stepped 
onto a horse carriage while he was not consciously thinking about them. Although 
his discovery seemed promising he struggled to prove it without any success. The 
answer came suddenly as the later time, while walking on a beach after giving up 
on the problem. In neither occasion he was consciously thinking about the 
problem. Similarly, the answer to the mystery of why carbon react certain way, 
came to Kekule in his dream. After many failed attempts to solve the mystery, he 
dreamed a snake which swallowed its own tail. This gave him the idea that carbon 
atoms form closed hexagonal shape rather than open chain. These discoveries 
were not the results of accidents that came out of nowhere. If that were the case, 
anyone could discovered these things. The reason these discoveries occurs to 
Poincare and Kekule and not anyone else was they had thought about these 
problems beforehand,. and their minds had continued to tackled the problem 
subconsciously. In the same manner although the attainment of m (bodhi) 
appears to be sudden without the second stage, the attainment is preceded by the 
second stage, the sceptical apprehension the experience and knowledge. In other 
words, unless a person has questioned the ability of ~ ~ (nama-rtipa) to 
accurately reflect ~~ (nirvana), he would not come to the true realisation that 
every ~ ~ (nama-rtipa) is ~ (sfulya). 
According to Zen, once a person has reached the sceptical stage, a fairly 
insignificant thing or event can enable him to the attainment of m (bodhi). There 
are many stories in Zen where persons suddenly attain f.! (bodhi) from ordinary 
experience. Banzan attained f.! (bodhi) when he heard a butcher saying 
"everthing in my shop is the best" and Chiyono realised ~ (sunya) of everything 
when a pail broke and spilled water. What did they see in the butcher's statement 
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and the broken pail? How did such experiences enable them to attain 1'1 (bodhi)? 
The process was explained in Dogen's remark about a bamboo; ''the entire 
universe manifests itself in ... a tall bamboo tree."19 What did Dogen experience 
when he saw the bamboo? His apprehension of the bamboo to be ~ (siinya) 
made him realised that not only bamboo but everything he experienced and 
comprehended was ~ (siinya). It is similar to Newton's experience of the falling 
apple. What Newton experienced was not only that the apple fell, but also 
underline principle of gravity that applies to everything in the universe. The 
difference between Newton's experience and experience of the enlightened is that 
the former is affirmation, whereas the latter is neither affirmation not negation. 
2.1.5. The summary of the positive ~ (siinyata) 
The Chapter One concluded that because of the tyranny of ~ '@. 
(nama-tiipa) we are not capable of comprehending ~- (nirvana), everything we 
experience and comprehend is inevitably i1 (maya) or IHitJ (viparyasa). Yet, 
Zen thinks it is possible to overcome i1 (maya) and !lifttJ (viparyasa) by 
attaining 1'1 (bodhi). This leads to the questions of what is ffi (bodhi) and how 
does it make it possible to combine the two opposing positions regarding our 
experience and knowledge? These two opposing views are compatible because 
Zen recognises two kinds of i1 (maya) and !lifttJ (viparyasa). The first kind is 
our experience and comprehend that do not correspond iliM (nirvana). What we 
experience or comprehend is said to be i1 (maya) and !I fttj (viparyasa), 
because it does not correspond the way !fifttj (viparyasa) actually is. The second 
kind composed of two false beliefs. One is false belief that ~ '@. (nama-tiipa) 
genuinely reflects ~· (nirvana). This generates the other false belief that we 
are capable to comprehend itiM (nirvana). The unenlightened suffers from both 
kinds of i1 (maya) and !lifttJ (viparyasa). They do not comprehend the way ~ 
M (nirvana) is, but falsely believe that they do. ffi (bodhi) does not enable a 
person to be liberated from the first kind, but at least it get rid of the second kind 
19 Dogen, Shobogenzo, II 89. 
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iJ (maya) and lifltJ (viparyasa). 
Relating to the distinction between the enlightened and unenlightened, there 
are two levels of truth called mm (samvrti-satya; mundane truth) and •• 
(paramartha-satya; absolute truth) as well as two kinds of knowledge, 1\ fi 
(maho; mundane knowledge) and tiS (prajiia; the ultimate knowledge). mm 
(samvrti-satya) and 1\ fi (maho) are what pragmatists think as truth and 
knowledge; they are defined as a matter of convenience and social agreement and 
not defined by the way the mind-independent reality anyway is. tiS (prajfi.a) is 
often considered to be the ultimate knowledge of •• (nirvana) as it really is, 
but as we have learned because experience and knowledge are limited to ;M~ 
(samsara) it is not possible even for the enlightened to understand~- (nirvana) 
as it really is. Instead, I believe tiS (prajfi.a) is simply an apprehension of 1\fi 
(maho) to be iJ (maya) or lft{IIJ (viparyasa). JJf& (paramartha-satya) is the 
truth of ~ (siinyatii) that everything is neither A nor not-A, (i.e. the truth is 
beyond the bi-polar nature of ~ fS (nama-riipa), thereby Ifill (madhyama; the 
middle way)). This raised a question of why such comprehension is considered to 
be positive rather than nihilistic. I answer this question by explaining that it allows 
the enlightened to be in peace with ~ fS s (nama-riipas) and to be liberated from 
~ (duk:ha). 
2.2. The aim and methodology of this thesis 
Relating to what ffi- (bodhi) is, I emphasised the importance of the second 
stage, the sceptic stage. This is because it related to the aim and methodology of 
this thesis. 
2.2.1 The aim of the thesis. 
I started this thesis aiming to present Zen's fundamental metaphysical view of 
the world in order to make sense of Zen's which appear to be illogical and 
puzzling. But because of the nature of ~ (slinyatii), it is not possible to 
understand Zen's ultimate view without attaining m (bodhi), the comprehension 
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beyond capability of analytical enquiry. This means that this thesis cannot express 
Zen's ultimate view. Instead the aim of the thesis is to transform us to the second 
stage towards ffi- (bodhi) by making us to "suspend any metaphysical beliefs" 
and "leave us positionless20". In other words, to makes us realise that, because any 
~ '@. (nam-riipa) according to which we construct experience and knowledge is 
i1 (maya) or !iiitJ (viparylisa), we do not know anything about ~- (nirvana). 
As we learned in this chapter that being sceptical about our experience and 
knowledge is a positive thing. It is an essential step toward attainment of f! 
(bodhi). This is where Zen differs from nihilism. For nihilists, not committing to 
any perspective is the end, so that faced with the inability to commit, the nihilists 
"shrug one's shoulders in indecision"21 • But for Zen, not committing to any 
perspective leads to the liberation from the tyranny of ~ '@. (nama-riipa). The 
aim of this thesis is therefore described as preparing myself and the readers for the 
attainment of m (bodhi) by making us realise that all we can experience and 
comprehend are i1 (maya) and !iiitJ (viparylisa) 
It is easy to make a statement that many metaphysical concepts are ~ 
(siinya), but it is a completely different matter to actually prove each one of them 
to be~ (siinya). The rest of the thesis (except the Chapter Eight) are dedicated to 
prove how plausible it is to regard commonly held metaphysical concepts to be 
not only~ (siinya) but also to delude us and our experience and knowledge to be 
i1 (maya) and lmitJ (viparyasa). 
2.2.2. ~tB8Jm1Bii (prasanga) methodology of this thesis 
Because an unenlightened person like myself cannot make any positive 
comment about what ~- (nirvana) actually is, I will use a method called ~8J 
m1ft ji (prasamga) in order to deny existing metaphysical views. ~ ~ m1ft ji 
(prasamga) is a method of disproving rivalling ideas and doctrines by showing 
how their premises lead to undesirable and implausible conclusion. It was a 
20 Garfield Jay L. (1990), "Epoche and Siinyatii: Skepticism East and Wesf', in Philosophy East 
and West, vol.40, p.2S6 and p.290. 
21 Garfield, Joy L. (1990), ibid, p.290 
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method widely used by Aryadeva 22 , Candrakirti 23 , Santideva 24 and 
Buddha-palita25• This method did not make an obvious and direct impact on 
Ch'an/Zen. But the fact that works of Candrak:Irki and Buddha-palita strongly 
influenced Ch'an/Zen implies that it must have made a not obvious but subtle 
impact on Zen. I believe the use of 1}~ (Jp; kouan) in Zen is the proof. 1}~ 
(Jp; kouan) are riddle-like questions that are given to pupils in order to help them 
to attain t! (bodhi). A famous example of 1}~ (kouan) is the "what is the 
sound of one hand?". It works in two different ways. One is a practical use, which 
is to prevent a pupil's mind to wonder off during meditation. If a pupil is 
preoccupied with a riddle, his mind is less likely to wonder off to think of so many 
other things especially things that could tempt him, such as cravings for sleep, 
comfort, food, sex, etc. The other use is to illustrate the ~ (siinyata) of ~ 1! 
(nama-Iiipa) by making a pupil to realise that it is merely a tool that confuses us 
and prevent us from understanding the way the world really is. 
~~~;! (prasanga) I will use in this thesis to examine the plausibility of 
existing metaphysical theories is based on three criteria; 1) compatibility with 
facts, 2) philosophical plausibility and 3) economy of theory. Obviously the theory 
must be compatible with observable facts. For example theory of numerical 
identity must explain and define what an individual is and how can something 
undergo change yet remain numerically identical. Theory of mind and body must 
explain what they are and why they seem to interact with each other. 
Philosophical plausibility means the rationality of a theory, what exactly the 
theory implies. A theory may concentrate too much on a particular aspect and 
neglect to examine the undesired implication. Philosophical plausibility also 
22 Aryadeva (~ti-) (2nd century CE), Indian Buddhist, a disciple ofNagrujuna. Famous for his 
work; Catuleyataka flmEiiltliJ 
23 Candrakirti (}'j ffl\) (7th century CE), Among three Buddhists I named here, he is famous for the 
method of argument stated above. His works include Prasannapadii and Madhyamakiivatiira W}... 
tf:li*J 
24 Siintideva (~~) (685-763), Buddhist scholar who taught Mahayana doctrines at Nalandii 
University. Only two of his works survived; Szksii-samuccaya W !!f! ~ • Ill A and 
Bodhi-caiyavariira WA. fttJH7~J · 
25 Buddhapalita ('fAil) (470-540), A Tibetian Buddhist of Miidhyamika school. His works is 
considered to be important since it is believed that his understanding closely represent that of 
Nagiirjuna. 
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involves absence of self-contradiction. Any theory that contains self-contradiction 
cannot be true. Because the reality itself cannot be self-contradictory, the 
contradiction must exist in the way we understand reality. The third category, 
economy of theory, in this context means simplicity. The theory should have fewer 
fundamental claims and it should not have many additional claims in order to 
accommodate different circumstances. Some theories make ad hoc modifications 
or reinterpretations of a theory, or arbitrarily narrow their domain of applicability. 
According to Occam's razor, those theories tend not to represent a true picture of 
reality. Using this method, the rest of this thesis (except Chapter Eight) examine 
plausibility of ~ (stinyata) against various existing metaphysical theories that 
claims certain thing we experience or comprehend to accurately reflect the way 
the mind-independent reality actually is. 
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In both Chapter One and Chapter Two, I explained that 4!5 ~ (nama-rtipa) is 
~ (sOnya), because the division between A and not-A, which defines 4!5 ~ 
(nama-rtipas) is ~.»., (samskrta) and such division is not 1311 (svabhava). In 
other words, any division that defines 4!5 ~ (nama-rtipas) is a product of human 
convention and not derived from the way the mind-independent reality is actually 
divided. 
For the boundaries of physical objects are not given by nature, not are 
the classes of events that count as "of the same type" that underline 
the generalizations that vouchsafe the attributions of explanatory 
significance involving words like "because." The canonizations of 
sortals and of object-boundaries drawn in space, time, and 
composition require social and linguistic conventions. 1 
The problem of 4!5 ~ (nama-rtipa), which the negative ~ (siinyata) illustrates, 
is that even though divisions are human inventions for the purpose of convenience, 
somehow we end up falsely believing that these divisions have objective 
legitimacy or that these divisions exist in the mind-independent reality. For 
example, we believe each human being is an ontologically or metaphysically 
distinct and separable entity, and we believe apples and oranges to be two distinct 
species. In order to defend ~ .»., (samskrta) and 1111311 (asvabhava) of 4!5 ~ 
(nama-rtipa) I will examine legitimacy of Zen's belief against realism which 
believes the division actually exists in the mind-independent reality and it is 
something we discover. 
Regarding identity condition, there are two issues, one is being identical and 
the other is being judged or regarded as identical. In other words the two issues 
are the issue of identity and the issue of identity judgement. Realists believe they 
are not two separate issues; they believe that we judge two things to be identical, 
because they are identical, as well as we judge two things to be distinct, because 
they are distinct. Zen on the other hand-believes that there is no direct connection 
1 Garfield, Jay L. (1990), "Epoche and Sunyatii: Skepticism East and West," in Philosophy East 
and West, vol.40, p.293. 
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between the two issues (i.e. the former does not necessarily determine the latter). 
Even if two things are identical, we may not recognise them to be identical, as 
well as we may falsely judge things to be identical, even though they are not. Zen 
thinks identity judgement is matter of human convenience and social convention, 
therefore identity judgement is arbitrary and not necessarily based upon facts. 
There are two kinds of division between being the same and different; one is 
numerical division and the other is qualitative division. These two kinds of 
division have to be distinguished because a condition for qualitative identity and a 
condition for numerical identity are different. This is clear from the fact that being 
numerically identical and qualitatively identical do not necessarily coincide with 
each other. A numerically identical thing can be qualitatively different or 
perceived as being so, as well as two numerically distinct things can be 
qualitatively identical, so that they are referred to by the same word or concept. 
This thesis deals with the objective legitimacy of qualitative divisions and 
numerical divisions separately. As numerical identity is often defmed in relation to 
qualitative identity, in order to analyse the objective legitimacy of numerical 
identity, this thesis tackles qualitative identity in the Chapter Three before 
analysing numerical identity in the Chapter Four. 
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3. 
Qualitative division 
As mental capacity of human is limited, in order to simplify what we 
experience and comprehend, we categorise things into different classes or types, 
such as natural kinds (human, water, ball), action (running, throwing), properties 
(blue, soft, agitating), events (party, seminar). A qualitative division defines 
qualitative identities of these classes and types by determining the boundary 
between what are "of the same type" and what are not. Zen thinks these classes 
and types are ~~ (nama-Iiipa) thereby they are ~ (slinya). In other words, 
these qualitative divisions that defines classes and types are products of human 
inventions and they are not the way in which ~- (nirvana) is actually divided. 
As I explained in the Chapter Two, ~ (sfulya) can only be demonstrated by 
~~Bit (prasanga), I will argue against the realist who believes certain qualitative 
divisions are intrinsic and that they are something discovered. 
3.1.Zen versus realism 
A realist thinks that general terms and concepts reflect the way the world is, 
because reality determines where qualitative divisions lie. Zen opposes this realist 
belief. It thinks human values specify where a qualitative division lies and not 
reality. Garfield wrote; 
[the realist] argues that there are particular semantic facts which 
constitute or determine the meanings of words and which we grasp 
when we know word ll?eanitlg ... 
[Buddhist on the other hand thinks that] word meamng and the 
assertability of correctness regarding word use rest not upon such facts 
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but upon a network of social conventions regarding word use.1 
Because realism assumes qualitative division to be intrinsic to the 
mind-independent reality, realism can be identified as supporting following two 
claims. 
• Qualitative divisions exist in ~ ;,;x (nirvana), so they are 
something we discover rather than something we invent. 
• Disagreement and discrepancies in the judgement of where a 
qualitative division lies is a result of ignorance or misapprehension 
of~- (nirvana) 
Zen opposes this view. As Watts2 describes, Zen thinks there are no ready-made 
boundaries (so-to-speak) in reality. But as we need to communicate with each 
other and organise our thoughts, we invent qualitative divisions to simplify the 
complex affair of reality. Qualitative divisions thereby reflect social and cultural 
agreements and not objective facts. Huntington writes; 
a) "The truth value of a collection of words or concepts derives from 
its being used in a manner that may be seen as somehow consistent 
with the conceptual matrix of the socio-linguistic community in 
which it occurs." 
b) "The meaning of a word or concept derives from its usage in some 
particular socio-linguistic community, and not from its reference to 
any real object".3 
To further clarify the difference between Zen and realism, let me refer to Dupre's 
description of realism. Dupre describes realism as believing (scientific) concepts 
1 Garfielf Jay L. (1990), "Epoche and Siinyatii; Skepticism East and West", in Philosophy East 
and West, vol. 40, p.290. A similar comparison is made by Has~e, Daizaburo~ (198?), r il\*.!l 
O)~K!tiiii3J ("Lfuguistic tactics ofBuddhlsm''), k W-l.ftttJi!H~J (Modern Thouht), p.272-i9I 
2 Watts Alan W. (1957), The Way of Zen, (N.Y.; Mentor Book), p.l9-21 
3 Huntington, C. W. Jr. (1983), "A 'nonreferential' view oflanguage and conceptual thought in the 
work ofTson-kha-pa", in Philosophy East and West, vol.33, p.326. 
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to "curves the nature by its joint4" (meaning a division we recognise matches with 
the divisions exists in mind-independent reality). Zen's position can be expressed 
as "we curve the nature in any way convenient for us". Our choice of qualitative 
division reflects human values, such as interest, convenience and social agreement. 
There may be infinite numbers of alternative ways to divide, classify or categorise 
the world. Among those infinite ways available to us, we choose a certain 
boundary, because it reflects our interest and convenience, and there is no rational 
or scientific reason to why a certain boundary should be chosen above all other 
possible divisions. This means that disagreement or discrepancy regarding a 
qualitative division arises because our choice of where the qualitative division lies 
is arbitrary. 
3.2.Realist's theories and their problems 
In order to address the implausibility of the realist belief, I choose to prove 
gg (siinyata) of so-called natural kinds. Zen does not believe natural kinds to be 
special, it believes their qualitative division to be as ~ 1.t, (samskrta) as any other 
divisions. Whereas realists believe that even though some qualitative divisions 
may be products of human convention, at least qualitative divisions of natural 
kinds are unlikely to be human inventions, therefore they are something we 
discover in nature. The task of the realist is to establish a theory which proves that 
a qualitative division that defines a natural kind is intrinsic to the 
mind-independent reality. Of the many realist's theories of qualitative division, I 
will concentrate upon just two; one-over-many theory5 and essentialism. My task 
is to critically examine the plausibility of these realist's theories in order to test the 
sustainability of the realists belief in qualitative divisions. 
3 .2.1. The one-over-many theory 
This theory has been one of the most influential realist's theories of 
qualitative division. The idea of the one-over-many theory originated in Plato's 
idea of"Form" (eidos). For Plato, Form is a template which particulars exe~plify 
4 Dupre, John. (1993), The Disorder ofThings, (Cambridge, U.S.A; Harvard Univ. Press), p.70. 
5 The term is used by Aune in his Aune, Bruce. (1985), Metaphysics- The Element -, 
(Minneapolis, U.S.A.; Univ. of Minnesota Press). 
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or materialise in various degrees. There are many literatures written on Plato's 
form, so I will concentrate upon a more generalised one-over-many theory. The 
one-over-many theory explains qualitative sameness in terms of being one and the 
same universal, or having the same or similar relation to one and the same 
universal. Two numerically different objects x andy can be both denoted by "Q", 
when x andy exemplify or have a relation to one and the same universal Q. For 
example, two particular objects are recognised to be cows, if they instantiate the 
same univiersal, namely cow. An animal which we call a horse is not cow, because 
it does not manifest the same universal. Those who support the one-over-many 
theory believe that the world is made out of two kinds of basic elements or beings; 
particulars and universals. The difference between the two is normally explained 
as that the former is restricted by space and time, whereas the latter is not. What 
this means is that there can only be one particular which exists at any given 
moment, whereas the latter can be manifested in several places simultaneously. 
Providing space and time as criteria to distinguish particulars and universals is 
problematic. Lowe provides two examples where a particular can exist in two 
distinct locations. The first is an example of a dismantled watch6• The watch can 
exist in two locationsifthe casing is in a drawer and the mechanism is on a table, 
for example. He also recognises that if time travel is possible, the same person 
(John) from the future, present and the past can stand side by side. Then, 
according the spatio-temporal account, John must be a universal for he exists in 
three different locations. There are further developments 7 in distinguishing 
particulars and universals. For example, Lowe offered an solution to the 
dismantled watch example by providing a restrictions. He defined universal as 
something that is instantiated as well as instantiate another entity, whereas a 
particular instantiates another entity, but itself cannot be instantiated by something 
else. 
The arguments for the modem one-over-many theory are subject-predicate 
discourse and the abstract singular term. The both arguments are based upon the 
assumption that, in order for a sentence such as "a is b" to have any truth value, 
6 Lowe E.J. (2002), A Survey of Metaphysics, (Oxford; Oxford Univ. Press), p.349. 
7 Lowe E J (1998), The Possibility of Metaphysics, (Oxford; Clarendon), p.l55 and also his (2002), 
A Survey of Metaphysics, (Oxford; Oxford University Press), p350. 
97 
Qualitative divisions 
both a and b must denote something. This assumption derives from a simple 
analysis of a sentence "a is b" where both a and b refer to particulars. For example 
a sentence "the morning star is the evening star" is true because "the morning 
star" and "the evening star" describes one and the same heavenly body Venus. 
Whereas a sentence "the moring start is mbaa" does not have truth value, since 
"mbaa" does not refer to anything. In the same way, in order for sentence such as 
"Socrates is courageous" and "this chair is blue" to have true values not only 
particulars (Socrates and this chair) but also universals (courageous and blue) 
must exist. 
Universal can be not only a predicate but also be a subject of a 
subject-predicate sentence8• When a universal is the subject of a sentence, it is 
called an abstract singular term. Sentences which include abstract singular terms 
are "courage is an important virtue" and "blue is a soothing colour". These 
sentences consist entirely of universals (courage, virtue, blue and colour). These 
sentences have truth value even if there is no particular that actually exemplifies 
courage or blue. What a subject and a predicate denote are not particulars and they 
do not require the existence of particular. There are further debates regarding the 
general terms to denote universals (such as between Ramsey9 and Quine1<) which 
I would like to omit in this thesis, for they do not have significant influence upon 
the outcome. 
The first problem of the one-over-many theory is that the truth value of both 
subject-predicate discourse and abstract singular term sentence can be explained 
without postulating universal. Predicate can be understood to denote a group of 
particulars rather than universal. For example, "Socrates is courageous" can be 
translated as "Socrates is one of the particulars denoted by the word courageous". 
In a similar way, a sentence that includes an unexemplified abstract singular term 
as a predicate can be translated to be an conditional sentence about particular or 
particulars. For example, "blue is a soothing colour" means ""if something is blue, 
it is one of the particulars that has a soothing effect". I do not believe it is an 
8 Loux,J'vfichael.J .. (\978),_Substance.andAttribute, (Dordrecht;Reidel); chapter 4. 
9 RIDnsey, F P. (1925), "Universals", in Mellor, D H. & Oliver, Alex. (eds.), (1997), Properties, 
(Oxford; Oxford Univ. Press.). 
10 Quine W.V. (1948), "On what there is", reprinted in Mellor, D H. & Oliver, Alex. (eds.), (1997), 
Properties, (Oxford; Oxford Univ. Press.) 
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effective way to prove or disprove ontological independence of the universal by 
analysing the truth value of a sentence. I think there is a fundamental problem in 
using the truth value of a sentence to indicate existence of what they denote. It is 
possible for a sentence to have truth value, even though a particular which the 
sentence denote does not exist. Imagine a sentence "Hera is a wife of Zeus". 
There is no concrete particular which "Hera" denotes, but the sentence is true and 
"Hera is a wife of Cronos" is false. 
Other two main objections against the one-over-many theory concern what is 
known as problems of regress. One is the problem of infinite exemplification and 
the other is the problem of semantic regress which is also known as Bradley's 
regress. If every truth about an particular is explained in terms of exemplifying 
corresponding universals, then a particular must be exemplifying infinite number 
of universal. Consider a Yorkshire man. Being a Yorkshire man implies further 
natural kinds which he belongs to or exemplifies, such as Caucasian, British, 
Homo sapiens, mammal, vertebrate, animal, organic being, carbon-based entity, 
and so forth. This regress can go on forever, thereby kinds that an object belongs 
to or exemplifies can mounts up to infinite. This leads to the absurd implication of 
the one-over-many theory that even a simple object exemplifies or be composed 
of an infinite many universals. 
The problem known as Bradley's regress derives from the fact that the 
one-over-many theory is not clear about the relation that is supposed to exist 
between the universal and the particular. If relation is explained in the form of 
universal, then, the relation between the particular and the universal require 
further universal. According to one-over-many theory, a sentence ''this ball is red" 
is understood to be true if the particular "this ball" exemplifies the universal "red 
(or being red)". But if exemplification is considered as a relation, then further 
exemplification emerges, namely exemplify the relation of exemplification that 
exists between the ball and red. This leads to infinite regress regarding 
exemplification; 
This ball is red 
This ball,exemplifies red. 
This ball exemplifies "exemplification of red". 
This ball exemplifies "exemplification of the exemplification of red". 
99 
Qualitative divisions 
I believe the one-over-many theory goes to unnecessary lengths to explain 
simple qualitative distinction. There are many alternative theories that are simpler 
and capable of explaining qualitative division without introducing the problematic 
concept of the universal as an ontologically independent entity. The theory 
explains how two or more objects can be identify to be the same kind, but it does 
not clarify how we can identify universals. In other words, it does not specify the 
criteria of qualitative identity judgement. 
3.2.2. Essentialism 
According to essentialism, the qualitative division is determined by the 
presence or the absence of a certain property, or a set of properties. An object is 
said to have the qualitative identity of Q, if it has a certain property or set of 
properties P which defmes Q. Whereas if the object does not have the property P, 
then it is recognised to be not-Q. Therefore, numerically distinct objects x andy 
can be qualitatively identical if they both possess the same property or the same 
set of properties, but they do not have to share every property in common. They 
only have to share an essential property P which defines the qualitative identity of 
Q. Suppose a fish, a bird, a cat, and a human. They all belong to a kind; 
vertebrates, because they all have the essential property of having a backbone. In 
other words, the kind vertebrate is defined by the essential property of having a 
backbone. Other properties these creatures possess or exhibit are accidental with 
regards to being vertebrate, because they do not influence whether these creatures 
are vertebrate or not. 
The first problem essentialism faces is the difficulty in identifying a primary 
essential property which defines the qualitative identity of a natural kind. Take the 
example of an elephant, we can write a long list of properties which the elephant 
possesses, such as "a long and nimble trunk", "thick grey skin", "big ears" and so 
forth. But none of these seem to be the essential primary property that defmes 
being an elephant because some elephants that lack one of or all of these 
properties, due to mutilation or genetic mutation, can still be recognised as 
elephants. 
The second problem derives from the progress of science. With scientific 
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development, the definition of the term changes and the boundary of the 
qualitative division shifts accordingly. To solve the problem, it is possible to argue 
that the past qualitative division was false or a mistake which arose from 
ignorance. But this leads to the pessimistic meta-induction from past falsity (see 
section 1.2.2.2.2.a). If all the qualitative divisions that past scientific theories 
proposed turned out to be false, the current qualitative divisions are most likely to 
be false again. 
To combat these problems, a new theory was proposed by Kripke and Putnam 
which is commonly known as the Kripke-Putnam theory of natural kind term. In 
this thesis, I would like to concentrate on Putnam's theory. This theory claims that 
a qualitative division of natural kind is defined by microstructural (or theoretical) 
truth and not by a stereotype. What Putnam calls a stereotype consists of 
properties that we normally associate the natural kind with. For example, to use 
Putnam's favourite examples, a stereotype of water is a transparent liquid which 
does not have any specific taste, freezes at 0°c and boils at 1 00°c, it is not sticky 
or dense like syrup. Another example is gold which is yellow coloured shiny 
metallic material. He argues that what defines natural kinds such as water and 
gold is not the stereotypes, but microstructural truth; water is something 
composed of two hydrogen molecules and an oxygen molecule and gold is 
something whose nucleus consists of seventy nine positrons. To illustrate this 
point Putnam provides his famous Twin-Earth argument11 • To summarise the idea, 
he imagined a planet similar to Earth in almost every way, but there is one 
difference; what the people of Twin-Earth call "water" has a different molecular 
structure called XYZ and not H20. The problem is that the stereotype of 
Twin-Earth-water (hereby twater) and the stereotype of Earth-water are identical, 
(i.e. twater looks and tastes like water, it freezes and boils like water, it has the 
same consistency as water, etc.). If the qualitative division of natural kind is 
defined by stereotype, we end up including twater into the type water. But twater 
should be distinguished from genuine water. The only way to distinguish between 
the two is to use the microstructural truth as the criterion for establishing a 
qualitative division of natural kind. Regafatess of how twater fits with the 
11 Putnlllll, Hilary. (1975) "The meaning of 'meaning"', in Harnish, Robert M. (ed.}(l994), Basic 
Topics in the Philosophy of Language, (Hertfordshire; Harvester Wheatsheat), p.228-234. 
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stereotype of water, since it does not consist of two hydrogen atoms and an 
oxygen atom, it cannot be included in the natural kind of water. What the 
Twin-Earth argument shows is that even if an object fails to match the appearance 
or properties of the stereotype, as long as it possesses microstructural (or 
theoretical) truth that defmes the natural kind Q, the object can be identified as Q. 
The obvious question that arises from Putnam's theory of natural kind terms 
is how did we recognise water before the molecular structures of water or gold 
were discovered. Putnam believes that the qualitative division of natural kind is 
determined by the way the world is, but not by the way we perceive it. So that ~f 
water is H20, then water has always been H20 regardless of whether or not we are 
aware of its microstructural truth. It is a mistake to identify twater as water even if 
we are ignorant of the microstructural truth of water. In the same manner, he 
explains all disagreement and discrepancy regarding qualitative division in terms 
of "the division of linguistic labour12." It is a division between experts and 
laypersons; those who know microstructural truth and those who are ignorant of it. 
According to the division of linguistic labour, because microstructural truth 
defines natural kinds, disagreement does not occur among experts. The only 
chance for disagreement to occur is where a layperson is present, because he is 
ignorant of the microstructural truth of water. And such disagreement can be 
solved by an expert educating the layperson about the microstructural truth. 
There are many problems with Putnam's theory of natural kind. Firstly there 
is a doubt as to the expert's ability to recognise the microstructural truth. Putnam's 
argument assumes that that experts have the ability to comprehend reality as it as. 
However, as we saw in Chapter One, even scientists suffer from i1 (maya) and 
D iiJ (viparyasa) because their understanding are influenced by ~ 1S 
(nama-riipa) of auxiliary hypothesis (section 1.2.2.2.1 ), paradigm and contextual 
value (section 1.2.2.2.2.b). These arguments demonstrated that the definitions of 
scientific terms and outcomes of scientific judgements are influenced by those 
values, and even experts are not capable of escaping from them. This proves the 
point that qualitative divisions in science are not defined purely by objective fact 
as Putnam wishes. 
12 Putnam Hilary (1975), ibid. p.232. 
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The second problem is that of applicability. Certain natural kinds such as 
water and gold can be defined in terms of microstructural truth, but there is a 
serious doubt to the existence of fundamental microstructural truths regarding 
natural kinds outside of pure chemistry and physics. Dupre argues that Putnam's 
theory cannot explain qualitative divisions of natural kinds in biology and 
taxonomy. Taxonomy seems to indicate that scientific qualitative divisions are 
influenced by the qualitative divisions of everyday life rather than the way 
Putnam suggests. For example, scientifically, birds should not be a class called 
Aves, but an order that belongs to Reptilia alongside Chelonia (tortoises and 
turtles, Crocodilia (alligators and crocodiles) and Squamata (snakes, lizards, etc.) 
This is because the microstructural truth that defines Reptilia is also applicable to 
all birds. The only reason Aves is considered as a class and not an order is that the 
ordinary language laypersons use has influenced science and not the other way 
round as Putnam assumes. 
Dupre 13 argues further that essentialism fails to explain not only the 
qualitative division in taxonomy but also the most fundamental qualitative 
division between natural kinds of male and female. There is no genetic essence or 
sex specific behaviour common to everything that is recognised to male. There is 
no anatomical sameness. For example the male Ginko tree has no anatomical 
similarity to male mammals. The qualitative division between male and female is 
not determined by microstructural truth but rather by stereotypes or the general 
similarities that exists among members of male or female. Interestingly there is a 
passage *1:$*114 (Vunalak:Irti-niradesa-siitra) which deals with ~ (siinyata) of 
the qualitative division between male and female. When Sariputta15 (~"JT-) met 
devakanyii (~3t; a celestial maiden), he asked why she took the female form and 
not the male form. To answer his question using her superhuman power she 
changed Sariputta into a female and replied ''the enlightened one understand that 
everything is neither male nor female", because such division is~ (siinya). 
13 Dupre, John. (1993), The Disorder ofThings, (Cambridcge, M.A., U.S.A; Harverd Univ. Press), 
p.68-84 . 
14 UfUftft~ {VIIDalak.Irti-niradesa-sutra), VI. 
15 Sariputta (~"JT-) is athe cheif diciple of Gautama Buddha. In many Buddhism texts were 
written in a form of Gautama Buddha talking to Sariputta. 
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There is also what Brown calls "the composition problem16." The problem 
arises from the fact that natural kinds normally exist in impure forms. For 
example "the stuff in rivers and lakes etc. typically contains not only H20, but 
also D20, H202, salt and other minerals etc."17 Including the impure liquid as 
water is not a problem for Putnam's theory, as long as the liquid contains H20. 
The problem is that this allows blood, coffee and tea to be water as well. I believe 
this also illustrates another problem in that the qualitative division is not as clear 
or definite as Putnam wishes. Even if I add a pinch of salt, a half glass of water 
remains to be water. If I keep adding a pinch of salt, then at some point there is 
more salt than water in the glass, and it becomes saturated salt rather than salt 
water. But at which point does the content of the glass cease to be water? If we do 
not regard the glass of dampened salt as water, then there must be some defmable 
point at which the content of the glass turns from water to salt. Moreover, 
according to Putnam because a qualitative division is something to be discovered, 
this point must be agreeable to all experts. Some may argue that the boundary is 
whether salt or water composes more than 50% of the content of the glass. But a 
question is how to defme 50%. Chemistry uses different way of measuring 
percentage. Percentage can be based on weight, mass or mole (atomic weight). 
One solution to the problem may be as Abbot18 concluded, to allow only the pure 
form of water to be known as water. This, however, makes the kind ''water" 
useless, because it cannot be applied to many liquids referred to water in common 
language. 
A problem of Putnam's theory which is relevant to ~ (siinyata) is his idea 
that disagreement and discrepancy regarding a qualitative division of a natural 
kind can be solved by experts. Let me express the problem using an example of 
cross-breeding between a tiger and a lion. 
16 Brown, Jessica. (1998), ''Natural kind terms and recognitional capacities", in Mind, vol.107, 
p.280. 
7 Brown, Jessica. (1998), ibid. p.281 
18 Abbot, Barbara. (1997), "A note on the nature of water'', in Mind, vol.l06, p.313-3l9. 
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[Fig.2.1.] Cross-breeding . 
........................ G>rCD ········· · · · ······ · ·········~ L; Lion T; Tiger TL; The cross-bred 
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6.25%Lion 
..... .... TL5 T 
.. -----··· 
,. · ············· · ······~ 
98.4375% Tiger .................... . 
1.5625% Lion 
Regarding the qualitative identity of cross-breeding between lion and tiger, 
contrary to what Putnam claim, disagreement can arise even among experts. A 
disagreement can derive from difference in the choice of criteria. Qualitative 
identity judgement can be determined by different criteria such as appearance, 
behaviour, genetic structure (DNA), ancestry, and so forth. Depending on which 
criteria a taxonomist uses, the outcome of qualitative identity judgement differs. 
For example, if the taxonomist chooses ancestry as the criterion of qualitative 
identity, then the cross-breed is neither tiger nor lion, but a new species called 
"liger" or "tigon". Whereas if appearance or genetic make-up is chosen, TL6 may 
be recognised to be a tiger (since TL6 is more than 98% tiger). This is the first 
kind of disagreement, the disagreement concerning criteria of qualitative identity 
judgement. 
Even if taxonomists could agree upon the criteria according to which a 
natural kind is determined, experts may disagree on where the qualitative division 
lies. Genetically TL6 is 98.4375% tiger which appears to be within the allowance 
of genetic diversity prevalent in the entire population of tiger. Supposing we 
compare TL6 wilh a tiger which suffers a genetic mutation. It is possible that even 
though its parents are both 100% tiger, the mutant has a lower number of genetic 
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properties of a tiger than TL6. In this case, essentialism has to choose one of the 
following two options. If we recognise the mutant as a tiger then we must 
recognise TL6 as a tiger, too. If we regard TL6 as a new species and not a tiger, 
then we cannot classify the mutant as a tiger. These essentialist interpretations, 
however, contradict with normal taxonomic practice. In taxonomy, the mutant is 
still regarded as tiger (a mutant tiger), whereas TL6 would be regarded as a 
separate species from a tiger, a cross-breed of the lion and the tiger. Moreover, the 
case of cross-breeding illustrates the fact that our qualitative divisions are often 
blurred and ambiguous. There is a discrepancy as to where people draw the 
boundary of qualitative division between the mutant tiger and the cross-breed. For 
example, some may refuse to classify any off-spring of cross-breeding as a tiger at 
all, even though it may be 99.999 .... % tiger. Some may classify any off-spring 
with 90% or more of a tiger's properties to be a tiger (i.e. from the fourth 
generation onwards), whereas others would claim only the sixth generation 
onwards (in excess of 98% tiger) can accurately be regarded as a tiger. Putnam 
would argue there is no disagreement among experts with sufficient knowledge 
regarding the qualitative identity of TL6. This implies that there must be one 
definite percentage which all capable experts would agree upon. Such an idea 
seems to be implausible. We cannot dismiss the discrepancy in qualitative identity 
judgement as simply a result of ignorance. The discrepancy is rather the result of a 
difference in individual opinion, preference, and convenience. This indicates that 
the qualitative division is ~ ~ ( samskrta) and not 1311 ( svabhava; intrinsic) to 
~;JX (nirvana). 
Since realists believe that there must be a definite qualitative division 
between being a tiger and not being a tiger, some decisions must be more 
objectively legitimate or more accurately correspond with the way in which the 
world is structured, and the disagreement and discrepancy would be resolved by 
the progress of our knowledge. Contrary to what the realist believes, it is difficult 
to dismiss these disagreements among taxonomists simply as results of ignorance 
or miscomprehension of reality. The above arguments indicate that the choice of 
criteria ~d where the boundary lies appears to be a matter of opinion. rather than 
particular essence or microstructural truth. 
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I may be accused of being unfair towards Putnam. Putnam uses the term 
natural kinds to denote a much narrower spectrum of things than I do. According 
to Putnam, natural kind term is a rigid non-descriptional term. This means that my 
argument against realism may not be applicable to Putnam's theory, but I have 
doubts as to the benefit of such a narrow field of definition. For example, 
Deutch 19 states that Kripke-Putnam's theory may be philosophically 
well-founded but it is rarely mentioned in linguistics, as the theory cannot explain 
the ordinary use of language. 
3.3. ~ (sunyati) of qualitative divisions 
3.3.l.Qualitative divisions and human values 
As we have seen above, it is not plausible to defend the realist's idea of 
natural kinds that their qualitative divisions are intrinsic to the mind-independent 
reality and they are something we discover. Contrary to what realists suppose, 
discrepancy, disagreement and diversity regarding where qualitative division is 
drawn cannot be dismissed simply as results of ignorance. Like the example of the 
cross-breeding between lion and tiger illustrated, disagreement is a result of 
personal choice and preference and not result of ignorance, because there is no 
definite and universal answer to where the qualitative division between tiger and 
not-tiger lies. This conforms with Zen's concept of ~ (siinyata). According to 
the concept, every qualitative division which ~ '{:g (nama-rupa) suggests is a 
product of human invention (~ ~; samskrta), so that it is determined by human 
values such as preference, convenience and social consensus and not by the way 
mind-independent reality(~~; nirvana) actually is. In other words, even though 
we may divide, categorise and label what we comprehend in terms of the 
qualitative division between A or not-A, there is not such division exist in the 
mind-independent reality. This is because every qualitative division is something 
we project upon what we experience and comprehend. As quotations from 
Garfield and Huntington indicated, meaning, assertability and truth value of 
concepts. or words which Buddhism calls ~.-(:g (nama-rupa) derives from human 
19 Deutsch, Harry. (1993), "Semantic for natural kind terms", in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
vol.23, p.389-412. 
107 
Qualitative divisions 
value and not from the way the mind-independent reality actually is. 
The way qualitative divisions derives from human values can be explained 
as follow. At a micro level, an individual divides, classifies and labels the world in 
the way he or she fmds useful. For example people organise their bookshelves in 
the alphabetical order of authors' names or of titles, size or category according to 
personal convenience. At a macro level, a certain invented qualitative division is 
accepted by society because other members of the society find it useful or they 
themselves have made a similar qualitative division. People try to agree on the 
definition or scope of a certain concept or how the world should be divided, 
because it is useful for people to communicate and understand each other. If 
people cannot agree on a definition or meaning of a word or a concept, the 
conversation is comparable to two people speaking in different languages. Once 
the qualitative division is accepted by the society, members of the society learn to 
classify the world accordingly, as Watts' stated; 
Just as people speaking the same language have tacit agreements as to 
what words shall stand for what things, so the members of every 
society and every culture are united by bonds of communication 
resting upon all kinds of agreement as to the classification and 
valuation of actions and things. 
Thus the task of education is to make children fit to live in a society 
by persuading them to learn and accept its codes - the rules and 
conventions of communication whereby the society holds itself 
together. There is frrst the spoken language. The child is taught to 
accept "tree" and not "boojum" as the agreed sign for that (pointing to 
the object). We have no difficulty in understanding that the word 
''tree" is a matter of convention. What is much less obvious is that 
convention also governs the delineation of the thing to which the word 
is assigned. For the child has to be taught not only what words are to 
stand for what things, but also the way in which his culture has tacitly 
agreed to divide things from each other, to mark out the boundaries 
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within our daily experience?0 
Where we choose to draw qualitative division influences qualitative identity 
judgement. Supposing there are three different definitions of a concept Q. To say x 
and y are qualitatively identical, we have to specify in what sense or in terms of 
which ~iS (nama-riipa). 
[Fig.2.2] Qualitative identity judgement 
~ 
~ 
I 
··········~·-············~······· 
In this example, qualitative identity ofx andy are 
different according to which definition of the Q is 
used. 
Q I; x is not Q but y is Q, therefore x and y are 
qualitatively different. 
Q2; x is Q, and y is also Q, therefore x and y are 
qualitatively identical. 
Q3 ; x is Q but y is not, therefore x and y are 
qualitatively distinct. 
Qualitative division plays a necessary part in our comprehension of reality, 
because seeing something in the hi-value manner of Q or not-Q is the way in 
which we simplify the complex affair of reality. The problem is that, as we learned 
in the Chapter One, the hi-value perspective (A or not-A) of the world causes the 
tyranny of :8 fB (nama-rupa). We see something in the wrong way (~ -fitj; 
viparyasa) or see an illusion (~l ; maya) because we falsely believe qualitative 
divisions we use are determined by the way the mind-independent reality is 
actually divided. As I explained in Chapter Two, understanding of ~iS 
(nama-riipa) to be ~ (siinya) is important because it is the only way to be 
liberated from ~l (maya) and H -fitj (viparyasa), and consequently from 15 
( duhkha). I have therefore spent a substantial part of this chapter in the critical 
analysis of realist theories. 
3.3.2. Why we falsely believe qualitative division? 
et u now move onto a question of why we falsely believe the existence of 
20 Watts, Alan (1957), The Way ofZen, (N.Y.; Mentor Books), p.IS-19. 
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qualitative divisions which !6 '@. (nama-riipas) implies, and if not reality then 
what determines our choice of a certain qualitative division over others. 
The commonly held belief in intrinsic nature, § 11 (svabhava), of 
qualitative division between natural kinds is strongly related to religious belief. 
Religions, especially ones that have faith in a creationist view, assume that 
qualitative divisions between different natural kinds are objective fact because 
they are God given. These religions think a human being is created as a human 
being, and a cow is created as a cow, a bird as a bird. For example in Genesis; 
God commanded, "Let the earth put forth vegetation, plants, yielding 
seed, and trees bearing fruit in which is their seed, each according to 
its kind."- and it was done ... 
God commanded, "Let the water bring forth swarms of living 
creatures, and let birds fly across the heavens." So God created the 
great sea monsters and every living creature with which the waters 
swarm, and every winged bird ... 
God commanded, "Let the earth bring forth living creatures: cattle and 
creeping things and beasts of the earth." So God made the beasts of 
the earth, and the cattle, and everything that creeps upon the ground 
according to its kind ... 
Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; 
and let them have domination over all the earth." So God created man 
in his own image, in the image of God he created him; make and 
female he created them. And God blessed them, saying, "be fruitful 
and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; ... 
This explains why people with the creationist's religious faith believe in objective 
qualitative division, but it does not fully clarify why many of us who do not hold a 
strong religious view still falsely assume objective legitimacy in qualitative 
divisions. Even though religious beliefs are no longer upheld by the majority, the 
way in which religions have divided the world is passed down to us, and we do 
not change this, because changing something which people have already agreed 
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upon would make communication difficult. Even though there may be an infinite 
number of alternative ways to divide and classify things, we stick with the widely 
accepted division as it is the most convenient one. We choose a certain way of 
dividing and classifying things not because it is objectively more legitimate, but 
because it conforms with the way in which society has previously divided and 
classified things. This phenomena is called social conformity and it is widely 
studied in social psychology. Various experiments carried out by Sherif1, Asch22, 
Larsen23 and Crutchfield24 indicated that the choices an individual make follow 
what a majority has chosen. In Asch's experiments, subjects were given the simple 
task of identifying which of three lines on a card matched the standard line. 
Subjects were put into groups where others were impostors who were instructed to 
give wrong answer. In such environment, the subjects agreed with the group 
decision. This indicates that humans are social animals who are reluctant to invent 
or use a qualitative division which contradicts the opinion and tradition of the 
majority. This is why we are stuck qualitative divisions derived from religions and 
falsely believe them to be intrinsic to the mind-independent reality. 
3.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, in order to demonstrate ~ (sfulyatii) of ~ ~ (nama-riipa), I 
have looked into plausibility for qualitative division which defines the natural 
kind to be ~lb (samskrta). I did so by setting up arguments against the opposing 
view held by the realist that qualitative divisions of natural kinds are intrinsic to 
the mind-independent reality and it is something we discover rather than invent. I 
came to the conclusion that the realist's theory of a qualitative division is not 
plausible because disagreement regarding the qualitative division cannot be 
dismissed as a result of ignorance as the realist suggests. 
21 Sherif, M. (1966), Group Conflict and Co-operation, (London; RKP). He devised an 
experiment which asked a subject to make assessment of how far a red light moved in the dark. 
The subject's decision was influenced to favour the group decision. 
22 Asch, S.E. (1956), "Studies of independent and submission to group pressuer, 1", in 
Psychological Monographs, vol.,70. 
23 Larsen, K.S. (1974), "Conformity in theAsch experiment", in Journal ofSocial Psychology, 
vol.35. 
24 Crutchfield, R.S. (1954), "A new technique for measuring individual differences to group 
judgement", in Proceedings of the Invitational Conference on Testing Problem, p.69-74. 
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If the qualitative divisions that defme natural kinds are ~ (sfinya), then 
other ~ '@. s (nama-riipas) according to which we divide things into different 
types would also be ~ (sfinya). To list few examples, the differences between 
running and walking, black and white, hard and soft, and so forth. It is important 
for us to realise that all ~ '@. s (nama-riipas) that are defined by qualitative 
divisions are~ (siinya) and our judgement of being different or being the same 
type is ~ ~ (samskrta). I believe I have covered sufficient ground to refute a 
realist's perspective of qualitative divisions, concepts and general terms. But to 
truly understand the ~ (emptiness) of ~'@, (concepts) we must proceed to the 
next chapter which explains the root of ~ (emptiness), which causes us to 
misapprehend reality. 
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4. 
Numerical divisions 
The previous chapter examined the qualitative divisions that define !61S s 
(nama-riipas) that are used to categorise and label things into different types. 
There is an another kind of division which defines !61S (nama-riipa) which can 
be called numerical division. In order to make sense of our experience and 
knowledge we divide the world not only into different types, but also into 
countable individual objects. While qualitative divisions defme !6 1S 
(nama-riipas) that used to categorise and label things into different types, 
numerical divisions define !61S (nama-riipas) that are used to divide the world 
into countable objects. For example, we perceive the world to be composed of 
individual persons, various creatures and organic beings such as amoebas, dogs, 
trees, natural inanimate objects such as mountains, islands, rocks and man-made 
objects such as tables, chairs, cars and so forth. In this example, "person", "dog", 
"chair" and so forth are !61S (nama-riipas) that are defmed by numerical 
divisions. Zen thinks that not only qualitative divisions but also numerical 
divisions are ~ ~ (samskrta) and M 1311 (asvabhava). In other words, Zen 
believes that the !61S s (nama-riipas) defined by numerical divisions are also ~ 
(sfinya). In order to defend this Zen's position, I will employ the same method 
which I used in the previous chapter. It is ~;~~)~ (prasanga), against realist's 
view on numerical division that is held by the unenlightened. As quotations from 
Garfield 1 and Huntington 2 indicated, realists believe that where numerical 
divisions lie are determined by the way the mind-independent reality (~j£; 
1 See the Introduction to Part Two and Chapter Three (section2.1.) 
2 See section 2.1. in Chapter Two 
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nirvana) is actually divided. In other words, they believe the mind-independent 
reality is actually divided in the way ~ 'fS s (nama-riipas) suggest. As previously 
examined this is the realist's belief that qualitative divisions are intrinsic to the 
mind-independent reality. The realist's belief also implies that there must be a 
definitive answer to questions of numerical identity, so that any disagreement and 
discrepancy regarding numerical division must be a result of ignorance. If Zen is 
right about numerical division, then this realists belief is not sustainable. 
4.1. Numerical divisions and 1111: (anatman) 
To understand numerical divisions to be 1f ~ ( samskrta; products of human 
invention) is particularly important for Buddhism, since it leads to idea of ~~~~ 
(anatman) which is often translated as "Non-Self'. Although no such distinction 
exists in Zen, I believe it is useful to break down the idea into two components; 
the denial of subjective/objective distinction and the denial of ordinary countable 
objects as genuine individual entities. In order to distinguish the two components, 
I will use "non-self' for the former and the "Non-Self' for the latter. The 
difference between "self' and "Self' is that "self' signifies what we perceived as 
"1", a human individual in first person sense, whereas "Self' encompasses 
everything which we believe to be an individual being, including animated objects, 
organic object, artefacts and so forth. In other words, "self' is a narrowed and 
specific case of "Self'. 
The first and the most fundamental division we make 1s the 
subjective-objective division, the division between 'self' and the world around us. 
We assume that: 
Physical things, other living beings are "out there" - objective reality; 
we - our true selves - are forever separated and different from the 
"things" and "person" that we think about, feel toward, analyze, 
describe by word and distinction ... 3 
3 King, Winston L. (1964), In the Hope ofNibbiina- an Essay on Theraviida Buddhism Ethics, 
(La Salle, U.S.A.: Open Court). 
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We commonly believe ourselves to be genume individual beings that are 
metaphysically or ontologically independent and separable from each other and 
from the environment. To put it an another way, we normally believe there is a 
definite division between the individual 'self' that is a subject of experience and 
thought, and the world, an object of experience and thought. Once a person 
believes he is a genuine individual, then that belief is extended to other things 
which we perceive as a individual beings. If I am a genuine individual entity, then 
other human beings which appear to be similar to myself must also be genuine 
individual entities. This belief in self and Selves to be genuine individuals is the 
realist view held by the unenlightened. 
self; self (I) appear to be distinguishable from others and from the 
environment, therefore self (I) must be a genuine individual 
Self; we perceive Self (any individual being) to be distinguishable from others 
and from the environment, therefore Self (any individual being) must be 
genuine individuals. 
Zen objects to this realist's view. Zen does not believe in the numerical division 
between subjects and objects, as well as numerical divisions between 'Selves' 
(ordinary objects). Zen considers the idea of separable and distinguishable 
'Selves' to be ~ (sfinya), in the sense that separable and distinguishable 'Selves' 
are ~ 1.t, (samskrta) and do not exist in ifti2 (nirvana). Contrasting to the above 
characterisation of the common belief, Zen's position concerning numerical 
division can be described as: 
non-self; self (I) appear to be distinguishable from others and from the 
environment, but self {I) is not a genuine individual. 
Non-Self; We perceive Self (individual being) to be distinguishable from 
others and from the environment, but it is not a genuine 
individuals. 
These two meanings have to be recognised, because the idea of M~ (anatman) 
is often misunderstood to deal only with "self' as an individual human being. The 
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ftfi; (anatman) is not just a human individual in the first person sense, but every 
countable object we consider to be a genuine individual. ftfi; (anatman) is 
strongly related to the topic of numerical division because the idea can be 
understood as the denial of the false belief the unenlightened hold regarding 
numerical divisions. I will come back to examine the idea of ftfi; (anatman) 
after I have demonstrated numerical divisions to be ~ l\ (samskrta) and how 
they do not reflect the mind-independent reality. 
Traditionally, ftfi; (anatman) has been explained using ~ (sfinyata) of 1i. 
ii (five skandhas). To state briefly the argument takes the form of fi; (atman; 
self) is composed of 1i.il (five skandha) and the 1i.8 (five skandha) are ~ 
(sfinya), therefore fi; (atman) is ~ (sfinya). But this approach is not easily 
comprehensible to western philosohers who has no knowledge of Buddhism, 
therefore I will use a different method to prove ~ (sfinyata) of fi; (atman). 
Please note that this chapter only deals with composite individual and not the 
microscopic individual. Composite individuals include humans, animals, houses, 
rocks, rivers, mountains and others which are divisible because they are made out 
of smaller units or parts. Whereas microscopic objects are so-called simples or 
mereological atoms that have no parts, they are the simplest existing units. 
4.2. 1\vo Problems of numerical identity 
Recognising the problems or difficulties of making a numerical identity 
judgement is important. These problems are the minimum requirement for any 
numerical identity theory to solve, and if the realist's theories fail to do so, these 
problems and difficulties become proof that numerical divisions are ~ l\ 
(samskrta) and ftl311 (asvabhava). If numerical divisions are intrinsic to ~~ 
(nirvana) as realists claim, then there should be a definite answer to every 
numerical identity judgement. But if numerical identity is ~ (sfinya), then 
disagreement and inconsistency regarding numerical identity judgement is 
inevitable. This section of the chap~r looks into vari~us d_ifijculties and 
inconsistencies that cannot be dismissed simply as the result of ignorance. 
Problems and difficulties can be divided into two kinds, the problem of natural 
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unity and the problem of change. The problem of natural unity deals with the 
difficulty of defining differences between what is an single individual, what is a 
constituent of an individual and what is a composite of individuals. The problem 
of change deals with the division between changes that alter the numerical identity 
and changes that do not. In both kinds of problem, the difficulty lies in finding 
universally applicable criteria of numerical identity of what makes x to be a single 
individual, and what makes x and y to be numerically identical. Together with 
stating problems and difficulties, I will also examine the possible criteria of 
numerical identity and argue why they cannot be used to defme numerical identity. 
After listing various difficulties regarding numerical identity, I will examine 
theories of numerical identity which aim to overcome these problems and 
difficulties. In order to demonstrate numerical divisions to be ~ (siinya), I will 
show that these theories fail to provide defmitive answers to these problems. 
4.2.l.Problem of natural unity 
As I stated earlier, ordinary objects are physically divisible to smaller parts or 
constituents. We somehow regard a collection of things to be a single individual 
rather than a collection of individuals. In order to defend the idea that a composite 
entity is a genuine individual, there must be something that metaphysically or 
ontologically unites these constituents. This is a topic which van Inwagen4 called 
the composition question; what unites constituents (xs) to make up a single entity 
(y). Philosophers have tried to find criteria of "natural unity"; what unites 
constituents, but there has not been much success. This chapter aims to argue that 
there is no natural unity, that it is simply ~ ~ (samskrta) a product of human 
convention. 
Because a human being has mass and the body is three-dimensionally 
extended it is physically divisible into smaller parts. For example a body is made 
out of cells, fibres and bones, and in turn they are made out of atoms and those 
atoms are made out of electrons, neutron, positron, those subatomic particles are 
made out of quantum particles. We somehow regard a mass of those constituents 
to be a single human being. The same thing can be said about everything that has 
4 
van Inwagen, Peter. (2002), Metaphysics-~ ed -,(Colorado U.S.A.; Westview Press) 
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mass. A plant is made out of stems, leaves, a flower or a fruit, roots, etc. A car 
consists of cylinders, a fuel tank, a radiator, windscreen, doors and so forth. We 
somehow consider a collection of matter be a single being, regardless of whether 
the object in question is natural, organic or artificial. 
An ordinary individual being is not only a composite but also a constituent of 
a bigger composite. Individual human beings make up a nation, such as Great 
Britain. The sun, the earth, Mars, Jupiter, and other satellites and moons compose 
the solar system. Many solar systems make up a galaxy. The universe is made out 
of galaxies and nebulas and so forth. If I position a human being as a composite 
and as a constituent, then I will come up with the following diagram. 
[Fig 4.1.] Infinite levels to divide the universe 
Planetary National Normal Organ Cellular Molecule 
Galaxy Solar system level level level level level level 
level level 
_.•A~ (@ ~~ ~ ~ ··~,, '4iiF ... ; ·--~ 
This indicates that the galaxy is a part of the universe, the solar system is a part of 
the galaxy, the earth is a part of solar system, each individual human being is a 
part of the earth and a nation, a cell is a part of the human being, atoms are parts 
of cells, and subatomic particles are parts of atoms. As it can be seen in the above 
diagram, the world can be divided at different levels, and recognising a human 
being as an individual being is only one of these infinite ways to divide the 
universe. In order to defend the idea that a human being or ordinary objects are 
genuine individuals, the realist has to argue that a dividing at a particular level is 
ontologically and metaphysically more significant than others. Zen argues that 
such a way of dividing the universe is not significant at all, and the choice of the 
division is made according to human values of preference, convenience and social 
consensus. To illustrate this point, let me make a comparison between a human 
body and a colony of ants. A human body is made out of different parts, such as a 
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brain (right and left hemispheres, cerebellum, brain stem), organs (kidneys, liver, 
intestines), heart, lungs, muscles, bones, bone marrow, blood cells, etc. Each part 
contributes to the sustenance of the body as a whole, and each part can survives 
because it belongs to the body as a whole (a kidney or a heart cannot survive on a 
vat by themselves). This relationship that exists between a whole body and its 
parts is similar to the relationship between individual ants and the colony as a 
whole. Even though the ability and intelligence of each individual ant is limited, 
the ant's colony displays a remarkable level of purpose and intelligence. For 
example, the construction of the colonial home involves a vast and sophisticated 
engineering planning. But clearly no individual ant carries a mental conception of 
the overall design. Moreover, it is clear from the fact that a single ant cannot 
survive by itself, that ants are interdependent on each other. The colony is 
sustained by individual ants as well as each ant being sustained by the colony it 
belongs to. If we consider a human being as a genuine individual rather than an 
aggregate of individuals, then why should we not regard a colony of ants as an 
individual and not an aggregate of individuals? If, on the other hand, we consider 
a colony of ants as an aggregate of individuals (individual ants), then why should 
we not regard a human being as an aggregate of body parts or cells which are 
individuals in their own rights? Realism has to prove that there is something that 
unites human body parts which does not exist amongst a colony of ants. 
The problem of natural unity is not limited to the three-dimensionally 
extended object, the same problem can be applied to the mind. Many 
neuro-psychological studies have indicated that mind is also divisible, therefore a 
composite. These neuro-psychological studies are carried out on split brain 
patients (those whose corpus callosums are destroyed by accidents or surgically 
removed as a treatment for severe epilepsy). As the left and the right hemispheres 
of a brain cannot communicate with each other, in some cases, patients behave as 
if two separate minds occupy one body. Preilowski5 reported that one person 
buttoned his shirt with one hand while the other hand unbuttoned it. Dimond 
asked split brain patients how they felt. One patient described the simple daily 
5 Preilowski, B. (1975) "Bilateral motor interaction: Perceptual-motor performance of partial and 
complete split-brain patients", in ZUlch, K.J., Greutzfeld, 0. & Galbraith, G.C. (eds.) (1975), 
Cerebral Localization, (N.Y.; Springer-Verlag), p.ll5-132. 
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task ofturning the pages of a book as follows: 
"If I'm reading I can hold the book in my right hand; it's a lot easier 
to sit on my left hand, than to hold it with both hands .... You tell your 
hand - I'm going to turn so many pages in a book - turn three pages 
-then somehow the left hand will pick up two pages and your're 
page 5, or whatever. It's better to let it go, pick it up with the right 
hand, and then to the right page. With your right hand you correct 
what the left has done."6 
These studies indicate that not only the physical body, but also the mind, is not a 
single entity but a composite. Realism must, therefore, provide proof that there is 
something which unites the divisible mind to make it a single entity. 
So far, we have considered the possibility of regarding a human being as a 
composite of individual constituents. Now let us consider the other possibility that 
an individual human being can also be an indistinguishable constituent of a 
composite individual. Like a colony of ants, human society is made out of 
individual human beings who do not necessarily carry the grand plan of the 
society. Moreover, most of us are not self-sufficient but our lives depend on the 
society. This seems to suggest that there is no significant difference between a 
colony of ants and a human society. Suppose that there is an extra-terrestrial 
intelligence observing the earth. The extra-terrestrial intelligence may perceive the 
human society to be no more sophisticated than a colony of ants or an aggregate 
of organs and cells. We can therefore imagine that to the extra-terrestrial 
intelligence, a human society may appear to be a single entity with interdependent 
parts rather than a collection of genuine individual entities. 
The same thing can be said about our minds. There are no boundaries 
between minds. In a society, people share and influence each others' ideas and 
feelings. In a discussion group, the final decisions of each individual are the result 
of interactions between their minds. As we have seen earlier, an individual mind is 
a composite where different parts of the niind colleCtively make a decision. 
6 Dimond, S.J. (1979) "Symmetry and asymmetry in the vertebrate brain" in Oakley, D.A., & 
Plotkin,H.C. ( eds.) Brain, Behaviour and Evolution, (London; Methuen), p.l89-218. 
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Therefore, there seems to be no fundamental difference between the way a 
committee makes decisions and the way an individual makes decisions. 
Supposing we put a group of people in one room, and one person in the other 
room, and ask them both to come up with a solution to a complicated political or 
managerial problem. From the solutions offered we would not be able to tell 
which room contains the single person or the group. This proves the point that we 
are not capable of telling whether the mind is a single concrete particular or a 
collection of concrete particulars. This is damaging to realism since what appears 
to be a concrete particular may not be a genuine concrete particular at all. 
In order for realists to defend the idea that human individuals are genuine 
individuals, they have to come up with a plausible argument for this particular of 
dividing the world to be metaphysically and ontologically significant than other 
alternative ways. In other words, any theory which supports the realist's view 
must prove the significant difference between the individual human, a colony of 
ants and human society. The failure to provide such evidence would indicate that 
world is not actually divided in the way ~ fS (nama-riipa) suggest. 
4.2.2. Problem of change and identity 
One of the philosophical questions that has persistently troubled many 
thinkers is the problem of change and numerical identity. What puzzles 
philosophers is the fact that something can be different as a result of change, yet, 
remains to be numerically one and the same thing. If no change takes place, the 
numerical identity of an object can be judged easily using Leibniz's law 7• 
Unfortunately, reality is not that simple. Everything experiences change, and 
change by definition means that what exists after the change is different from 
what it was before the change occurred. The problem is that some changes alter 
the numerical identity and other changes do not. On some occasions we recognise 
objects before and after the change to be numerically distinct, yet on other 
occasions we recognise what was before and after the change to be numerically 
identical. If realists are correct, there is definite and intrinsic difference between 
7 For x andy to be numerically identical, everything that is true to x must be true toy. The idea 
was expressed in Leibniz's letter to Clarke. A quote can be found in H.W.B.Joseph (1949), Letters 
on the Philosophy of Leibniz, (Oxford; Clarendon), p.l7. 
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these two kinds of change so that every question regarding numerical identity 
judgement has a definite answer. If a question turns out to be insolvable or there is 
no consistency in what degree and sort of change and degree causes numerical 
identity to alter, then numerical identity must be ~ l\ (samskrta) and not 
intrinsic as realists believe. 
4.2.2.1. The problem of constituent change. 
It is true that the identity of certain physical objects can be determined by 
their constituents. For example, the identities of a lump of clay or a stone are 
determined by their constituents. Unfortunately there are objects whose identities 
are not determined simply by their constituents. Different cases of the ship of the 
Theseus given by Lowe8 illustrate this point. A ship belonged to a hero Theseus 
in Greek legend was preserved in a harbour for many years after his death. Like 
many ships do, the ship named Theseus underwent continuous repairs and 
replacement of its parts, such as changing the masts, sails, wooden decks, and so 
on. Let us call the very ship that left the port for its maiden voyage as T1 and the 
ten years old Theseus as T2u. Ten years was quite long time, so that, in order for 
the Theseus to remain seaworthy, it needed extensive repair, so much so that the 
original parts that T1 consisted of were all replaced. Despite the fact that T1 and 
T2u did not share the same physical parts, people would still considered Tl and 
T2u to be one and the same ship. This case-a indicates that constituents do not 
define numerical identity since the materially different Tl and T2u were 
considered to be numerically identical. 
Suppose further that those old parts which were replaced had not been 
destroyed but had been stored away in a warehouse. Then one day, those original 
parts were brought together to build a ship, let us call this reconstructed ship the 
Theseus T3p. In this second case ( case-P) there were two resulting ships, the 
repaired ship TIP which was in the harbour and the reassembled ship T3 p which 
was in the warehouse. The first difficulty of change is to determine which of the 
two was numerically identical with the original ship Tl. Tl and T3P are 
qualitatively identical in every sense. So logically T3P should be considered as 
8 Lowe, E.J. (2002), A Survey of Metaphysics, (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press), p.25 
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nwnerically identical with Tl. But the case-a suggests it is TIP and not T3P that is 
nwnerically identical with Tl. Why do we normally regards T2P to be 
nwnerically identical with T2? 
To make the matter more complicated, let us suppose an another case, case-y, 
in which the repaired ship does not exist. The nwnerical identity judgement we 
made in case-a and P suggest that T3y is not nwnerically identical to Tl. But in 
case-y we would recognise T3y to be numerically identical with Tl. This is 
because, as Lowe9 points out, like a camping tent which goes through the same 
process and maintains its nwnerical identity, case-y is simple dismantling and 
reassembling. 
[Fig. 4.2] Three basic cases of the Theseus 
case-a case-P TI case-y 
Tl Tl 
l r-------~ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ 
T2a T2~ T3~ T3y 
This case indicates inconsistency in nwnerical identity judgment. Despite the fact 
there is no difference between T3P and T3y, only T3y was recognised to be 
nwnerically identical with Tl but not T3p. If realists are right, there would be a 
solution that finds a consistency among these case. 
This problem of constituent change and numerical identity is not limited to 
artefacts. The same problem can be applied to humans and other organic beings. 
Everyday, a hwnan individual intakes the necessary materials, such as protein, 
carbohydrate, fat, water, vitamins and minerals, from the environment in order to 
sustain its existence. A hwnan intakes those materials by eating and drinking. 
Once the materials are consumed, they turn into parts of one's body; the flesh, 
bones, blood and so forth. As a result they are no longer distinguishable from the 
body; they are now parts that make up the body. On the other hand, materials are 
also constantly disposed from the body in the forms of excrement, sweat, and the 
shedding of skin cells and hairs. Hundreds of dead cells eire discarded :from the 
9 Lowe, E.J. (2002), ibid, p.27. 
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body everyday. The following scientific data gives an idea of how intakes and 
discard of materials at a molecular level. 
[Tabel 4.1] Elements and periods that minerals stay in the body10 
Elements Volume (gram) I Location Half life Sources 
In body Daily intake (days) 
Carbon 16000 300 All tissues 40 Any foods 
Phosphorus 780 1.4 Direct excreted 0.5 
Cells 2 Food additives 
Soft tissues 19 
Sodium 100 4.4 Bones 10-500 Table salt 
Other tissues 10 
Potassium 140 3.3 All tissues 30 Vegetables, fruits & nuts 
Calcium 1000 1.1 All tissues no-data Daily products, beans 
Chloride 95 5.3 All tissues 10 Table salt 
*Volume in standard-man (70g) + volume of daily intake 
** Length of time it takes for an amount of molecules to become half of the 
original volume 
The above three cases of the ship Theseus and half lives of various material 
illustrate that, in some cases, two different sets of material are considered to be 
numerically identical, while in other occasions, the identical sets of matter can be 
regarded as numerically distinct. Any theory that regards ordinary objects to be 
concrete particulars has to be able to distinguish between a case where two 
different collections of matter are considered to be numerically different things 
and the other case where two different collections of matter are numerically one 
and the same thing. 
4.2.2.2. The problem of qualitative change 
The changes that things experience are not only constituent change but also 
qualitative change. What I refer as qualitative change includes structural change, 
change of properties and kind to which the object belongs. What I refer as 
structural change is topological change, change in the arrangement of constituents. 
A collection of matter can be rearranged to change its shape. Imagine the Theseus 
sailed out into an ope11 ocean for a war, but it was separated from its fleet and lost 
its bearing. A hundred days later food was running low and seeing neither enemy 
10 International Commission on Radiology Protection, Publication 30, Partl-4. 
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ship nor allied ship, crews turned the ship into a fishing vessel using some of 
ship's existing parts. Although the original ship Tl and the restructured ship T2S 
were made out of the same collection of matter, they had different structures. In a 
such case, although the ship T2o had changed its structure, T2S may had still be 
judged as numerically identical with Tl. Imagine a different scenario, case-a, in 
which the Theseus had been washed up on a beach. Because the crews had been 
unable to free the ship, they gradually rearranged the ship's structure into a 
building. The ship Tl and the building T2e were made out of the same collection 
of matter, yet it is debatable whether they can be considered as a numerically 
identical objects. It is possible for an object to experience gradual yet extensive 
structural change which leads to no structural similarity between the object before 
and after the change. These examples indicate that some structural changes alter 
numerical identity but others do not. If realists are correct, there must be a definite 
boundary between structural change that alters numerical identity of the object 
and one that does not. 
Normally constituent change and structural change would bring changes in 
properties. Let us reconsider the second case of the Theseus again. The second 
case (case-~) is where there were two resulting ships, the repaired ship T2~ and 
the reconstructed ship T3~. Being a warship, the Theseus had upgraded its 
armours and equipment in order to match the effectiveness of enemy ships. 
Therefore it is possible that Tl and T2~ were different not only in their material 
constituents but also in their properties such as durability, manoeuvrability, and so 
forth. Moreover, if T3~ had been constructed using the exact same parts and the 
original design of Tl, T3~ would had been qualitatively identical to Tl in every 
aspect. This increases the difficulties regarding cases a, ~ andy. Why would we 
judge Tl and T3~ that were materially and qualitative identical ships to be 
numerically distinct, yet Tl and T2 that were neither materially and qualitatively 
identical to be numerically identical? Why T3y but not T3~ to be numerically 
identical to Tl even though T3y and T3~ are identical in every aspects? 
Traditionally, location is also considered to be a criteria for numerical identity. 
It is based upon tlie idea that tWo objeCts cannot shaie or exist in the same location. 
Imagine two identical toys come out from the same mass production line one after 
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the other. It is possible that they have identical structure and identical intrinsic 
properties, but the two toys are numerically distinct because they do not and 
cannot occupy the same location. Disagreement and agreement of location, 
however, do not define numerical division. Wiggins illustrated this point using the 
following example: 
during the Festival of Britain the stone in Meriden, inscribed to show 
that it marks the reputed centre of England, was removed from 
Meriden to London to be put on show ... Well, during transport it will 
have remain the same stone but not the same landmark as the Meriden 
stone. Moreover, after its return to Meriden, it is questionable whether 
it is any longer that same landmark. After its return, old villagers 
alleged that it was put back some yards away from its old site.11 
In this example, change of location (i.e. moving the stone from Meriden) did not 
alter the numerical identity of the stone. We have already looked at the problem of 
location as a criterion of individual in section 3 .2.1. The dismantling watch and 
the possibility of time travel making it possible for the same individual to be in 
more than one location at the same. Again, any theory of numerical identity must 
be able to distinguish between the two kinds of disagreement of location, one 
which defines numerical division and the other which does not. 
The change of kind to which an object belong to is related to all of the 
changes mentioned above. With the structural change of the Theseus we saw the 
ship change the kind which it belongs to from a warship to a fishing vessel or to 
the building. As the case-c indicated, there are some changes in kind that alter the 
object's numerical identity, and others, such as case-0, that do not. Therefore, 
some changes of kind alter the numerical identity of the object, and others do not. 
For any theory of numerical identity to be plausible, the theory must be able to 
distinguish between the two types of kind change. 
So far I have analysed the problems of change regarding inanimate objects, 
but these qualitative changes are not limited to inanimate objects. Irt fact, 
11 Wiggins, David (2001), Sameness and Substance Renewed, (Cambridge; Cambridge Univ. 
Press), p.34. 
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qualitative changes that a person goes through in his life may be more noticeable. 
Physical appearance, such as height, weight, colour of hair and skin complexion 
do not remain the same all through one's life. Properties such as personality, 
habits, mental capacity, and preferences and so forth would also change with age. 
For example, a restless child can grow up to be a calm person, and a shy person 
can grow up to be an outgoing person. Tastes in music and clothes also change 
over the years. Relational properties of a person and the kind the person belongs 
to can also change. A kind to which the person belongs normally changes 
according to the person's relational properties, such as social position and function, 
so that a change of relational property and a change of kind often coincide with 
each other. In our lives, we learn and gain the ability to perform new skills, and 
according to attained skills and knowledge our status as student, butcher, doctor, 
engineer and so forth change. Some time we also change our social status without 
gaining any ability. For example, we can become a father or an uncle and so forth. 
As a result of these changes, it is possible that ten years old Richard (R1 0) has 
more things in common with 10 years old Simon (S 1 0) than himself in his forties 
(R40). If the shared properties are determined by numerical identity, then RIO 
would be considered to be numerically identical with S 10 rather than with R40. 
But our common numerical identity judgement contradicts that. So why in some 
cases does similarity defme numerical identity but in others it does not. If realists 
are right, there must be a defmite boundary between two kinds of similarities. 
4.2.2.3. The problem of fission and fusion 
The problem of fission and fusion is a combination of the above three 
problems of numerical identity; the problem of natural unity, constituent change 
and qualitative change. Let us firstly consider fission where one object is split into 
numerically two or more objects. The· second example of the Theseus ( case-P) 
illustrated this point. In the original example, the repaired ship (T2P) and the 
reassembled ship (T3P) had different relationships to the original ship (T1). But 
imagine a similar case (case-s) where T1 was put in a dry dock and dismantled 
irito bits, and' the disnuuitled parts are separated in tWo. At the later date, using the 
two bundles of parts, additional parts and the original drawing of T1, two identical 
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[Fig.4.2] Case l;: ofTheseus 
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The case-s is more difficult to determine the numerical identity than case-p, as the 
both of the resulting ships had an identical relation to the original ship Tl. In such 
a case, there are three options; 
1) Only one ofthe resulting ships is numerically identical with the original ship Tl; 
2) Both T3~a and TIQ> are numerically identical with T1; and 
3) Neither T3~a nor TIQ> is numerically identical with Tl. 
If we take the first option, then the realist has to find the difference between T3l;:a 
and T3l;:b in order to explain why one of them is numerically identical with Tl but 
not the other. This is not possible because they are identical in every aspects. The 
second option faces the problem of transitivity. If Tl = T3l;:a and Tl = T3l;:b are 
true, then it follows that T3l;:a = T3sb. T3l;:a and T3sb are, however, two 
numerically distinct ships capable of existing in two different locations. In order 
to take the second option, the realist must come up with a solution as to why the 
logic of transitivity does not work. The third option is to consider when the 
original ship was taken apart, a part which was a constituent of Theseus ceases to 
be a part of Theseus and becomes 'a part which used to be a constituent of 
Theseus'. The resulting ships that were constructed from 'parts that used to be 
Theseus' were not numerically identical with Theseus. The third option, however, 
also faces a problem similar to the problem case-y illustrated. Imagine case 11 
where the second bundle of parts is not used to build a ship. In this case we would 
recognise the reassembled ship (TJ11a) to be numerically identical to the original 
ship Tl. 
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If the realist's belief in numerical identity were correct, there would be a definite 
distinction between T3~a and T3TJa; one that is not recognised as numerically 
identical with Tl and the other that is regarded to be numerically identical with 
Tl. 
Wiggins provided a thought experiment12 which illustrates a similar problem 
to case-~. Inspired by cases of split brain patients, Wiggins imagined an operation 
in which a brain is divided and each half is housed in a brainless body. Let us call 
the original individual Andy. If the operation is successful, there would be two 
distinct bodies and consciousness that equally demonstrate Andy's memory and 
characteristics. To determine the numerical identity of the resulting two people, 
there are three options available to the realits that are same options available in 
case-~ of the Theseus. The options are: 
1) Only one of the resulting people is numerically identical with Andy; 
2) Both resulting people are numerically identical with Andy; and 
3) Neither of the resulting people are numerically identical with Andy. 
Regarding personal identity, the first two options face the same difficulties 
mentioned earlier, but the third option faces further problems. Parfit provides a 
problem that derives from memory. Imagine Andy has a memory of listening to 
Beethoven's Symphony No.9. After the operation two resulting people are asked 
whether or not they have heard the music before. If we take the third option 
seriously, then even though the resulting people have a memory of the music, they 
have to answer they have not, because it is Andy who has heard the tune and they 
are not numerica1Jy identical w;.!~ Andy. 11tere is also ap~ti~a1 problem with the 
third option. If the resulting people were regarded as numerically distinct from the 
12 Wiggins, David. (1967), Identity and Spatia-Temporal Continuity, (Oxford; Blackwell), p.50. 
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original person, then anyone can escape criminal prosecution. Imagine that Andy 
committed murder and before he was caught he underwent Wiggins' operation. If 
we consider the resulting people to be numerically distinct from the original Andy, 
then he can escape criminal prosecution. Even though the two resulting people 
have the memory of committing the crime, they can claim that it is Andy who 
committed the crime and not them. Parfit pointed out a further problem of fission 
in the following example. 
Suppose that the bridge between my hemispheres is brought under my 
voluntary control. This would enable me to disconnect my 
hemispheres as easily as if I were blinking. By doing this I would 
divide my mind. And we can suppose that when my mind is divided, 
in each half, bring about reunion. 
This ability would have obvious uses. To give an example: I am near 
the end of a math exam, and see two ways of tackling the last 
problem ... There were two features of the case of the exam that made 
us want to say that only one person was involved. The mind was soon 
reunited, and there was only one body. If a mind was permanently 
divided and its halves developed in different ways, the point of 
speaking of one person would start to disappear. 13 
The question which Parfit's thought experiment provokes is what is the difference 
between this case and Wiggins' case? In Wiggins' case, the experiment results in 
two numerically distinct individuals, whereas in Parfit's case, two streams of 
consciousness still belong to one and the same person. The realist must be able to 
explain why the former results in two distinct individuals, but not the latter. 
Let us now move onto the problem of fusion using a thought experiment 
similar to those provided by Wiggins and Parfit. If brain hemispheres can be 
separated and housed into different bodies, then we can imagine an experiment 
involving not only Andy but also a second person Ben. Both Andy and Ben 
13 Parfit, Derek (1971), "Personal Identity" in Philosophical Review, vol.80. I use reprinted 
version in Honderich, T. & Bumyeat, M. (eds.), Phi/osophi As It Is, (London; Penguine Books), 
p.l89 
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undergo the first part of Wiggins' operation, so each brain is divided into two 
halves. Instead of housing four hemispheres into four different bodies, let assume 
that the left half of Andy's brain and the right half of Ben's brain were connected 
and put into a brainless body. 
[Fig. 4.5] Brain Fusion 
Andy Ben 
In such a case of fusion, what is the identity of the resulting person? Parflt gives 
an explanation of what will possibly happen to such person. 
To give examples - first, of compatibility: I like Palladio and intend 
to visit Venice. I am about to fuse with a person who like Gitto and 
intends to visit Padua. I can know that the one person we shall 
become will have both tastes and both intentions. Second of 
incompatibility: I have red hair, and always vote Labour. The other 
person loves red hair, and always votes Conservative. I can know that 
the person we shall become will be indifferent to red hair, and a 
floating voter.14 
As we can see from these examples, unlike cases of fission, fusion would bring a 
change of personality which makes numerical identity before and after the 
operation more difficult to determine. In the case of fusion, because it can bring a 
change of personality it is more likely that the resulting person will be recognised 
as numerically distinct from the original. A similar problem is demonstrated by 
Parflt's thought experiment which I mentioned earlier. At the end of solving the 
maths problem, he fuses the two streams of thought. If the separation of the two 
streams of the consciousness is over a short period, it does not cause any difficulty 
in detenhinin.g the numerical identity. If, however, the separation is over a long · 
14 Parfit, Derek. (1971), ibid. p.199. 
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period, long enough for the two streams of consciousness to develop different 
opinions or preferences, then it is quite complicated to make a numerical identity 
judgement about the consciousness before and after the fusion. In order to 
overcome this problem, the theory of numerical identity has to define how long 
the separation must be in order for the person to alter his numerical identity. 
4.2.3. Summary of numerical identity problems 
All problems of numerical identity can be considered as problems of unity. 
The problem of natural unity is about what unites constituent parts to make up a 
single concrete particular. The problem of change is what unites temporal parts 
that are different from each other to compose a single concrete particular. If the 
realist is correct, there must be something in reality that unites different temporal 
parts, and there must a clear division between a temporal part that belongs to the 
numerically identical concrete particular and a temporal part that does not. Any 
theory of numerical identity must be able to provide evidence that such 
objectively legitimate division exists and our judgement of numerical division is 
based on the way mind-independent reality is and not products of human 
invention. 
As we have seen there are so many ways for things to change; constituent 
change, structural change, change of intrinsic property, change of relational 
property, and change of kind they belong to. Each of these different types of 
change is divided into two; one that alters numerical identity and the other which 
has no influence upon numerical identity. In order to defend the plausibility of 
realism, realists' theory of numerical identity has to prove that there is definite 
division between the two kinds of change in all of these problems mentioned 
above. In other words, the realist must produce a plausible theory which gives 
definite answers to these problems. So let us now look at theories of numerical 
identity to see whether any theory can answer these questions. 
4.3. Theories of numerical identity 
So fat we examined difficulties and problem of making definite numerical 
identity judgement. These problems seems to suggest that there is no particular 
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criteria according to which we make numerical identity judgement. This finding 
seems to oppose realist's belief in numerical divisions that there should be no 
ambiguity and inconsistency in correct numerical identity judgement because 
numerical divisions are intrinsic to the mind-independent reality. Contrasting to 
realists, it is easy for Zen to accommodate the problems of numerical identity and 
existence of inconsistency. According to Zen, the inconsistency are results of the 
fact that human values, such as preference, convenience and social consensus, 
influence our numerical identity judgement. This section of the chapter looks into 
various theories of numerical identity to see whether they can solve problems and 
ftnd underlining consistency in our numerical identity judgement. It has to be 
noted that theories I will describe below are "realist's interpretations of' theories 
of numerical identity, and the theories in their original forms do not necessary 
imply numerical identity to be intrinsic to the reality. It is possible to accept a 
theory of numerical identity as a matter of convenience without believing what we 
perceive as individuals to be genuine individuals. These theories simply analyse 
how we can make judgement about numerical identity. This is why I have to 
emphasise that theories described below are realist's interpretations of theories of 
numerical identity. 
4.3.1. The substratum theory of identity 
The basic concept of the substratum theory of identity was introduced by 
Aristotle 15• However, what is known as the substratum theory is an anonymous 
theory that different philosophers from different points in history supported and 
developed. The substratum theory I present here is not the theory proposed by one 
particular philosopher, it is rather what I consider to be the most plausible form of 
the theory. Concerning the problem of natural unity, there are disagreements 
amongst substratum theorists. Some argue that there is no natural unity, so that 
only the simplest or mereological atoms possess a proper identity and a complex 
or composite object is not an ontologically single united entity. Others argue that 
there are ontological or metaphysical foundations for a complex object to be a 
single entity. Silice we are interested in the plausibility of ordiriary objects to be 
15 Metaphysics, 1017a22 and 1038b10 
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genuine individual entities, this section of the essay concentrates on the latter 
version of the substratum theory. 
The basic idea of the substratum theory is that different stages of the object's 
career and different constituents of the object are united by belonging to one and 
the same substratum. As long as the object remains to be one and the same 
substratum, even if it undergoes extreme changes and its attributes or material 
constituents change, the object remains numerically identical. This enables 
substratum theorists to solve the problems of change, because it allows a 
substance to possess or be associated with different and sometimes contradicting 
attributes. The substratum theory can support realism since it explains numerical 
identity, to be defmed simply by whether or not x and y are the same substratum, 
and there is no room for human values to influence numerical identity judgement. 
This is how the substance theory successfully solve the problem of change 
illustrated by the examples of Richard and Simon. Rl 0 and S 10 are two distinct 
substance, whereas RlO and R40 are numerical identical because they both belong 
to one and the same substance that is referred by a word "Richard". 
Although the substance theory solves the problem of change and numerical 
identity concerning animate objects, it is not quite clear whether the idea of 
substance can be extended to artificial objects such as the ship Theseus. It does 
not provide defmite boundary between what are numerically identical with Tl and 
what are not. Another damaging problem for the substance theory of numerical 
identity is the problem of inconceivability. In order to avoid the problem of 
change and identity, substratum must not be associated with any attribute. The 
substratum has to be allowed to change any attributes without altering its 
numerical identity. Substratum is therefore defined as "something I know not 
what16". All we directly experience or are aware of are its attributes, and not the 
substratum. Then, it is a mystery or even absurd to think that we can ever make an 
correct identity judgement based upon substratum which we cannot know 
anything about. Descartes argued even thought we have no perception of 
substance, it is still possible to make correct identity judgement appealing to 
reason. It may be possible'for to make identity judgment of wax ba8ed on reason, 
16 Locke, John (1690), Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Vol.II, 23.2 and 23.6 
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but it is difficult to see how reason can solves difficult cases of numerical identity 
judgement I mentioned in section 4.2. 
4.3.2. Essentialism 
Like the essentialism we have seen in the Chapter Three (section3.2.2.), the 
essentialist's view on numerical identity are that numerical division is determined 
not by entire property, but by a certain essential property or properties. In order 
for x andy to be numerically identical, they have to be qualitatively identical only 
in their essential property, and they can be different in their non-essential 
properties. The theory argues that numerical identity is determined solely by an 
essential property or a set of essential properties the individual possesses and there 
is no room for human values, such as preference, convenience and social 
consensus to influence numerical identity. An essential property can be 
summarised as follows: 
Def-1) An essential property must be present at all time in an object in order for 
it to retain its numerical identity. In other words, any property whose 
absence does not alter the object's numerical identity is not an essential 
property, but an accidental property. 
In addition to the above definition, some essentialists also assume the following 
definition: 
Def-2) If a certain property Px is an essential property for being x, then at any 
given moment, there is only one object which possesses Px. In other 
words, there cannot be two or more objects that share essential 
property. 
Like Lowe 17, I refute Def-2, based upon the following reason. If numerical 
identity is always defined by a single property, then Def-2 is true, but it is possible 
that numerical identity is defined by a set of properties. Let's take three properties, 
being Japanese (Pj), being a~post graduate student in Philosophy (Pp) and being a 
17 Lowe, E.J. (2002}, ibid. p.98. 
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martial artist (Pm). Independently, each property picks up more than one 
individual, but the combination of the three properties picks up only one 
individual, Yasushi Ihara. I believe that our common way of comprehending 
numerical identity is not based upon a single property, but upon a combination of 
properties. I do not dismiss the possibility that some numerical identities may be 
determined by a single essential property, but in most cases it is a set of essential 
properties which defines numerical identity. 
If essentialism is true, then there must be at least one property or aspect of the 
object which remains true to the object through out its entire history. But is there 
such a property? What is the essential property that defmes the numerical identity 
of the Theseus? Is there such a property which the original Theseus (T1) shared 
with the repaired Theseus (T2p) but not with the reconstructed Theseus (T3P)? Is 
there such a property which remains true through out my entire life? The objection 
against essentialism is that it may be specific about the definition of the essential 
property, but in most cases of change no actual property fulfils the criteria of 
essential property which essentialism defines. 
Another problem is that sometimes, qualitatively identical objects are not 
regarded as numerically identical. This problem can be addressed using an 
example which I would called "the problem of the reunited candle" which was 
inspired by Lowe's example of a tree18. Imagine a jasmine-scented candle which 
is pale blue, spherically shaped and made out of 1000 atoms; a1, a2 ... a1000. It 
was lit one night and it burned away. In our eyes, it seemed to disappear, but in 
fact the atoms that composed the candle were simply scattered. Although it is 
unlikely, it is theoretically possible that after a million years, these 1000 atoms 
happen to be gathered to make a spherically shaped jasmine-scented pale blue 
candle. Let's call the original candle Cl and the reunited candle C2. We can 
imagine that they are identical in every aspect. According to the essentialism, C 1 
and C2 should be recognised as a numerically identical candle, since they are 
identical not only in their constituents and structures but also in their intrinsic 
18 
"Suppose, for in~ce, th1t(all of.tl!.~.atoms composing acc::rtaiutree where to be dispersed 
throughout the universe for many years, becoming parts of various other objects during that time, 
but that at some much later time they were to come together again by chance to form a tree, 
exactly similar to the original tree. Would this original tree be numerically identical with the much 
later tree? Surely not." Lowe, E.J. (2002), ibid., p.31. 
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properties. Our common sense, however, would contradict this decision and to say 
C 1 and C2 are numerically distinct candles. This seems to suggest that our 
numerical identity judgement is not based on essentialism, and there are some 
other criteria that define numerical identity. If numerical identity is determined by 
essential property as essentialism claims we must dismiss our common judgement 
simply as a result of ignorance or mistake. But would it be possible to dismiss 
them as such? 
A similar point is addressed by he change Theseus underwent. If possession 
of the identical intrinsic property or properties determines numerical identity, 
since T3~ and T3y are qualitatively identical in their intrinsic properties, not only 
T3y but also T3~ should also be judged as numerically identical with Tl. Some 
may suggest that although T3~ and T3y are qualitatively identical in their intrinsic 
properties, they may differ in their relational properties. For example, T3~ and 
T3y may not be different in themselves, but their environments and their relations 
to Tl are different. But could a relational property satisfy the criteria of the 
essential property? I believe it cannot since there are many examples that show 
that a change in relational property does not alter an object's numerical identity. 
For example, changing the relational property of who the commander of the ship 
is, does not alter the numerical identity of the ship. It seems that essentialism is 
plausible as a theory, but since it fails to provide an answer as to which actual 
property can be an essential property, it is not a practical solution to the problems 
of numerical identity. 
Other difficulties that essentialism faces is that it does not offer any answers 
to the problems of natural unity, and the problems of fission and fusion. In this 
sense again essentialism fails to be a practical theory of numerical identity. 
4.3.3. The continuity theory 
The continuity theory assumes spatio-temporal continuity to be a necessary 
criterion for numerical identity. Continuity theory can allow an object to change 
its entire constituents, structure and properties yet remain numerically identical, 
providing that the existence of the object before and after the 'change is contiimous. 
The idea of the continuity theory is based upon an assumption that change is 
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gradual. Let me explain this using the example of Richard and Simon. 
[Fig.4.6] Continuity and discontinuity 
a) b) 
Time 
The continuity theory can correctly acknowledge R40 to be numerically identical 
with RI 0 and numerically distinct from S I 0 because there is a continuity which 
exists between RIO and R40, but not between RIO and SIO. Although RIO and 
R40 possess more differences than similarities, at least RIO and Rll (eleven years 
old Richard) would have more things in common than difference, so that they are 
easily perceived as numerically identical. In the same manner, RII and RI2 
(twelve years old Richard) can be identified as the same concrete particular. Then 
according to the transitivity of numerical identity, we can confirm that RIO and 
R40 are numerically identical, (RIO= Rll = RI2 = ... = R38 = R39 = R40). The 
Continuity theory can also accommodate the problem of fission illustrated by 
case-~. According to the logic of transitivity, if TI = T3~a and TI = T3~b are both 
true, then it follows that T3~a = T3~b. This conclusion does, however, contradict 
our common sense that T3~a and T3~b cannot be numerically identical (e.g. the 
port authority would never let the owner to get away with one marine licence 
between two ships). According to the continuity theory, even though TI =T3~a 
and TI = T3~ are true, there is no direct continuity existing between T3~a and 
T3~, therefore they are two distinct ships. This allows the continuity theory to 
judge both T3~a and T3~ to be numerically identical with TI , yet they 
themselves are numerically distinct from each other. It also accommodates the 
problem of dismantling and reassembling, illustrated by case-y of the Theseus. 
According to the continuity theory even though the Theseus was dismantled, its 
parts never ceased to be parts of the Theseus as long as they do not become parts 
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of something else. In other words, although those parts do not constitute a ship, 
they do not cease to be parts of the Theseus. This argument is reinforced by the 
case of the reunited candle. The original candle (Cl) and the reunited candle (C2) 
are numerically distinct, based on two reasons. Firstly, their existences are not 
continuous. Secondly, during the discontinuous period, the molecules that 
compose C 1 became parts of something else and cease to be parts of the candle. In 
this way, the continuity theory successfully explains why T3y is numerically 
identical with Tl but C2 is not numerically identical with Cl. 
The continuity theory can allow changes to occur without altering numerical 
identity, but the theory may be too generous. Supposing that a mouse died in an 
isolation tank, and before it did, the mouse ate a spore. As the result, a mushroom 
starts to grow from within the mouse's decaying body. Although the change from 
the mouse to the mushroom is gradual and their existence is spatia-temporally 
continuous, we would not recognise the mouse and the mushroom to be 
numerically identical. In other words, the continuity theory fails to distinguish, the 
mouse-mushroom change from cases of metamorphosis such as caterpillar into 
butterfly or tadpole into frog in which the organism before and after the change is 
numerically identical. 
Moreover, the continuity theory, like essentialism, fails to provide any answer 
to the problem of natural unity. It has nothing to say about what makes certain 
composite objects to be single entity and others to be collections of entities. In this 
sense the continuity theory is not a plausible theory of numerical identity. 
4.3.4. The sortal Dependency Theory 
According to the sortal theory of numerical identity, we cannot simply ask 
whether or not x and y are numerically identical. We have to specify in what 
context the numerical identity of x and y is questioned. In other words, according 
to the theory, all identity statements must take the form of "x is the same f as y." 
The advantage of defining numerical identity in this way is that it allows x and y 
to be different in some respects, yet be numerically identical since it is acceptable 
for x to be same f as y, yet x is a different g as y. There are two kinds of sortal 
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theory; the sortal relativity theory proposed by Geach19 and the sortal dependency 
theory put forward by Wiggins20• According to Geach, there is no definite answer 
to numerical identity because x and y can be numerically identical as well as 
distinct at the same time depending on in what sense identity of x and y are 
questioned. Unfortunately, the realist would not be satisfied with sortal relativity 
theory, since it allows the existence of an infinite number of numerical divisions 
that are equally legitimate. For example, the theory fails to recognise the 
difference between ''x is the same collection of matter as y" and "x is the same 
ship as y" and considers the numerical identity these two statements express as 
being equally valid. 
Wiggins comes up with a sortal dependency theory which solves this problem. 
The sortal dependency theory argues that the numerical identity between x andy is 
defmed only by the substance-sortal noun. According to Wiggins, "Among the 
best candidates to play the roles of sortal and substantial predicates ... are natural 
kind words." 21 This enables the theory to differentiate between the 
caterpillar-butterfly change and the mouse-mushroom change that the continuity 
theory fails to distinguish. In the former case, "caterpillar" and "butterfly" are 
both phase-sortal nouns of the same substance-sortal nouns taxonomically 
classified as insect (Insects)", order "Lepidoptera (butterfly)" or species "Maniola 
Jurtina (meadow brown)". In this way we can correctly identify a caterpillar and a 
butterfly to be numerically identical. Whereas in the latter case, "a mouse" and "a 
mushroom" are not phase-sortal nouns that share the common substance-sortal 
noun, therefore they are considered to be numerically distinct. The advantage of 
defining numerical identity with a substance-sortal noun is that the noun expresses 
a possible change which the object may experience. This allows an object to 
change its attributes and constituents completely, yet remain numerically identical 
providing that the change is implied in its substance-sortal noun. For example 
sortal noun "butterfly" implies the change from caterpillar to butterfly, but 
"mouse" does not permit the change into a mushroom. This enables the sortal 
dependency theory to correctly recognise the butterfly and the caterpillar to be 
19 Gearch, P.T. (1962), Reference and Generality, (N.Y.; Cornell Univ. Press), 
20 Wiggins, David. (2001), ibid., p.77. 
21 Wiggins David. (2001), ibid., p.77. 
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numerically identical, and the mouse and the mushroom to be numerically 
distinct. 
The problem of the sortal dependency theory is that it alone cannot solve the 
problem of change and numerical identity, since it is possible that the same 
substance-sortal noun can be applied to more than two numerically distinct 
objects. For example, even if the same substance sortal noun "person" can be 
applied to x and y, this does not mean they are numerically one and the same 
person, since there are billions of people in the world. In order to overcome this 
problem it is necessary for the sortal dependency theory to involve the continuity 
theory, and it seems that there is a happy marriage between the sortal dependency 
theory and the continuity theory. The continuity theory requires some way of 
distinguishing between the mouse-mushroom change and caterpillar-butterfly 
change which the sortal dependency theory can provide. And continuity theory 
provides the way to distinguish two numerically distinct objects that can be 
referred by the same sortal noun. 
"all it is necessary .. .is the following truth-condition, T, for an identity 
statement 'a=b'. If one locates each of the particulars a and b [under 
covering concept or concepts] and, where appropriate, sc. in the case 
of 'identity through time', traces a and b through space and time 
[under covering concepts], one must find that a and b coincide [under 
some covering concept jJ. "22 
I believe, that the sortal dependency theory is in fact a truth condition for 
continuity theory, and not the other way around, because the sortal dependency 
theory can only be used when the spatio-temporal continuity between x andy is 
established. The theory should therefore be formulated as "x andy are numerically 
identical if and only if their existences are spatio-temporally continuous and they 
can be referred to by the same substance-sortal noun." 
Even in conjunction with the continuity theory, the sortal dependency theory 
is far from being a plausible an:d problem"-free theory. It does riot provides what 
22 Wiggins David, (1967), Identity and Spatia-Temporal Continuity, (Oxford; Blackwell), p.35. 
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realists crave, the definite distinction between change that alter numerical identity 
and change that does not. Price's example of Rover-Clover illustrates this point. 
To determine the effects of the Martian atmosphere on higher 
animals, NASA sends Rover [a dog] to Mars. After a successful 
Mars landing and take-off, Rover returns to Earth, where he is 
continuously observed for six months. Film cameras recorded every 
moment of his existence. During this time, Rover undergoes a 
gradual change, so that by the end of the isolation period he is an 
amorphous mass of cells. Even the chromosomal constitution of his 
cell has changed: its nature is not identifiable as the sort of be found 
in members of any known kind of organism. To ascertain that it was 
something in the Martian environment that produced this 
transformation, NASA rockets other dogs of different breeds and 
ages - even a pregnant dog - to Mars. The result is the same in each 
case. 
No one can deny that the entity in the isolation unit at the end 
of interval in question, call it "Clover," is Rover, the object confined 
there six month earlier. That is, one cannot claim that Rover ceased 
to exist at some time during that period. For no organism died: the 
cell composing the spatiotemporally continuous Rover and Clover 
never ceased functioning. Yet, we cannot justifiably classify Clover 
as a dog. For the only biological significant property Clover shares 
with any dog that ever lived is the property of being composed of 
cells. And, as was just mentioned, even Clover's cells are unlike 
those of any dog (or anything else) in point of genetic make-up.23 
The Rover-Clover case illustrates a problem of defining sortal noun "dog". If 
numerical divisions are as definite as realists hope, then there must be a clear-cut 
division between what kind of change ceases the creature to be a dog and what 
kirtd of change allows a creature to remain a dog. Let· assume two kinds of change. 
23 Price Marjorie S. (1977) "Identity Through Time" in The Journal of Philosophy, vol.74, 
p.201-17 
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The first kind is a radical change such as described above, the change that makes 
Clover to be nothing like a dog. It removed all characteristics of a dog (e.g. Clover 
is a man-eating spider-like creature which is not recognisable as a dog). The 
second kind of change was a less radical change, a change that was a result of 
over-exposure to radiation or a chemical agent (e.g. the unrecognisable 
appearance of Clover as a dog was due to massive tumours all over its body and 
the break-up of its DNA). If we allow both Clovers to be numerically identical 
with Rover, then the sortal noun "dog" has to be abandoned. According to Price, if 
we allow Rover and Clover to be numerically identical, terms which can be used 
in f are limited to 'entity' or 'thing'. This denies the ability of the sortal 
dependency theory to solve the problems of Theseus, "T2P is the same thing as 
Tl" and "T3P is the same thing as T1" are equally true. 
Alternatively, if we assume Clover to be numerically distinct from Rover, 
then, the problem of determining how much change Clover has to experience in 
order for the substance sortal category of "dog" to be not applicable to Clover. 
Moreover, if Rover and Clover are numerically distinct, at which point in time 
does the biological mass in the isolation tank ceases to be a dog? The 
Rover-Clover case is different from the mouse-mushroom case because in the 
latter, the mouse ceased to exist and its corpse became the mushroom, whereas in 
the former case Rover did not cease to exist. But to say Clover is not a dog, there 
must be some point in time at which the entity in the isolation tank ceases to be a 
dog. The creature (Rover) which was put in the tank on the first day was a dog, 
but 183 days later the creature (Clover) in the tank is not a dog. We can divide the 
six months into 4392 hours and into 263520 minuets, and yet we cannot pin point 
at which point the creature in the tank ceased to be a dog. There seems to be no 
definite objective difference between the mutation of an unknown kind and the 
mutation as the result of radiation. This obviously contradicts realists who believe 
numerical division to be intrinsic and definite. The problem of the sortal 
dependency theory comes down to the problem of natural kind which this thesis 
discussed in the previous chapter. Wiggins assumed that there is a special class of 
category called the natural kind which defmes the sUbstance-sortal category. 
Contrary to what Wiggins assumed as we have seen in the previous chapter, there 
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is no such category called natural kind. What we considered to be natural kinds 
are ~lt, (samskrta) and gg (siinya). They are something we invented in order 
to simplify the complex matters of the reality. As the result, numerical identity 
judgement is also matter of preference, convenience and social consensus. 
4.3.5. Numerical division as ~.lit (samskrta) 
I have examined four theories of numerical identity to see whether any of 
them can support the realist's belief in numerical divisions. Realists believe 
numerical divisions that define ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) are determined by the way ~ 
~ (nirvana) is actually divided and not by human values. This implies numerical 
divisions are definite and any disagreement and discrepancies are result of 
ignorance. In order to defend such a view, four theories of numerical identity were 
tested to see whether any of them can provide definite answers to problems of 
natural unity and of change. All theories fail to resolves these problems or to 
demonstrate numerical divisions that define ~ 'fS s ( nama-riipas) to be definite. 
The question now is if not ~~ (nirvana) then what determines numerical 
divisions? Zen thinks all divisions between A and not-A we perceive are products 
of human invention. As Garfield and Huntington described, numerical divisions 
are drawn in accordance with human values such as preference, convenience and 
social consensus. Shoemaker and Swinburne 24 provided an example which 
defend a relativist's view of numerical identity similar to that of Zen. Suppose two 
halls; Alpha Hall where Smith has his office and Beta Hall in which Jones has his 
office. Historically Alpha Hall and Beta Hall were independent buildings, but five 
years ago a foyer was built to connect the two structures. For those who know the 
history, a phrase "the building in which Smith has his office" means Alpha Hall, 
whereas for others who do not know the history, the phrase denotes the entire 
structure rather than just the Alpha Hall. If realists were right, then only one of 
these two meaning would be correct. It is, however, not possible to say one is the 
correct and the other is the incorrect use of the phrase "the building in which 
Smith has his office". If fact, meaning and truth value of the phrase is determined 
24 Shoemaker, S. & Swinburne, R. (1984), Personal Identity, (Oxford; Blackwell), p.l46. 
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by knowledge of both a speaker and a listener, and not by the way the 
mind-independent reality is actually divided. For those who have worked in the 
university for long time the phrase ''the building in which Smith has his office" 
means Alpha Hall, but for those who have just joined the -university the phrase 
means the entire building structure that contains both Alpha and Beta Hall. 
Numerical identity judgement is influenced not only by knowledge but also by 
convenience. Different numerical identity conditions applied to different things 
reflect their relation to us. The numerical identity of the Theseus is related to its 
function as ship, as a warship or as a memorial to the war hero. As a ship, 
Thesesus ceases to be numerically identical with T1 when it ceased to be 
seaworthy (for example dismantled or turned into a building on the beach). As a 
warship, it ceases to be numerically identical with T1 when it turned into a fishing 
boat. As a memorial to the war hero Theseus, it can remain to be numerically 
identical with T1 even when it ceases to be seaworthy (its ladder was bolted and 
the keel was removed) but not when it turned into a fishing boat. The numerical 
identity of a person is related to his ability to interact with others, to take 
responsibility for his or her actions, and so forth. There are no definite answers to 
whether a split brain patient is a single individual or two individuals occupying a 
single body, whether a person who underwent Wiggins' operation is numerically 
identical to both resulting people or not, and so forth. There is no definite 
universal answer to whether people who suffer from amnesia or split-personality 
who commit crimes should be punished or not. Each case is judged differently 
according to our opinion about offender's mental health, awareness of his 
responsibility, memory of the crime, likeliness to re-offend and so forth. The 
important point here is that although the degree or severity amnesia or 
split-personality may influence judgement, there is no definite degree of amnesia 
or split-personality that determine whether the person should be punished or not. 
That is determined by human value of preference and opinions. 
4.4. fiB (anatman) 
4.4.1. Is a section of a river a pond? 
I have spent much of this chapter defin.iitg the problems of numerical identity 
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because they are exactly the arguments which support ~ (siinyata) of ordinary 
individuals (~; Selves). Concerning natural unity, the above realist's theories of 
numerical identity fail to show that dividing the world at the certain level is 
ontologically or metaphysically more significant than infinite numbers of 
alternative ways of dividing the world. This gives rise to an suspicion that the idea 
of natural unity may not have any metaphysical, ontological or even rational basis, 
rather it is a product of human invention. We bundle constituents together and 
assume the existence of some kind of unity in order to simplify the complex 
matter of reality. Based on such an assumption, we distinguish what does and does 
not belong to a certain object as its constituent parts, and we also draw a boundary 
between the composite object and its environment. 
The problem of constituent change strengthens the view that there is no 
natural unity that draw the boundary between the individual and its environment. 
The continuous change of constituents which we looked at section 4.2.2.1. has a 
much wider implication regarding the identity of composite objects, than just the 
difficulty of determining the identity. A molecule which was a part of my body 
few days ago can now be a part of a plant, or a creature or whatever exists in the 
environment. The reverse is also true that what was once part of another organism 
or environment can be a part of my body. For example a bacon-lettuce-sandwich I 
had for lunch yesterday is now integrated into parts of my body. At t2 (before I ate 
the sandwich), the sandwich was not a part of me. I could clearly distinguish 
myself from the sandwich. But at present (t3), molecules that made up the 
sandwich are now part of me; my blood, my muscle and my cells. Let us now 
expand the time scale wider. At t1 (before the sandwich was made), the bacon in 
the sandwich was a part of a pig, and the lettuce and wheat that made the bread 
were parts of different plants. Also three hundred days from now (t4), all 
molecules which made up the sandwich are no longer in my body through 
excretion, shedding skin cells and hairs. Those molecules can well be parts of 
different objects; animals, insects, plants, inorganic objects or the environment. 
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[Fig.4.7.] The cycle of material exchange 
The earth 
This constant exchange of material between an individual and its environment 
indicates that whatever exists in the world may eventually be incorporated into my 
body, and what constitutes my body can become part of anything that exists in the 
world. This fact makes it difficult to draw a clear boundary between an individual 
being and its environment. To distinguish my body from its environment is as 
absurd as thinking a section of a flowing river to be a pond, as if it is somehow 
independent from the river. This is why Zen thinks :f:lt (Selves) are ~ (slinya). 
What we perceive as individuals are not genuine individuals, and the numerical 
divisions we perceive are ~ ~ (samskrta) products of human invention. 
Therefore it ts i1 (maya) and II ft!J (viparyasa) to believe in ~ fS s 
(nama-riipas) to reflect the way the mind-independent reality (~~; nirvana) 
actually is. 
Zen's idea of all numerical divisions to be ~~ (samskrta) appears to fit 
with an western philosophical idea called monism25. Monism is an idea that the 
entire world is one single entity and what we perceive as individuals are merely 
parts of the all encompassed entity. Despite similarities between Zen and monism, 
it is incorrect to identify Zen as monism. Zen is not monism because it does not 
affirm the entire universe to be a single entity, it only indicates that numerical 
divisions are ~ (slinya) and not intrinsic to ~~ (nirvana). As we saw in the 
2~ There are two types of monism. One is the idea that there is only one kind of thing and the other 
is the idea that there is only one entity. The relation between these two types is contingent since it 
is possible to deny the latter without denying the former (there are many entities and they belong 
to one and the same kind of entity). 
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Chapter Two, the aim of analytical enquiry in Zen is to make us realise that what 
we experience and comprehend are Kl (maya) and Dft!J (viparyasa), so that we 
can be liberated from the second kind of Kl (maya) and Dft!J (viparyasa), our 
false belief in our ability to comprehend the mind-independent reality as it 
actually is. Analytical enquiry can only be used to deny our false beliefs and it can 
never reveal the way iflljjl (nirvana) actually is. So that Zen only denies the idea 
of world to be composed of individuals we believe to exist, and does not make a 
further step like monism to say that there is only one single entity in the universe. 
Moreover, to describe the entire universe to be a single entity violates the 
paradoxical statement to ~ (sfinyata). As we saw in section 1.3.1., ~ (sfinyata) 
is always expressed using paradoxical statement of "A and not-A" or "neither A 
nor not-A". According to this paradoxical statement, Zen denies monism as well 
as its opponent pluralism, because ~ ( sfinyata) should be expressed as "the 
universe is a single individual and a composite of individuals" or ''the universe is 
neither a single individual nor a composite of individual". Monism is only half of 
what Zen aims to describe as the way iflljjl (nirvana) is. 
4.4.2. MR (anatman; Non-Self) as a positive concept. 
Despite the overwhelming amount of evidence most western thinkers try to 
defend the numerical identity of ordinary objects, because they believe that the 
denial of this only leads to non-productive nihilism. Lowe wrote; 
The whole world, for the conventionalist, seems doomed to merge into 
an amorphous lump in which there is no real individuality or 
distinctness, no genuine diffemtiation into multiplicity of particulars, 
apart from the divisions which we or people of other cultures impose or 
project upon the world through the filter of our thought and language. 
And then we must ask: what place can we ourselves have in such a 
world, seemingly so much of our own making? For we can hardly be 
supposed to make ourselves, in, the objects of which we speak. If the 
only way to avoid the 'amorphous lump' conception of the world is to 
148 
Numerical division 
embrace essentialism, then at least essentialism has common sense on 
its side, for what that is worth?6 
Why are people so scared of accepting that the world is in fact an amorphous 
lump and there is no genuine individuality or numerical distinctness? Zen actually 
agrees with them on one level but disagrees on another. Individuality and 
numerical distinctness that ~ ~ (nama-Iiipa) suggests are useful and essential 
for us to carry out every day tasks. Therefore denying them will have devastating 
consequences and lead us to non-productive nihilism. What Zen aims to show is 
that they are useful and essential tools to simplify the complex matter of reality, 
but as the same time, it illustrates the importance of realising they do not 
accurately correspond with the way the world really is. The world is an 
amorphous lump, but we need to divide it into manageable chunks. We invent ~ 
~ s (nama-Iiipas) so that we can agree on how to divide the amorphous lump. But 
we must correctly understand that the individuality and numerical division which 
~ ~ (nama-Iiipas) suggest are not the way ;Jl;}jl (nirvana) actually is. Zen does 
not wish to deny the usefulness of individuality and numerical distinctness, but it 
aims to make us realise that they are merely tools. Like Parfit, Zen thinks the 
importance of numerical identity judgement surpasses the objective legitimacy of 
numerical identity. In other words, although numerical identity judgement may 
not be objectively legitimate, it is something useful and necessary for us to carry 
out our daily tasks. 
The comprehension of M:Ji (anatman; Non-Self) is of particular interest to 
Zen and Buddhism in general, because the comprehension is strongly related to 
liberation from !f ( duhkha; suffering). It is believed that unawareness of M:Ji 
(anatman) causes !f (duhkha) which derives from impermanence of Selves. One 
of the !f ( duhkha) the unenlightened suffer from is the fear of death. Zen argues 
that the comprehension of M:Ji (anatman) can liberate us from the fear of death 
or in fact death itself. Death is feared because it is the annihilation of an individual. 
An individua:i existS betWeen two points in tiine; birth and death. Between these 
26 Lowe, E.J. (2002), ibid., p.l13-114 
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two points despite the changes it undergoes; an individual maintains its numerical 
identity. For example an individual, Joan Mir6, came into existence at his birth in 
1893, and ceased to exist at his death 1983. Obviously Mir6 did not exist before 
1893 and he has not existed since 1983. Between these points in time, Mir6 grew 
up, changed his appearance, personality, style in painting and sculpture, and even 
molecular constituents of his body, yet remained numerically identical. He can 
remain numerically identical despite these changes because numerical division 
maintains him to be separable and distinguishable from others and from his 
environment. Unfortunately, existence of an individual as a separable and 
distinguishable entity from others and its environment does not last forever. 
Nothing and nobody we perceive as an individual can exist forever. 
Impermanence arise from the death or the annihilation of individuality ts 
inevitable. The impermanence of an individual is discussed frequently in 
Buddhism. In Suttaniptida, for example; 
For everything that is born, there is no escape from death ... 
The young, the old ... the wise and the foolish surrender to death, 
Everything certainly reaches death. 27 
Similarly Darmapada28 mentions the inevitability of death in many places. What 
comprehension of 11ftjG (Non-Self) does is to make us realise that what we 
perceived to be an individual is t1 (maya) and OiitJ (viparyasa). What we 
perceive as an individual is not a genuine individual because it has never been 
separable or distinguishable from others or from its environment. This reveals that 
the matter of death arises from t1 (maya) and OiitJ (viparyasa). Cessation of an 
individual never occurs because the genuine individual has never existed in the 
first place. The relation between our false belief in an individual to be a genuine 
individual and the problem of death is expressed by Mf fi M 'M' 
27 Suitanipiida, III, 8. 
28 Dharmapada Oli~ft), one of three most important texts for Theravada (_tifftll). There are 
many passages that mention inevitability of death are, 41-48, 135, 147-152, 170,235, 237, 240, 
287-288. 
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(sarva-samskara-anityah), one of .= 5:li ~ 29 (trilaksana; Three Marks of 
Buddhism). It means everything which is conditioned or created by us is 
impermanent. In other words, impermanence is applied only to :fi~ (samskrta), 
things we invent or assume to exist. If we understand -~ (Non-Self), then we 
realise that 1'~1'jJ;R (anutpada-anirodha), nothing comes into existence and 
nothing goes out of existence, i.e. nothing is impermanent. In other words, there is 
neither birth or death, they are both :fi ~ (samskrta), products of human 
invention derived from i1 (maya) and iii iitJ (viparyasa). This realisation 
liberates us from death, because we understand that there is no such thing in the 
first place. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter and the previous chapter defend the idea of all divisions that 
define ~ ~ (nama-riipa) to be ~ (sfulya), i.e. all divisions are :fi ~ 
(samskrta) products of human invention and no such divisions exist in the 
mind-independent reality ( i)iljJ;R; nirvana). Such understanding is important 
because ~ ~ (narna-riipa) plays a crucial role in forming experience and 
knowledge. As we have seen in the Chapter One, in order to make sense of what 
we experience and comprehend we divide what it into different types and 
countable individuals using ~'@! s (narna-riipas) that are defined by qualitative 
divisions and ~ 1S s (nama-riipas) that are defmed by numerical divisions. 
Because the unenlightened falsely believe in a division that defmes ~ ~ 
(nama-riipa) to reflect the way the mind-independent reality actually is, they 
suffer from i1 (maya) and !iiiitJ (viparyasa) in that the way they comprehend 
reality to be is the way the mind-independent reality actually is. In order to 
overcome such i1 (maya) and til fttJ (viparyasa), it is crucial for us to 
understand ~ (siinyata) of division which is directly linked to the ~ (sfulyata) 
29.=.~~11 (trililksana; Three Marks of Buddhism) is consist ofsarva-samskiir!i-anityiili(filfi1ftt'if;; 
everything which is samskrta (~~)is impermanent}, sarva-dharmii-aniitmiinah (il~111t:Jl; the 
absense of self and anything we perceived as an individual) and siintam-nirvana O~M~fit; there 
is calmness and peace in nirvana) 
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of ~~ (nama-riipa). 
Recognising numerical division to be ~ (siinya) is of particular interest to 
Buddhism, since it is related to the concept of -~ (anatman) and consequently 
the liberation from death. I explain practical implication ofM~ (anatman) in 
Chapter Eight. 
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Part3 
~ (sunyata) and metaphysical 
concepts relating to science 
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It is not possible to discuss metaphysics without mentioning space, time, 
causation and substance, because they are keys to our fundamental prospect of our 
surroundings. Since Zen recognises everything we comprehend to be ~ (sOnya), 
what we comprehend as space, time, substance and causation should also be ~ 
(sOnya). This part of the thesis therefore examines the plausibility of ~ (sUn.yata) 
regarding the above fundamental metaphysical topics and conclude that they are 
~ 1S s (nama-rt1pas) that are useful tools to make sense of our experience and 
knowledge but they are ~~ (samskrta) and M1311 (asvabhava) and they are 
both causes and consequences of iJ (maya) and U:iitJ (viparyasa). As I stated 
above it is important to understand them to be gg (sOnya) because they form the 
foundation for our view of reality. 
To help demonstrate gg (sUn.yata) of space, time, fundamental substance and 
causation, I will look into modem physics. I believe it is appropriate to employ 
modem physics because modem physics contradicts our commonly held views on 
these topics. Modem physics make us realise that everything we think we know 
about space, time, substance and causation is i1 (maya) or UiitJ (viparyasa) and 
it traps and distorts our understanding of i.X;Jf& (nirvana). Special relativity theory 
and quantum entanglement contradict our comprehension of space and time. The 
wave/particle duality and Heisenberg s uncertainty principle suggests what we 
considered to be material substance is likely to be ~ (sOnya). Probability density 
formula and Heisenberg s uncertainty principle of quantum physics implies there 
is no such thing as causation and all events happen at random. In order to make 
modem physics comprehensible I will deal with all the above topics of modem 
science in Chapter Five. Although the chapter is titled as space and time, a 
substantial part of the chapter will be about modem physics and quantum 
interpretation, and not specifically about space and time. At least, once all relevant 
issues arise from modem physics are explained in Chapter Five, Chapter Six and 
Seven can be kept short and precise. 
I must make absolutely clear that what I aim to do in this part is not justifying 
Zen's metaphysics using modem physics as evidence. Zen monks and scholars did 
not have some mystical precognition about modem physics, therefore it is absurd 
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to employ modem physics as proof of the plausibility of classic Zen. Instead I 
offer Zen concept of gg (emptiness) as an inspiration for an alternative 
metaphysical theory. It is modem Zen I am presenting and not the Zen of past 
masters. 
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5. 
Space and Time 
~ ~ (nama-riipas) of space and of time play important roles in our 
comprehension of the world. Our ideas regarding space and time provide a 
framework within which we sort out what we experience and comprehend. As the 
unenlightened, we tend to assume space and time to be intrinsic nature of ~jJ;& 
(nirvana). In other words, we believe that three-dimensional space, distance, flow 
of time and simultaneousness to be intrinsic to ~~ (nirvana). But according to 
Zen, everything we experience and comprehend is ~ (siinyata) and this should 
include both space and time. In order to prove that both space and time are ~ 
(siinya), this chapter looks into modem physics which contradicts with our 
understanding of space and time and concludes that both space and time are ~ 
(sfinya). In other words, the mind-independent reality is not spatio-temporal. 
5.1. ~ (siinyti) of time 
Time is something very familiar to us yet very puzzling. Everyday, we talk 
about time (what time the lecture starts, how long the lecture takes), we feel time 
(we get excited when the weekend arrives, we panic when deadlines are in a few 
days time) and we can even organise time (we can move appointments, we make 
time to go to the gym). Yet, when we are asked what actually is time, most of us 
fail to define what it is. St Augustine wrote in Confessions that "what then is time? 
If no one asks me I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not". 
Similarly, ~JC (Dogen) wrote "The leaving and coming of the directions and 
traces [of time] are clear, and so people do not doubt it. They do not doubt it, but 
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that does not mean they know it."1 This section looks at this puzzling nature of 
time and aims to conclude that we know nothing about time and what we 
comprehend as time is ~ 'fS (nama-riipa) which is :ft" lt, (samskrta) and not 
intrinsic to ~~ (nirvana). 
5.1.1. Relativity of time. 
There is no consensus among different schools of Buddhism regarding time. 
Sarvastivadin school (~- t1.J :ft" ftil) affirmed the existence of three distinct times, 
the future, the present and the past. Madhyamaka school (tPG~) opposed such a 
position and claimed that even time is ~ (sOnya). It argued that what we 
understand as time (future, present and past) is ;ft"lt, (samkrta), a product of 
human invention and not intrinsic to ~M (nirvana). Zen's idea of time derives 
from this Madhyamaka school's idea of time. Like Madhyamaka, Zen argues what 
we comprehend as time is ~ ( sfulyata), so that what we think as flow and 
sequence of time are not intrinsic to ~ M (nirvana) and they are :ft" lt, 
(samskrta), products of human invention and something that are conditioned by 
human values such as preference, convenience and social consensus. This idea can 
be defended by demonstrating what we perceived as flow and sequence of time 
are relative to function of mind. Austin 2 provides two psycho-physical 
experiments that shows how our mind influence our understanding of time. 
Lehmann's study3 showed that what we consider as a moment of now is not 
scientific sense of now as a non-stretched point in time, but it has certain duration 
spread anything between 10 and 100 millisecond. What this means it that our 
judgement of which events are simultaneous is not definite and what we judge as 
simultaneous may not be actually simultaneous. Suppose an event B occurred 50 
millisecond after an event A. Some may consider A and B to be simultaneous 
while others think they are not. Milner 4 analysed how the brain damage 
I ii~ (Dogen) nEJ!IIHii~ (ShObagenzo), r~~J (being-time). 
~ A!Jstin,},ames ,1-1~ (2000), ~ef}.andJf!e)Jr,aifl, (Cam!>ri<lge M,A., U.S.A.: The MIT }>ress). 
Lehmann, H. (1967), "Time and psychopathology", in Interdisciplinary Perspectives of Time: 
Annals of New York Academy of Science, vol. 138, p798-82l. 
4 Milner, B. (1971), "Interhemispheric differences in the localization of psychological processes in 
man", in British Medical Bulletin, vol.27, p.272-277. 
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influences the comprehension of time sequence. Study showed that brain damage 
patients could not often put event in right chronicle order. They got muddled up 
about sequence of which event came after which. This indicates that our 
judgement of time sequence requires brain process and what we see as a sequence 
of event is actually a mental image or a memory of the event reconstructed in our 
mind and not actual sequence of the event. What these psychological studies of 
time prove is that there can be inconsistency between what we perceive as flow 
and sequence of time on one hand and actual flow and sequence of time on the 
other. In other words, flow or sequence of time we comprehend is not intrinsic or 
the way actually time works, and we have no idea of what time is or whether there 
is such thing call time. 
~'@?. (nama-riipa) of time (flow and sequence of time) and of change are 
useful tools for us to simplify the complex affair of reality. But like any other 
concepts, they cause "the tyranny of tools". It prevent us from comprehending the 
world as it really is. It is therefore important to acknowledge that our 
understanding of time does not reflect the way the world really is. 
5.1.2. Special relativity theory 
The idea that time is ~ (sUnya) is not a too far-fetched idea thanks to 
Einstein's special theory of relativity, which is represented by the most 
well-known (but not necessary widely understood) equation E = mc2 • The 
relativity of time Einstein talked about is obviously different from the relativity of 
time Zen addresses. The former sees the relativity between time and the motion of 
object, whereas the latter regards relativity between what we perceive as time and 
function of mind or human values. Despite this difference, it is relevant for the 
purpose of this thesis to mention the special relativity theory. Since the purpose of 
the thesis is to demonstrate whatever we believe to know does not reflect the way 
the mind-independent reality (~jj!; nirvana) actually is. The special relativity 
theory illustrates actual time is not something we assume it to be. In our ordinary 
life, we think of time as definite in the sense that it flow exactly the same way for 
' . . - . . 
everyone. Einstein's special theory of relativity contradicts this commonly held 
belief. According to the special relativity theory, the faster the object moves, the 
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slower time flows for the object, (i.e. flow of time is relative to the object's 
motion). The idea of a special theory of relativity was published by Einstein in 
1905. The idea was developed to explain a bizarre implication of Maxwell's 
electromagnetic equation. What the equation entails is that electromagnetic waves 
including light travels at a fix speed regardless of the motion of the light source. 
Unbeknown to Einstein, empirical evidence for his special relativity theory had 
already been discovered by Michelson and Morley 5 • Albert Michelson and 
Edward Morley devised an experiment in order to measure the speed of the Earth, 
by observing how fast or slow light travels. The result of the experiment 
contradicted the prediction. Regardless of the direction of the apparatus, time of 
day or season, all results came out to be equal to c, the constant speed of light. In 
other words, light does not change its speed regardless of how fast and which 
direction the light source is moving. Lorentz and FitzGerald thought that the result 
of the Michelson-Morley experiment was due to the fact that the distance changes 
with speed (Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction). The reason the speed of light 
appears to be constant is because an object (in this case the apparatus) shrunk 
according to the speed it travels. Imagine an object which is moving with relative 
speed v to the observer. If the observer perceives the length of the object to be x, 
then the length of the object from its own perspective is xO. 
[Eq.5.1.] Length contraction 
( )
-Y, 
xo=x· 1 :: =x·y 
LLorentz factor J 
This theory explains the result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, but it does 
not explain anything other than that. Einstein's special relativity theory, on the 
other hand, not only explains the Michelson-Morley experiment, but is also 
compatible with Maxwell's electromagnetic equation. Einstein's theory, however, 
contradicts our common belief of time. Even nearly a hundred years after its 
publication, many people still assume the flow of time to be absolute. According 
to Einstein's special relativity theory, time flows differently relative to the 
5 Michelson, A.A. & Morley, E. W. (1887), "On the relative motion of the earth and the 
luminiferous ether'', in American Journal of Science, vol.34, p.333-345. 
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movement of the observer, and there is no definite time. For two objects whose 
difference in speed is v, while object A experiences a certain length of time tJ.t', 
and object B experiences a different length of time ..1t. The difference of how the 
time flow for object A and B (known as time dilation) can be calculated using the 
Lorentz factor. 
[Eq.5.2.] Time dilation 
( )
-\1, 
..1t' = ..1t 1 :: = ..1t . 'V 
L Lorentz fact~ 
What Einstein discovered was not just a hypothesis; it has been proven by 
several experiments. A particle accelerator at CERN boosted particles called 
muons so close to the speed of light that their half life was stretched twenty times 
that of normal muons at rest. This happened because for the muons that travel 
close to the speed of light, time flow much slower than observers who are in rest. 
Similarly, using a device called an electron synchrotron in Daresbury Laboratory 
in Cheshire, it was discovered that wave length of electrons increase when they 
are travelling close to the speed oflight (because for them time is flowing slowly). 
There are two more important elements to Einstein's special theory of 
relativity. The first of the two is that not only time but mass of the object changes 
relative to its speed. If an object with rest mass of mo moves with the velocity v, 
then its mass changes to m. The resulting mass m can be calculated using the 
similar equation to the time dilation. 
[Eq.5.3] Relativistic mass formula 
v2 
)
-Yl 
-- =mo·'V 
c2 
The implication of this formula is that anything moving close to the speed of light 
increases its mass to an infinite value (see Eq.5.4. and Fig. 5.1.). The moving 
object of infinite mass requires infinite energy, so no object with mass can reach 
the speed of light. In other words, nothing can exceed the constant speed of light c. 
This becomes important when we discuss the quantum entanglement later. 
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[Eq.5.4. & Fig 5.1.] Ifthe object's velocity gets close to c 
0---+ c 
Speed of an object 
(v) 
The other important element to Einstein's special relativity theory is that the 
stretch of time and shrinkage of distance postulated by Lorentz-Fitzgerald 
contraction are one and the same thing. According to Einstein, both the time and 
distance we measure are relative to the speed an observer or an object travels. 
Imagine an alien civilisation some 2 million light years away. In possession of a 
spaceship which can travel at almost the speed of light (at 0.999 999 999c). 
According to the equation of time dilation, for alien astronauts, it would only take 
89.3 years to reach the earth. 
[Eq.5.5] Space travel 
( 
(0.999999999c)2 
~t' = 2000000 . 1 - -----
c2 
_y, 
) ~ 89.3 
The distance between points A and B is equal to the speed multiplied by the time 
it takes. For us, the distance between the alien planet and the earth is 1.89 x 
l022(m)6• For the alien astronauts, however, the distance between the two planets 
is only 8.34 x 1017 (m)7• How can the distance between the two planets vary so 
much? According to Einstein, since there is no absolute time or absolute rest, 
there is no absolute distance. This indicates that space (distance) as well as time is 
relative to the speed of the observer. This intimate relation between space 
(distance) and time contradicts our common perception. In everyday life, we 
conceive space and time to be distinct and mutually independent, but the theory of 
6 299792458 (rnlsec) x 31449600 (sec/yr) x 2000000 (yr) 
7 299792455 (rnlsec) x 31449600 (sec/yr) x 89.3(yr) 
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special relativity states that they are manifestations of one entity called 
space-time. 
Psycho-physical experiments and Einstein's special relativity theory provide 
evidence that what we perceived as time is not necessary what the time actually is 
5.2. Quantum physics and !! (sunyati) 
Quantum physics consists of three elements; quantum phenomena, quantum 
mechanics and quantum interpretation. The quantum phenomena are the 
observable facts of what occurs in the quantum world or what quantum effects 
have in observable events. What is unique about quantum phenomena is that they 
contradict with our common conception of reality or the laws of classical physics. 
Quantum phenomena are, however, tested under strict conditions, so that there is 
no room to deny that these strange phenomena exist. The second element, 
quantum mechanics is the result of formalising quantum phenomena. 
Formalisation is the process of analysing phenomena and finding an equation or a 
formula that is empirically adequate. Quantum mechanics is important because it 
gives us not only an ability to calculate and predict outcomes, but more 
importantly it states relations between different variables and clarify what those 
variables mean. The third element, quantum interpretation, is an interpretation of 
quantum mechanics which explains why the variables are related in certain ways 
or why certain mathematical formulae can explain or predict quantum phenomena. 
The quantum interpretation is the part of quantum physics relevant to metaphysics. 
Different quantum interpretations give different views on what the true nature of 
the reality is. In order to demonstrate ~ (slinyaHi) of space, substance and 
causation, I will carry out ~; ~ ~ ;! (prasange) against existing quantum 
interpretations that assumes our ideas of space, substance and causation actually 
reflect the way a~ (nirvana; the mind-independent reality) anyway is. The 
quantum interpretations I will look into are the Copenhagen interpretation, hidden 
variable theories (de Broglie's pilot wave theory and Bohm's quantum potential 
the()ry),cy:lg Evert-Deutsch's many-worlds _i;ntewrt1tation. 
Although the main focus of this section is ~ {slinyaffi) of space, I will look 
into quantum interpretations in terms of all space, time, substance and causation. 
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This is because these topics are interrelated and it is not possible to separate them. 
This chapter examine how these quantum interpretations deals with these topics. 
And later in Chapter Six and Seven, I will re-examine the implication of quantum 
physics on substance and causation. Because of this, the section 5.2. tends to be 
descriptive and not focused on ~ (siinyata) of space. I believe it is important to 
include this chapter since this establishes the framework on which the next two 
chapters are based. I defend the plausibility and impact of what I conclude in this 
chapter in Chapter Six and Seven. I also regret that I use many mathematical 
equations. To me an equations makes a brief and precise point. 
5 .2.1. Puzzling quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics 
By the end of the 19th century, many believed that all major discoveries in 
science had been made, so that all that was left for science to study were the 
minor details. However those small details changed science completely, because 
classical physics could not explain what scientists thought to be minor and 
insignificant details. Those small details that did fit classical physics are known as 
quantum phenomena which gave birth to a new kind of physics called quantum 
physics. According to classical physics, quantum phenomena and mechanics are 
paradoxical or counter-intuitive (many texts uses the term "quantum paradoxes" 
to describe them). Reality, however, cannot be paradoxical. Paradoxes must lie 
within our understanding of the universe, not in reality. Classical physics was 
replaced by quantum physics because according to quantum mechanics what were 
known as quantum paradoxes for classical physics could no longer be seen as 
paradoxical (although currently available quantum interpretations are far from 
paradox-free). 
Regrettably, since there is not enough space to cover the entire field of 
quantum physics in this thesis, I can only mention three quantum phenomena and 
their related mechanics that are relevant to the purpose of this chapter. Other 
important discoveries in quantum physics, such as Bohr's model of atomic 
structure, QED (Quantum Electric Dynamics), the matrix description of wave 
furidion, super synlinetry, super stririg theory and so forth, will have to be 
discarded. The three topics of quantum phenomena and their related mechanics 
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that this chapter looks into are 1) the wave/particle duality, 2) probability and 
uncertainty and 3) entanglement. In order to demonstrate the plausibility of its 
claim, any quantum interpretation must be able to accommodate the above 
quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics as its minimum requirement. If any 
interpretation fails to do so, then it is not worth examining its philosophical 
plausibility. 
5.2.1.1 The wave/particle duality 
One of puzzling phenomena that gave rise to quantum physics is the 
wave/particle duality of light. Scientists have known for a long time that light 
possesses both wave-like properties as well as particle-like properties. The 
problem is that nothing can be both wave and particle because their properties are 
mutually exclusive. This strange fact can be demonstrated by the so-called 
double-slit experiment. The original experiment was carried out by Young 
between 1 797 to 1799 and was designed to prove light to be a wave and not a 
particle. The setting of the experiment was as followed; 
[Fig.5.2.a] Young's Double-Slit Experiment 
SH!B ~ ~ Photographic Plate 
Ligh~_/~ 
SlitA u 
[Fig.5.2.b.] If light is a stream of particles [Fig.5.2.c.] !flight is a wave 
If light was a stream of particles like pebbles, then those that have gone though 
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the slit A would pile up behind the slit A, and those that have gone thought the slit 
B would pile up behind the slit B. If this were the case, pattern that emerges on the 
photographic plate would be the simple sum of two piles [Fig. 5.2.b ]. Whereas if 
light were wave, then the pattern that appears on the photographic plate would be 
different. According to the law of superposition of waves, within the overlapping 
region where the two waves are in step, the intensity doubles (constructive 
interference) and where two waves are half a wavelength out of step, the waves 
cancel each other (destructive interference). As a result, light would create an 
interference pattern similar to two overlapping ripples [Fig.5.2.c]. When the 
experiment was carried out the result turned our to be the interference pattern of 
ripples, which suggested light was a wave and not a stream of particles. 
With the development of technology, scientists can now carry out the 
double-slits experiment using a minute amount of light. When light was reduced 
to a minimum, light started to arrive at the photographic plate as a particle and not 
as a wave (i.e. instead of the interference pattern, a small dot appeared on where 
the light particle had landed). This particle nature of light was confirmed further 
by modifying the double-slits experiment. When the experiment was repeated 
with only one of two slits opened, impressions of light particles were concentrated 
behind the opened slit, like pebbles do. This indicated that light behave as a 
stream of particles. 
[Fig.5.3] The single-slit experiment 
A curious thing is that when both slits were opened, although light particles 
arrived at the photographic plate as particles, the light created the interference 
pattern of a wave. (i.e. rather than the photograph looking like one in Fig.5.2.b., 
the pattern was the same as one Fig.5.2.c). 
This fact that the interference pattern appeared only when both slits were 
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open, suggests that light travelled as a wave and not as a particle (a single particle 
cannot pass through both slits, so that if light travelled as a particle, interference 
patter should not have appeared). At the same time if light were a wave, then it 
would not have appear on the photographic plate as a dot. What this implies is that 
light travels like a wave and not like a particle, yet it arrives at the photographic 
plate as a particle and not as wave. 
The development of technology made the situation even worse. As de Broglie 
predicted in his essay8, not only light, but also all matter display wave/particle 
duality. So far, similar double-slits experiments have been carried out using 
electrons, neutrons and even atoms, and all results confirmed the puzzling 
wave/particle duality. The wave/particle duality is demonstrated not only by the 
double-slits experiment but also by the ultra-violet catastrophe of black body 
radiation and photo-electric effects. Both indicate that electromagnetism 
demonstrates wave-like property, that its energy level is determined by its 
frequency but at the same time it possesses property of existing in a definite size 
like a particle (called a packet). Due to the lack of space in this thesis, I would like 
to omit both the ultra-violet catastrophe of black body radiation and photo-electric 
effects as evidences of the wave/particle duality of matter. 
The wave/particle duality is related to the question of what kind or kinds of 
element or fundamental substance which everything is made out of. In history, 
there have been many theories about fundamental building blocks of the universe. 
Some ancient Greeks9 and Indians10 thought the universe was made out of four 
basic elements, earth, water, fire and air. Cartesian dualism thought there were two 
kinds of fundamental substance; material substance and mental substance. Many 
modem thinkers believe material substance to be the only fundamental substance. 
According to Zen, since everything we believe to exist is ~ (siinya), these which 
we considered to be substance or fundamental elements should also be ~ 
(sunya); they are products of human invention (~l\; samskrta) and they do not 
8 de Broglie, L, (1925), "Recherches sur la theorie des quanta", de /'Academie des Sciences 
voL 177, p.630-632. 
9 Famously Empedocles of Acragas established classic theory of fundamental elements. 
10 Ajita Kesakambala, one of six influential sramana philosophers who existed at the time of 
Gautama Buddha. Others Indian philosophers of his time thought there may be additional three to 
five basic elements to exist. 
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exist in ~M (nirvana; the mind-independent reality). The wave/particle duality 
is important because it questions our belief in the material substance and suggests 
that material substance is ~ (sfinya). I will discuss this in the Chapter Six. 
5.2.1.2. Quantum uncertainty 
The second puzzling aspects of quantum physics is that at the quantum level, 
things seems to occur at random. This is radically different from the everyday 
world we experience. At the level of everyday objects, such as a car, a mug and a 
football, we can predict what will happen next if we know all the forces that 
causally influence the event. This is because at the level of everyday objects, 
under identical conditions, outcomes of the same action will always be the same. 
The car, the mug and the football do not suddenly change momentum or trajectory 
without any force applied to them. But at the quantum level, outcomes can vary 
even if the conditions and the cause remain identical. For example, the single- and 
the double-slits experiments illustrate that photons and electrons do not always 
appear on the same spot on the photographic plates, despite there being no 
apparent difference in the settings of the experiments. There are always certain 
spreads to where matters appear on the photographic plate. This spread can be 
mathematically described using a simple formula, known as the probability 
density formula, which is equal to the square of the absolute value of 
Schrodinger s wave function; 
[Eq.5.6.] Schrodinger's wave function 
\fl (x.t) = A·sin(kx-wt)- i·Acos (kx-wt) = Ae i(kx-wt) 
[Eq.5.7] The probability density formula 
Prob(x.t) = I "1'12 
Since the wave function of the matter wave is complex, the square of 'I' is not (A-sin(kx-Wt)- i·A-cos 
(kx-wt))'. For complex number (a--i·b), to make its square, it has to be multiplied by its complex 
corijugate (a+i·b). Therefore, the square of the wave function is; 
I'I'I"=(A·sin(kx-wt)- i-Acos (kx-wt) ·(A-sin(kx-wt)+ i·A·cos (kx-wt) 
What the formula describes is how likely the particle in question is to be found at 
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a certain location (x) at a certain time (t)11 • The important thing to note here is that 
the equation does not give a precise location of the particle, it only gives the 
probability of where the particle is likely to be found. Reliablity of both the 
probability density formula and Schrodinger's wave function have been proven by 
their ability to explain and predict quantwn phenomena. The most important thing 
to note in the formula is that it contains the complex number i (i = ...f-1). Since the 
wave function of the matter wave contains a complex number, the matter wave 
cannot be identified by its physical characteristics alone. Physically observable 
characteristics of a matter wave are the real part of the wave, and although the 
imaginary part of the wave influences the behavior of the matter wave, it is not 
physically observable. 
Another aspect of the quantwn world differing from the everyday world is the 
impossibility to measure location and momentwn simultaneously. Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle illustrated this. 
[Eq.5.8.] Heisenberg's uncertainty principle 
fl 
Lh . L'lp 2: --
2 
Because n is Planck's constant, and not a variable, the right-hand-side of the 
equation is constant. This means standard deviations for location (L'lx} and 
momentwn (f'¥J) are inverse proportion to each other. Standard deviation (L'l) is a 
measurement of the dispersion. If L'lx is close to 0, then the size of the area where 
the particle is like to be found is significantly smaller. In other words, the smaller 
L'lx the more precise our prediction of the location of a particle. In the same way 
f'¥J to be large indicates p can be any value within f'¥J. Because L'lx and f'¥J are 
inverse proportion to each other, certainty concerning the location of a particle 
increase when certainty of momentwn decreases, and vice versa. 
Classical physics thinks everything has definite dynamic values, but 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle suggest that quantum elements do not have 
11 
.for ,exrunpl~, suppose nvo ,locations x1 a_nd x2 .on the photographic plate and different 
probability density; Prob(x1,t) = O.Ql (the probability of finding the particle at the location x1 is 
1%) and Prob (x2,t) = 0.25 (the probability of finding the particle at the location x2 is 25%). Those 
probability densities tell us that it is 25 times more likely to find the particle on x2 than x 1; yet, it 
is possible to find it at x 1. 
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definite dynamic values, so that it exist everywhere and nowhere in particular and 
has no particular velocity and spin. This suggestion was proven by a quantum 
phenomena that is known as the tunnelling effects. Suppose the following set up 
of an experiment. 
[Fig.5.4.] A setting to measure tunnelling effect 
Potential barrier 
D-------->-----1 --->---ED 
The electron emitter 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
tJ Detector B 
Detector A 
According to classical physics, if there is no other force, whether the particle is 
transmitted or deflected at the potential barrier is determined by the initial 
momentum of the particle. In order for the particle to pass the barrier (to be 
transmitted), the particle must possess sufficient energy. If the particle possesses 
sufficient energy, then it will be transmitted and it will be recorded on the detector 
A. Whereas if the initial momentum of the particle is not sufficient, the particle 
will be deflected and will be recorded by the detector B. The idea is easily 
illustrated with a simple potential barrier. 
[Fig.5.5.] Potential barrier 
Reflected 
Required Potential energy 
The ball will be transmitted or reflected by the hill according to whether initial 
velocity is less or greater than the critical value. The result of the tUnnelling 
experiment, however, contradicted the prediction made by classical physics. 
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Sometimes, even when the initial momentum of the particle was not sufficient to 
pass through the barrier, the detector A recorded the particle. Other times, even 
thought the particle possessed sufficient energy, the detector B indicated that the 
particle has been deflected. The result of the experiment illustrated that at the 
quantum level, things seems to happen at random and violate classical physics 
that assumes the deterministic nature of reality. Classical physics assumes two 
things regarding causation. The first is the idea that nothing happen without a 
cause. Normally we assume everything that occur has a cause or causes to why 
that happens. The second is the deterministic nature of causation. Classical 
physics believes that under the identical circumstance, the identical causes always 
result in the identical outcome. For example, if we repeat an experiment under an 
identical circumstance, the result will always be the same. All the tunnelling effect, 
quantum mechanics of probability density formula and Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle suggest causal determinism to be ~ (siinyata). They imply traditional 
ideas of causation and determinism to be :ff£!1, (samskrta) and not derives from 
the way the mind-independent reality actually is. The causations and determinism 
are ::8 1S s (nama-riipas) as tools that enable us to assume regularity in order to 
give us some degree of certainty. These regularities we assume to exist in the 
world are useful but some time lead us to false prediction and false expectation. I 
will come back to ~ (siinyata) of causation in the Chapter Seven. 
5.2.1.3. Quantum entanglement 
The whole topic of entanglement has its origin in the so-called EP R thought 
experiment 12 . The thought experiment was invented to demonstrate how 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle violates relativistic mass formula of the 
Einstein's special relativity theory 13 , thereby false. Suppose explosion of a 
molecule made up by two identical particles, Particle Land R. The particle-L flies 
off to the left and the particle-R to the right. Because the two particles are 
identical in every way except their direction of traveling, we can calculate the 
12 The name EPR came from names of its inventors Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. In Einstein, 
Podolsky, Rosen (1935), "Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered 
complete?", in Physical Review, Vol.47, pp.777-780. 
13 See E.q. 5.4 in section 5.1.2 
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speed of L by measuring R, and understand the momentum of R by measuring L. 
But according to the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, even under such 
conditions we cannot measure the location and momentum simultaneously. This 
implies that measuring one of them instantaneously affects the other regardless of 
the distance between the two. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen thought Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle is wrong because the instantaneous communication violates 
the mass formula of the special relativity theory [E.q.5 .4. in section 5 .1.2]. As we 
saw in section 5.1.2, according to the mass formula of the special relativity theory, 
nothing can exceed the speed of light, because reaching the speed of light requires 
an infinite amount of energy. 
In this thesis, in order to understand the EPR experiment and what the result 
of such experiment suggests, I use a simplified version of EPR-B 14• 
[Fig.5.6.] EPR-B using polarisation of entangle photons 
Polarising filters 
[ 
Transmitted path 
- -{D (]}------ ~---------r------~ I I I I / 
Detectors ~Deflected path 
tJ 
In the experiment, the probability of the particle to take a transmitted path or a 
deflected path is determined by the angle of the polarised filter and spin of the 
particle. The probability of the particle to be transmitted can be calculated using a 
simple formula, 
[Eq.5.9.] 
Prob( 8 ) = cos2 8 
where 8 is the angle of the filter. 
To make the matter simpler, let us assume that there are only three possible angles 
14 This is a version of EPR tlioughfexperiin:ent which measure spin (rotation) and location rather 
than speed and location. This version was developed by Bell, J.S. (1964), "On 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox", in Physics, Vol.l, p.l95-200, reprinted in his (1987), 
Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Physics, (Cambrisdge; Cambridge Univ. Press), p.14-2l. 
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of the filters; 0°, 30° and 60°. Then transmitted rates of particle in each angle are 
calculated as; 
[Table.5.1.] 
oo; cos20° = 1 ( 1 00%) Every photon passes the filter 
30°; COS230o = 3/4 (75%) Only three out of four photons pass the filter 
60°; cos260° = 1/4 (25%) Only one out of four photons pass the filter 
Using two filters and particles with the same spin direction (it is normally the 
opposite directions, but to make the matter simple, I would like to assume the 
same direction) we can have nine possible outcomes. According to physics of an 
ordinary object, the rate of co-ordination between particles going to the right filter 
(R) and those going to the left filter (L) can be calculated according to simple 
mathematics; 
[Eq. 5.10] Prediction by classic physics 
Rate of co-ordination 
=(rate of both pass)+ (rate of both deflected) 
=(pass rate of R) x (pass rate of L) +(deflected rate of R) x (deflected rate of L) 
= cos2 e R x cos2 e L + (1- cos2 e R ) x (1- cos2 e L) 
When the experiment was actually carried out by Aspect et al 15 , the result 
contradicted the above prediction and proved Heisenberg's uncertainty principle 
to be correct. More importantly the result indicated violation of the special 
relativity theory. In other words, it demonstrated the instant communication 
between L and R. 
15 Aspect, A., Grangier, P. & Roger, G. (1982), "Experimental realization of 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Gedankenexperiment: A new violation of Bell's inequalities", in 
Physical Review Letters, vol.48, p.91-94. 
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[Table.5.2.] The quantum entanglement in EPR-B experiment 
~0~ ~3~ Classical Physics expects Aspect's result C:J: Pass rate of Pass rate of Coordination Coordination Gla: 
~'0 CD'S R L rate Difference o1 rate 1- ~ wo filters 
fiR fiL cos•e R cos•e L eq· .... a cos• a 
o· o· 4/4 4/4 16/16 o· 16/16 
o· 30" 4/4 3/4 12/16 30" 12/16 
o· 60" 4/4 1/4 4/16 60" 4/16 
30" o· 3/4 4/4 12/16 30" 12/16 
30" 30" 3/4 3/4 10/16 o· 16/16 
30" 60" 3/4 1/4 6/16 30" 12/16 
60" o· 1/4 4/4 4/16 60" 4/16 
60" 30" 1/4 3/4 6/16 30" 12/16 
60" 60" 1/4 1/4 10/16 0 16/16 
Total co-ordination 10/18 13/18 
The table shows that the rate of co-ordination classical physics expects (1 0/18 or 
55.56%) and the result of Aspect's experiment (13/18 or 72.22%) do not match. 
The result of Aspect's experiment indicated that the co-ordination rate was higher 
than classical physics expected. Furthermore, surprisingly, the co-ordination rate 
was exactly COS2 a' where a is the difference in angles of two filters (a= I e R 
-8 Ll). What the result of Aspect's experiment suggested is that the pass rate of 
particles L and R are related; somehow the pass rate of the right hand side was 
altered by the pass rate of the left hand side, and vice versa. According to 
Einstein's special relativity theory, it is not possible for particle L and R to 
simultaneously alter each other while they are apart. Contrary to Einstein's theory, 
the experiment proved that Heisenberg's was right and Einstein, Podolsky and 
Rosen were wrong. There is instantaneous communication between two particles 
which violates the special relativity theory. 
The instantaneous communication of the quantum entanglement can suggest 
three-dimensional space to be ~ (siinya), because the entangled particles behave 
as if there is no distance between them. We assume distance and 
three-dimensional extension to be intrinsic to ~~ (nirvana), but they could be 
~ (siinya). I will defend this idea using ~; fiJ ~ ~ (prasamga), by 
demonstrating how theories that assume mi ~ (nirvana) to be 
three-,dimensionally lead to undesirable and implausible conclusion. 
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5.2.2. Quantum interpretations compared 
Although historically, de Broglie's pilot wave theory came first, it is easier to 
start with the Copenhagen interpretation, since it was (and perhaps still is?) the 
most influential interpretation and I can present other interpretations in 
comparison to the Copenhagen interpretation. The other reason to put the 
Copenhagen interpretation first is to give fair treatment towards hidden variable 
theories and the many-worlds interpretations. Non-Copenhagen interpretations 
have suffered unfair dismissals, in favour of the Copenhagen interpretation16• By 
arguing against the Copenhagen interpretation first, it is easier for other 
interpretations to enjoy fair treatment. 
Above quantum interpretations assume not necessary all but some of what we 
perceived as space, time, fundamental substance and causation to be intrinsic to 
the mind-independent reality (~jJ;;£; nirvana). In order to prove them to be ~ 
(siinya), I carry out ~miB~i! (prasanga) upon the above quantum interpretations. 
As I stated in Chapter Two, ~;iB~5! (prasanga) examines the plausibility of an 
idea or theory in terms of 1) compatibility with facts, 2) philosophical plausibility 
and 3) economy. In the context of quantum physics, the first criteria means 
compatibility with quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, in order to be 
true description of the reality, any theory has to be able to at least explain puzzling 
quantum phenomena and mechanics mentioned above. 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, since it is not possible to deal with 
topics of space, time, substance and causation separately, I will examine these 
quantum interpretation in terms of all space, time, substance and causation. 
5.2.2.1. The Copenhagen interpretation 
The Copenhagen interpretation still remains the most influential interpretation 
16 Hostile attitudes towards non-Copenhagen interpretations can be found in many literatures. To 
give few examples, Heisenberg (1958), Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern 
Science, (N.Y.; Harper and Row), p.l29-130, I Margenau Hendry (1964), "Measurements and 
Quantum states; part 1", in Philosophy of Science, vol.30, p.7, I Rosenfeld Leon (1961), 
"Foundations of quantum theory and complementarity", in Nature, vol.l90, p.384. I Hanson, 
No~~od: (19~3), Thf Confep~of th~ Pgsitr(J~,JC~bridge; <:;:~bricJge UJ!iy. Ptes,s). 
Omnes, R. wrote "iliere iS ito serious alteriuitive to it -(the Copenhagen iriterpretation), since the 
approach through hidden variables, whatever its interest, has not been developed to the point of 
giving a theory but only the preliminaries of a theory", in his (1992), "Consistent interpretations of 
quantum mechanics", in Reviews of Modern Physics, vol.63, p.340. 
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of quantum physics, despite its problematic philosophical implications. It is 
difficult to explain precisely what the Copenhagen interpretation is. This is due to 
the fact that the term "Copenhagen interpretation" covers many diverse and often 
conflicting quantum interpretations. Even the pioneers of the theory, such as Bohr, 
Heisenberg and Pauli, all held significantly different . views. Moreover the 
interpretations of von Neumann and of Wingner are radically different to these of 
the above key figures. Unfortunately, there is not enough space to explore these 
various Copenhagen interpretations in depth. Instead I discuss what I believe to be 
the most widely accepted form of Copenhagen interpretation which is a 
compilation of the best parts from different versions of Copenhagen 
interpretations, and not by one particular person. 
The Copenhagen interpretation is the literal interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. It believes Schrodinger's wave function, probability density formula, 
the uncertainty principle to be a true and complete descriptions of matter. This 
means matter normally exist as wave of probability and has no definite dynamic 
values such as location, momentum, spin and so forth (this is because E.q.5.6. 
contain the complex number i (i = ...J-1)). But this does not explain the 
wave/particle duality. In order to accommodate the duality, the Copenhagen 
interpretation employs an idea called "the collapse of wave function". It argues 
that a matter normally exists as a probability wave which does not have definite 
dynamic values, but it turns into a particle when its momentum or location is 
measured (in quantum physics the act of measuring is referred to as "observing"). 
In other words, the observation forces the probability wave to collapse and turn it 
into a particle that possesses definite dynamic values. In the terminology of 
quantum physics, the matter can be in two distinct states; eigenstate where the 
matter is a particle and non-eigen state where it is the probability wave. 
According to the probability density formula, when matter is in a non-eigen 
state, the probability density spread, so that everywhere possess more than 0 (0%) 
less than 1 (100%) of finding a matter, yet no particular location has probability 
density equal to 1 (100%). On the contrary, when the matter is in an eigenstate, 
the probability on a particular location turns into 1 (100%), and probability of 
fmding the matter elsewhere turns into 0 (0% ). 
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[Fig.5.7] The collapse of the wave function 
Eigen-state Non-Eigen-state 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 100% 
Location 
1 Probability density 
According to the collapse of wave function, in the double-slit experiment, the 
light changes its state three times. At the light source, the light was a particle, it 
had definite location and momentum. As soon as the light left the light source, it 
turned into the probability wave. Because the light traveled as the probability 
wave which exist everywhere and nowhere in particular, it can travel through both 
slits and cause interference pattern. The light turns from the probability wave to a 
particle again when it hit the photographic plate, thus a single dot appears on the 
location where the matter turned into a particle. In the same manner the tunneling 
effects can be explained using the collapse of a wave function. As soon as the 
electron left the emitter, it turned into a probability wave which spread out and has 
no definite dynamic value. Because the probability for finding the electron spread 
everywhere even behind the potential barrier, it could appear on the other side of 
the barrier despite the electron did not have sufficient momentum. Although the 
Copenhagen interpretation does not explain exactly how that happens, it is at least 
compatible with the quantum entanglement. The distance exists because we 
assume that particle L and R remained and travelled as particles. If the particles 
turned into probability waves, their existence overlapped because as probability 
waves their existence spread everywhere. In other words, as probability waves 
there is no distance between them. 
Although the Copenhagen interpretation is mathematically satisfactory, there 
are problems regarding the collapse of the wave function, the idea of observation 
forces a matter to change from a probability wave to a particle. Problems of the 
collapse of the wave function can be divided into two kinds. The first kind is 
about the distinction betWeen the object tlraegoes into a riori-eigen state when it is 
not observed and the object that stays in an eigen state regardless of whether it is 
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observed or not. The second kind is the distinction between the observer who is 
capable of collapsing wave function and one who is not. The first problem is 
illustrated by the famous thought experiment known as "Schrodinger's Cat". 
A Cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following 
diabolical device (which must be secured against direct interference 
by the cat); in a Geiger counter there is a tiny amount of radioactive 
substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of one hour one of the 
atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none; if it 
happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a 
hammer which shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has 
left this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat 
is still alive if meanwhile no atom has decayed. The first atomic 
decay would have poisoned it. The t/J -function of the entire system 
would express this by having in it the living and the dead cat (pardon 
the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts17• 
The first paradox Schrodinger's Cat thought experiment illustrates is that the 
Copenhagen interpretation implies ''the cat is neither dead nor alive (or dead and 
alive at the same time) unless it is observed". But surely the cat must be either 
dead or alive regardless of whether it is observed or not, and it cannot be in some 
strange suspended state of neither dead nor alive. Not only the cat, but everyday 
objects around us continue to exist and continue to have definite positions and 
momentum regardless of whether or not they are observed. Suppose I left a cup of 
tea on a dinning table and went into a kitchen to get some milk. Even when I am 
in a kitchen and not observing the cup, the cup does not turn into a probability 
wave, as the Copenhagen interpretation suggests. In order to combine the fact that 
the cup does not go into non-eigen state when it is not observed and quantum 
phenomena that quantum particle turns into non-eigen state when it is not 
17 SchrMmger, E. ( 1935), ''Die gl!genwllrtige situation in der quantenmechanik", in 
Naturwissenschaften Vol.23. Translated and Reprinted as "The present situation in Quantum 
Mechanics" in Wheeler, J. A. & Zurek, W. H. (eds.), (1983), Quantum Theory and Measurement, 
(Princeton; Princeton Univ. Press), p.l52-67 
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observed, the Copenhagen interpretation has to make the distinction between an 
object that goes into non-eigen state when it is not observed and an object that has 
defmite dynamical values regardless of whether or not it is observed. Such a 
distinction normally coincides with a distinction between microscopic and 
macroscopic objects. There are two problems in this line of argument. Firstly it is 
difficult to imagine that there is a clear boundary between microscopic and 
macroscopic. But more serious, the second problem is the paradox that somehow, 
microscopic elements go into non-eigen state without making a macroscopic 
object they compose to be in non-eigenstate. All macroscopic objects are made 
out of microscopic objects. For example, the cat is made out of microscopic 
objects (electrons and neutrons). If those electrons and neutrons that compose the 
cat go into non-eigen state when they are not observed, then the cat as a whole 
should also goes into the non-eigen state (not having a localised position, i.e. cat 
that exists everywhere but nowhere). However, the fact, that the cat does not go 
into a non-eigen state even when it is not observed, goes against the Copenhagen 
interpretation. 
The second distinction problems for the Copenhagen interpretation can be 
illustrated using the tunnelling effect. In the experiment, polarising filters alter the 
wave function without collapsing the wave function of the electron. Whereas, 
when the electron interacts with the detector, the detector collapses the wave 
function rather than altering the wave function. What is the difference between the 
filters and the detector? Why does only the detector collapse wave function and 
not the filter? The Copenhagen interpretation normally identifies the distinction 
with an another distinction which is between an object that is capable of 
possessing consciousness and an object that is not. It argues that only observation 
by a conscious observer can collapse a wave function. This leads to the age old 
problem which philosophy and psychology have been trying to solve for many 
years without any success. The problem is finding a distinction between objects 
capable of possessing consciousness and objects that are not. The Copenhagen 
interpretation has to prove that there is a metaphysical or physical difference 
between the two. Let us recon8ider Schiodinger's Cat. Comnion sense tells us that 
surely the cat must be aware of its own state. If the cat can be aware of its own 
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state, then does this not qualify the cat to be a conscious observer? Suppose 
further, if we replace the cat with a chimpanzee, a fish, a bird, an insect, a 
plankton, a bacteria, can they be qualified as conscious observers that are capable 
of collapsing the wave function? Where in the hierarchy of organic beings lies the 
boundary between conscious and non-conscious? I will discuss this point in the 
next chapter (section.6.2.2.). 
The Copenhagen interpretation suggests what is called complementarity that 
the matter is either in eigen state or non-eigen state, and matter cannot be both the 
provability wave and a particle at the same time. This derives from the idea that in 
order for a matter to be a particle and to have definite dynamic values, the 
probability wave has to collapse. Dipankar Home18 proposed an experiment to 
challenge this claim. If a gap between two prisms were narrower than the 
wavelength of the incoming light, between the gap, the light behaves both as a 
wave and as a particle at the same time. The experiment was carried out by 
Mizobuchi and Ohtake of Hamamatsu Photonics, and the result proven the 
Home's prediction to be correct. This obviously denies the complementarity which 
the Copenhagen implies. 
There is also the problem of non-eigen state. The Copenhagen interpretation 
suggests that matter normally exists in a non-eigen state unless it is observed. This 
seems to go against our common view of reality. Bell stated that; 
One wants to be able to take a realistic view of the world, to talk about 
the world as if it is really there, even when it is not being observed. I 
certainly believe in a world that was here before me, and will be here 
after me, and I believe that you are part of it! And I believe that most 
physicists take this point of view when they are being pushed into a 
comer by philosophers. 19 
Similarly Pagel describes that the Copenhagen interpretation forces us to accept 
18 Home, .Dipankar, (199~). "Optical tunnelling of single photon state: Wave-particle 
complementarity revised". Talk given at the 4th International Symposium of the Foundation of 
Quantum Mechanics in the Light ofNew Technology, Tokyo; 23-27th August 1992. 
19 From John Bell's interview by BBC Radio 3, printed in Davis P. and Brown J.R.(eds.) (1986), 
The Ghost in the Atom, (Cambridge; Cambridge Univ. Press), p.50 
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that "the electron seems to spring into existence as a real objecr0" when it is 
observed by a conscious being. Philosophers and many physicists find the 
conscious observer claim of the Copenhagen interpretation to be too problematic. 
The fifth and the final objection accuses the whole Copenhagen interpretation 
of being an ad hoc argument. The whole Copenhagen interpretation is an attempt 
to legitimise the wave description of matter. Since the Copenhagen interpretation 
takes the wave description of matter to be a true and complete description; it has 
to introduce the idea that there are two possible states of matter. In order to defend 
this dual state of matter, the Copenhagen interpretation introduced "collapse of the 
wave function". To defend the collapse of the wave function, the interpretation 
introduced the special role of a conscious observer. To me, the entire argument of 
the Copenhagen interpretation consists of ad hoc arguments in order to defend its 
belief that the wave function is the true and complete description of matter. 
Regarding ~ ~ ai 5! (prasanga), the Copenhagen interpretation scores 
relatively high on the first criterion, the compatibility with facts. But the 
interpretation must score high since it is a literal interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. The interpretation fails to satisfy the other two criteria, namely 
philosophical plausibility and the economy of quantum interpretation. The 
interpretation contains too many philosophically questionable ideas such as the 
collapse of wave function, the existence of the animate/inanimate distinction and 
the existence of microscopic/macroscopic distinction. Introducing above ideas is 
bad for the economy of theory as well. These ideas are all ad hoc ideas introduced 
to make literal interpretation of quantum mechanics philosophically plausible. 
These forces to conclude that the Copenhagen interpretation is not plausible 
interpretation. 
5 .2.2.2. Hidden variable theories 
Hidden variable theories oppose two core concepts of the Copenhagen 
interpretation, namely; 1) the collapse of wave function and 2) the indeterminate 
nature of reality. Hidden variable theories think that matter does not go into a 
non-eigen state even when it is not observed. In this sense hidden variable theories 
20 Pagels, Heinz (1982), The Cosmic Code, (London; Michael Joseph), p.144. 
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have advantages over the Copenhagen interpretation. Because hidden variable 
theories do not postulate the collapse of wave function, many problems the 
Copenhagen interpretation faces disappear. Concerning the indeterminacy, hidden 
variable theories supposes the source of the uncertainty to be our epistemological 
limitation rather than the way quantum phenomena work. The reason we can only 
know things in terms of probability is that there is/are factor or factors which 
influence the behaviour of matter, but which we do not know of, thus the name 
hidden variable. 
Hidden variable theories were not well received nor well discussed. This was, 
I believe, due to objections based on sentimentality rather than rationality. Hidden 
variable theories were accused of being too conservative or a backward step 
towards the determinism of classical physics. The biggest obstacle faced by 
hidden variable theories, however, was the apparent proof by von Neumann21 , 
which supposedly proved that mathematically any form of hidden variable theory 
is incompatible with known quantum mechanics. Although in 1935 Grete 
Hermann pointed out a certain flaw in the proof, his argument was ignored by the 
science community. It took another 31 years to disprove the seemingly solid von 
Neumann objection against hidden variable theories. Bell who showed that von 
Neumann's objection was based upon false assumption stated in the interview 
that; 
When you translate [his assumptions] into terms of physical 
disposition, they are nonsense. You may quote me on that; The proof 
of von Neumann is not merely false but foolish! 22 
So now, we can look at different hidden variable theories without any negative 
prejudice. In this paper, I will mention two of the many hidden variable theories; 
the de Broglie pilot wave theory, and Bohm's quantum potential interpretation. 
21 
von Neum&tin J. (1932) Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechnik, Berlin; Springer, the 
English translation (1955) Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, (Princeton; 
Princeton Univ. Press). 
22 Interview in the American science magazine Omni, 1988, May, p.88 
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5.2.2.2.1.The de Broglie's pilot wave theory 
The most interesting thing about de Broglie's concept23 is that, unlike the 
classical idea of matter being either a particle or a wave, he argues that matter 
consists of a wave part and a particle part. This idea is known as the principle of 
the double solution, which successfully combines the wave nature and the particle 
nature of matter without any contradiction. According to de Broglie, a matter 
wave, which the wave function describes, is something that accompanies a 
particle, and one cannot have a particle without its associated wave, nor a matter 
wave without the particle. 
[Fig.5.8.] particle with extended wave part 
According to the pilot wave theory, the particle part of matter always has a 
definite trajectory, and that trajectory is determined by the extended wave part of 
the matter, which senses the environment and guides the particle part accordingly 
(hence the term "pilot wave"). For example the behavior of the matter in the 
double-slits experiment can be explained as follows; even though the particle part 
goes through only one of the slits, its wave part senses whether the other slit is 
open or closed. If the wave part senses the other slit to be open, it guides the 
particle part to a certain location on the photographic plate according to wave's 
interference pattern, as section 5.2.1.1 illustrated. Whereas if the wave part senses 
the other slit to be closed, it pilots the particle part to create non-interference 
pattern. Because the wave part of the matter decides the trajectory and where on 
the photographic plate the particle should land, it appears that the particle travels 
as a wave. 
There are several objections to de Broglie's pilot wave theory, but in this 
thesis, I mention just two, which are criticisms relevant to the development of 
23 de Broglie, L, (1925), "Recherches sur Ia tbeorie des qunata", in de l'Academie des Science, Vol. 
177, p.630-632. 
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Bohm's hidden variable theory. The first of the two is a criticism raised by Pauli. 
Pauli showed mathematical flow in de Broglie's theory. The theory fails to 
provide definite dynamic values, even though the fundamental idea of the theory 
claims matter always has dynamical values. The second problem with de Broglie's 
pilot wave theory is its difficulty to explain the quantum entanglement. This 
non-locality problem of de Broglie's pilot wave theory was illustrated by the 
Gleason theorem 24 and a more specific case of the problem by the 
Kochen-Specker theorem25 • The problem can be illustrated as follows; In order for 
the pilot wave theory to accommodate the entanglement, the pilot wave has to 
travel faster than the speed of light. De Broglie's pilot wave theory cannot 
accommodate the pilot wave to be faster than the speed of light since the theory 
portraits a pilot wave as a real three dimensional wave. 
5.2.2.2.2. Bohm's quantum potential theory 
Responding to criticisms faced by the pilot wave theory, Bohm introduced a 
new version of hidden variable theory26. The most obvious difference between de 
Broglie's pilot wave theory and Bohm's quantum potential theory is that de 
Broglie treated a pilot wave as a real wave, whereas for Bohm, what the wave 
function described was not an actual wave but a quantum potential field which 
influences the behaviour of a particle. The idea can be easily illustrated by using 
simple hydro-dynamics. If there are areas of higher water pressure and of lower 
water pressure, the difference in water pressure moves water molecules from the 
area of higher pressure to the area of lower pressure, until it reaches equilibrium. 
In the same manner, particles move according to differences in quantum potential, 
moving from an area of higher quantum potential to an area of lower quantum 
potential. This is a very important difference between de Broglie's pilot theory 
and Bohm's quantum potential theory. As the hidden variable is not a wave part of 
matter but a field within which matter exists, it does not have to travel at all. In 
24 Gleason, A.M. (1957), "Measurement on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space", in Journal of 
Mathematics and Mechanics, vol.6, p.885-893. 
25 Kocheri S &Specker, E.P. (1967), ''The' problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics", in 
Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics, vol.l7, p.59-87. 
26 Bohm, David. (1952}, "A suggested interpretation of quantum theory in terms of "hidden 
variables" Parts I and II, in Physics Review, vol.85, p.l66-179 & p.l80-l93. 
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this way Bohm's theory overcomes the entanglement problems postulated by the 
Gleason theorem and the Kochen-Specker theorem. Another important difference 
between de Broglie's pilot wave and Bohm's hidden variable theory is that 
Bohm's quantum potential field exists in (3·n dimensional) configuration space27 • 
As we saw earlier, de Broglie's pilot wave exists in three dimensional space, 
which creates a problem regarding compatibility with Schrodinger's wave 
function of more than two particles. According to the wave function, the 
behaviour of two entangled particles have to be calculated in a six dimensional 
configuration space. This also explains the quantum uncertainty. Since ordinary 
objects contain billions and trillions of subatomic particles, it is impossible to 
comprehend behaviour of ordinary objects. For example, since a simple pen 
contains an astronomical amount of particles, in order to comprehend or predict 
the behaviour of the pen, we have to consider almost infinite dimensional 
configuration space. 
This idea of non-locality of quantum potential leads Bohm to take a holistic 
view of the universe. The theory explains the entanglement in terms of a particle 
changing quantum potential of even the far side of the universe. If this is true, 
then it also has to be true that whatever is happening on the other side of the 
universe influences the behaviour of quantum particles here on the earth. This 
implies a web of interaction between every particle in the universe (a change of 
any particle is felt by every particle in the universe). The idea of holism has its fair 
share of criticisms, but Bohm's holism has a particular twist which it makes much 
harder to accept. Because of the quantum entanglement, this web of interaction 
has to be instantaneous, regardless of the distance. If Bohm's holism is correct, 
something happening here on earth instantaneously influences the behaviour of a 
particle on the other side of the universe. This problem ofBohm's holism is often 
described as a particular version of so-called "butterfly effect". The butterfly 
effect is the idea that although insignificant, theoretically a flap of a butterfly in 
Thailand can have causal effects upon the emergence of a storm in the Caribbean. 
Bohm's quantun1 potential theory implies that not only a flap of butterfly 
27 For Bohm, like Schr6dinger, if there are n number of particles in an equation, then the equation 
must be taken as a description of3·n dimensional space. For example, if there are two particles in 
question, then there will be 6-dimensions (n=2). 
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influences the weather ten thousand miles away but also the influence is 
instantaneous. 
The second and most common criticism against hidden variable theory 
accuses the theory of being an ad hoc argument, a desperate attempt to save 
classic causal determinism. The whole point of hidden variable theories is to 
enable classic physics to explain quantum phenomena which appears to contradict 
classic physics. Historically the only argument that supported causal determinism 
was a success of Newtonian physics. Before Newton, some people believed in 
determinism but it was based on fatalism derived from religious belief and not any 
scientific evidence. When the behaviour of quantum mechanics proved Newtonian 
mechanics to be false, there was no reason other than sentimentality to hold onto 
causal determinism. I will come back to this point in Chapter Six which discusses 
the emptiness of physical causation. 
Regarding three criteria of judging the plausibility of quantum interpretation, 
Bohm's hidden variable theory explains the wave/particle duality, but struggles to 
explain exact mechanism of the tunnelling effects and the quantum entanglement, 
because it assumes a matter to be a particle. In terms of philosophical plausibility, 
it has an advantage over the Copenhagep interpretation, because it does not 
require the collapse of wave function. But it implies a particular version of holism 
which is hard to accept. The theory suggests that everything in the universe not 
only is causally related, but also the causation is instantaneous regardless of where 
two things or events are located. The hidden variable theories seems to be ad hoc 
to the belief in the deterministic picture of reality, that nothing happen without 
cause and things do not happen at random. It seems quantum potential theories 
were sentimental attempts to combine quantum mechanics with causal 
determinism of classical physics. 
5.2.2.3. The many-worlds interpretation 
The so-called many-worlds interpretation was originally proposed by 
Everett28 in 1957. Like hidden variable theories, the many-worlds interpretation 
denies rion.;.eigen state and the collapse of wave function. However, unlike hidden 
28 Everett, H. (1957), "'Relative State" Formulation of Quantum Mechanics' in Review of Modern 
Physics, Vol.24, p.454-462. 
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variable theories, it denies causal determinism. As Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle and the probability density formula illustrated, mathematically there is 
no reason for one particular possibility to materialise. The theory therefore argues 
that all the possible outcomes that wave function describes must also exist or 
coexist. The question then is why do we see only one particular outcome and not 
see other possible outcomes? In the tunnelling effect, the electron is either 
transmitted or reflected, so that the electron is recorded by only one of two 
detectors, but not by both detectors. Everett (and later De Witt and Graham29) 
proposed that the reason we do not see all those possible outcomes is because 
each possible outcome belongs to different branched out universes. Concerning 
Schrodinger's cat thought experiment, when the box that contain the cat and the 
diabolical device is closed, the universe splits into two copies, one contains a live 
cat and the other a dead cat. Both copies contain the same observer, too. 
[Fig.5.9.] Schrodinger's cat and the many-worlds interpretation 
Universe-A 
Universe-B 
For the observer in universe B, the cat is alive all the time even before he opens 
the box, whereas for the observer in universe A, the cat is dead. The reason the 
observer in universe B does not see the dead cat is because he just happens to be 
in universe B. What the probability density of the wave function represents is the 
probability for the observer to be in a particular branched out universe. There are 
advantages for regarding the uncertainty principle and the probability density in 
this way, because the theory does not require any supplemental metaphysical 
claim. It can accept quantum mechanics as a complete description of quantum 
phenomena. Mathematically it is elegant, in the sense that it has no inconsistency 
29 De Witt, B. S. & Graham, N. (1973), The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, 
(Princeton; Princeton Univ. Press). 
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with empirical evidence displayed by quantum phenomena. 
There are three kinds of criticism against the many-worlds interpretation. The 
first is neither philosophical nor scientific. It is what Squires30 described as "the 
uneasiness" of introducing an infinite number of coexisting universes. The 
many-worlds theory is accused of introducing unnecessary elements into 
explanation. According to the many-worlds interpretation, the numbers of parallel 
universes is equal to every possible outcome of every quantum effect. Physicists 
and philosophers admit that introducing an infinite number of parallel universes is 
metaphysically less controversial than defending determinism or giving a special 
role to the conscious observer, since it does not require supplemental claims. 
However, the existence of infinite parallel universes is too controversial and too 
radical for many people, since in order to explain even simple phenomena, we 
have to think about infinite numbers of worlds that influences the very world we 
are in. 
The second problem of the many-worlds interpretation is that it does not 
explain how and what makes a world split or fuse. The theory argues that every 
time there are two or more possible outcomes, the world splits to accommodate all 
possible outcomes. But does this mean the existence of multiple possibilities 
makes the world split into whatever number of possible outcomes there are? If so, 
what sort of special force does the existence of multiple possibilities hold in order 
to make a whole universe split? Moreover, what makes the universes fuse? If, in 
the double-slits experiment, the photographic plate is placed too close to the 
screen, the interference pattern does not appear, because two possible paths are 
not allowed to overlap. The interference pattern emerges only when two possible 
paths are allowed to overlap. Does this mean the set up of the experiment makes 
the whole two or more universe fuse? The problem of the many-worlds 
interpretation is that it does not provide any explanation concerning what exactly 
makes these worlds split or merge. 
In recent years, Deutsch31 has modified the many-worlds interpretation 
(which he calls theory of multiverse) to solve the above criticism. Contrary to 
30 Squires, Euan (1994), The Mystery of the Quantum World, 2nd edition, (Bristol; Institute of 
Physics Publishing), p.72 
31 Deutsch, David. (1997), The Fabric of Reality, (London; Penguine Books). 
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many-worlds interpretation above, Deutsch think the universe does not split or 
branch out, but that the universe started as an infinite number of identical 
universes. Every time quantum transition happens, those identical universes 
become different. This way, Deutsch does not have to explain the kind of force 
which is great enough to split or fuse an entire universe. The theory only requires 
minute inter-universe force which is sufficient to influence quantum phenomena, 
but not the entire universe. For example, in the double-slits experiment, two 
worlds can interfere without merging. Although it is elegant, the theory still does 
not explain what is or are inter-multiverse energy or force that enables two 
multiverses to influence each other. 
The third objection against the many-worlds interpretation is that it is not 
possible to test whether the claim is true or false. Unless there is some way to 
prove that such inter-multiverse force exists to create the interference patter, the 
theory of multiverse is merely an baseless speculation which holds no credibility. 
Deutsch claims that he will provide the set up for the possible experiment to test 
the existence of multiverses based on the study of quantum computers32• If a 
certain calculation involves two possible process, the outcome would holds 
information for both processes. If there is a way to record both processes, it is 
possible to see whether or not the outcome is actually influenced by both these 
different processes. If the many-worlds interpretation is correct, records would 
show all possible processes. For the time being, we must wait for his thought 
experiment to be actually carried out, in order to judge the plausibility of the 
many-worlds interpretation. 
Some consider the many-worlds interpretation to be a superior quantum 
interpretation to the Copenhagen interpretation and hidden variable theory. It has 
superb empirical adequacy without introducing implausible claims or unnecessary 
extra metaphysical claims. The theory, however, suffers from philosophical 
implausibility and economy. It assumes infinite coexisting universes that are 
influencing each other constantly at quantum level. 
32 I am not aware of his actual paper but his unpublished paper was discussed in Marcus Chown 
(2001), "Taming the multiverse", in New Scientist, issue 2299, p.24-30. 
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5.2.2.4. Zen metaphysical interpretation 
Zen thinks everything we experience or comprehend is~ (siinya), so that 
nothing we understand is intrinsic to ifal• (nirvana). This should include what 
we perceive as space, time, fundamental substance and causation. The quantum 
interpretations I examined above assume not necessary all but at least some of 
space, time, fundamental substance and causation to be intrinsic to the 
mind-independent reality. All interpretations above assume three-dimensional 
distance to be intrinsic to the mind-independent reality (ifal.; nirvana). In other 
words they all assume the mind-independent reality to be at least three-dimension 
(hidden variable theories assume to be 3·n dimension). This is why they have 
difficulty in explaining the mechanism of how the quantum entanglement occurs. 
They have explained why two entangled particles is real, they behave as if there is 
no distance between them. In terms of substance, the Copenhagen interpretation 
thinks both wave and particle forms of matter are real. The matter exists either in 
eigen state or non-eigen state. The quantum potential theory thinks fundamental 
substance is particle and not wave. The particle exists in the quantum potential 
field which influence their behaviour. The many-world interpretation also thinks 
particles are genuine substance, and wave function describes a probability for the 
observer to be in a particular universe. In terms of causation, the Copenhagen 
interpretation rejects both the existence of causation and deterministic view of the 
world. It suggests that things happen without a cause and things happen at random. 
The hidden variable theories maintain causal deterministic view that nothing 
occurs at random without cause, so that the present state of the universe was 
determined by the past state of the universe and there will be only one possible 
future state that can derive from the current state of the universe. According to the 
hidden variable theories, only reason quantum phenomena seem to be at random 
is because there is a variable which we are not aware of but determines the 
behaviour of quantum particles. It is difficult to identify what the theory of 
multiverse thinks of causation, because it denies certain causations yet it 
postulates another kinds of causation. It denies causal deterministic view of reality. 
It explains that certain things occurs because we just happen to be in a particular 
multiverse where these things occurs, and there is no other reason to why thing 
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happens this way and not the other. Yet, when it tried to explain the interference 
patter that emerged in the double-slits experiment by introducing inter-multiverse 
causal influence. 
Zen thinks these what we perceived as space, substance and causation to be 
gg (siinya) and not intrinsic to ~- (nirvana). According to gg (siinyata), the 
wave/particle duality can be explained in the same way Spinoza solved the 
mind-body problem. Spinoza thought that neither mind nor body is a genuine 
substance, they are a mode of substance conceived under attributes of thought and 
a mode of substance conceived under attributes of extension. In the same manner 
we can imagine that a matter is neither a wave nor a particle, but we just perceived 
as a wave or as a particle. It is against the idea of~ (siinyaiii) to assume the 
matter to be either a wave or a particle. This approach has the advantage over the 
Copenhagen interpretation; since there is no need to postulate the collapse of the 
wave function which implies the discontinuous existence of matter. According to 
the Copenhagen interpretation, matter changes the state depending on whether or 
not it is observed by a conscious being. 
[Fig.5.9] Copenhagen interpretation of matter changing its state 
Collapse of the ~ ~ 
wave function ' ' 
L:.' ~.:-' 
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On the contrary, if we consider both eigen state and non-eigen state to be merely 
ways we perceive the matter to be and not the actual state of the matter, there is no 
need to postulate the collapse of the wave function by a conscious observer. 
[Fig. 5.1 0.] Zen metaphysics interpretation 
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This interpretation of both wave and particle to be ~ (siinya) can explain 
what seems to be discontinuous behaviour of quantum matter. In the double-slits 
experiment and the tunnelling effect, existence of the photon and the electron 
seems discontinuous in the sense that they seems to lose defmite dynamic values 
such as momentum, location and spin. This is why the Copenhagen interpretation 
thought they turns into the probability wave when they are not observed. The idea 
of wave and particle to be ~ (sOnya) can be illustrated by the following example 
of a dancer and a shadow of the dancer. Imagine a man dancing between a screen 
and a light source, and we are watching his shadow from the other side of the 
screen. 
[Fig.5 .11] A dancer and shadows 
, . 
What we perceive as a dancer is not the dancer himself but the shadow of the 
dancer that appears on the screen. The movement of the dancer is exactly what we 
consider as dynamic values, such as momentum, location and spin. They are just 
how the dancer appears on the screen and not actually how he dances. Suppose we 
switch off the light for ten seconds (so that the shadow on the screen disappears 
for ten seconds). When the light is turned on again, the shadow seems to have 
moved in a discontinuous manner and his momentum location and spin seem to 
suddenly change. But this does not mean he moved in the discontinuous manner 
or suddenly comes into existence. During the ten seconds, even thought we cannot 
see the dancer dancing, it does not mean he ceases to exist or he stops dancing. He 
continues to exist and continues to dance even when we can not see him. In the 
same manner, even though we perceived the photon to disappear, it travelled 
without having dynamic values and sudden appears again on the photographic 
plate, it does not mean the photon changes its state or suddenly changed dynamic 
values. This dancer and screen analysis can also explain the quantum 
entanglement. Let me use the same dance and screens example, but this time there 
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are two screens, two light sources, so that there are two shadows on the dancer; 
[Fig.5.12] The simultaneous change oftwo shadows 
According to the angle between screens and light sources, the two shadows may 
appear to be shadows of two different dancers, but they are still shadows of one 
and the same dancer. In this way, the two shadows move simultaneously without 
having any direct causal connection between them. In the similar manner we can 
imagine that two entangled particles L and R are capable of changing 
simultaneously because they are not two distinct particles but two distinct 
appearances of one and the same entity. This leads me to imagine that 
three-dimensional space and distance are also ~ (siinya). If the 
three-dimensional space is not intrinsic to the mind-independent reality, we can 
explain how a single entity can appear at the different location. Suppose I mark 
two points A and B on a piece of paper. The closest distance between the two, in 
the two dimensional Euclidean space is as figure 5.13.a suggests, along a straight 
between the two points. 
[Fig.5.13] Distances between two points 
(a) (b) (c) 
However, if I fold the paper, the closest distance between the two points gets 
much shorter than the straight line on the paper (see Fig. 5.13.b and c). In a 
similar way, because we think of a distance in the three-dimensional Euclidian 
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space to be absolute, we believe that two entangled particles cannot communicate 
instantaneously. But if we assume the distance in the Euclidian space to be 
relative and not absolute, we can accommodate the quantum entanglement. We are 
like those flatlanders (section 1.2.2.1.a) who are struggling to make sense of the 
penetrating conic object from two dimensional perspective. According to the idea 
of ~ ( sfulyata) nothing we experience and comprehend is the intrinsic nature of 
~- (nirvana) because it is :fir~ (samskrta), a product of human convention. 
This should include our perception of the reality to be three-dimensionally 
extended. Although we perceive the reality to be so, the mind-independent reality 
is actually not three-dimensionally extended. So what is the mind-independent 
reality like? The idea of ~ (siinyata) does not have an answer to this question. It 
only states although we perceive the reality to be three-dimensional, it does not 
mean the mind-independent reality is actually three-dimensionally extended. 
Moreover, the quantum entanglement suggests that the three-dimensional 
extension is not the intrinsic nature of the mind-independent reality. The 
assumption of the reality to be three-dimensionally extended is an useful ~ 1! 
(nama-riipa) for providing a framework within which we can comprehend 
causation and fundamental substance, but it does not necessarily reflect the 
intrinsic nature of the mind-independent reality. 
Concerning the quantum entanglement demonstrated by EPR-B experiment, 
there is something this 'shadows of a dancer' analysis cannot capture. That is the 
fact that the observer is also part of reality, and not a complete bystander. 
Everything that exists, exists in the domain of non-dimensional reality, and things 
can interact with each other without having three-dimensional manifestation of 
causal effect. This explains how the act of observation influences the dynamical 
value of the matter and how the entangled particles can instantaneously collapse. 
Other quantum interpretations assume direct causal connections between the 
observation and the entanglement of L and R. The latter causal connection, causal 
connection between L and R, is the problem since it violates special relativity 
theory. If we consider all observer, particle L and R and causal connections 
between them to be mere physical manifestations, then there is no problem 
explaining the instantaneous interaction between the observation, dynamic values 
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of left and right hand side. 
[Fig.5.14] No direct casual chain between the observer, particle A& B 
Super-luminal-causation 
Other quantum interpretations assume the direct 
causal connection between particle L and R. 
This leads to the violation of Einstein's special 
relativity theory. 
manifestation 
If we consider both particle L and R to be 
the one and the same entity, then there is no 
need to postulate direct causal connection 
between L and R. 
In this way it is possible for the two entangled particles to have what appear to be 
an instantaneous interaction, without actually having one. What this suggest is that 
if there were any causation at all, it is not physical. In other words, physical 
causation is ~ (slinya) and it is not the intrinsic nature of ~;JX (nirvana). 
Chapter Seven examines why it is not plausible to sustain our belief in physical 
causation and determinism, but to state briefly in this chapter, our false belief in 
physical causation derives from our need to find a pattern and regularity, in order 
to simplify what we experience and comprehend, and there is nothing other than 
the success of classical physics to support the idea of reality to be causally 
determined. 
This interpretation based on ~ (sunyata) is more plausible than the quantum 
interpretations mentioned above, regarding three criteria of ~~~5! (prasanga). 
It is compatible with all observable quantum phenomena as it was illustrated 
above. It has philosophically plausible in the sense of not containing a 
self-contradicting claim unlike other quantum interpretations. It also satisfy the 
criteria of the economy of theory. It does not contain any ad hoc idea in order to 
stay compatible with observable quantum phenomena. 
There are several possible criticisms I can think of against this quantum 
interpretation based on ~ (slinyata). The most obvious objection is that it is too 
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sceptical. It denies both waves and particles to be genume substances or 
fundamental quantum elements, yet it does not provide any positive claim to what 
the genuine substance is. It denies the mind-independent reality to be 
three-dimensional extension, but it does not say what the mind-independent 
reality is like or how many dimensions there in the mind-independent reality. It 
suggests physical causation to be ~ (siinya), but it does not say what the actual 
causation is. Another problem of this interpretation is that, like the many-worlds 
interpretation, since mind-independent reality ts not accessible to us, the 
interpretation is not falsifiable. So again, it ts questionable to accept an 
interpretation which cannot be proved or disapproved. These criticisms are, 
however, not a problems for my thesis. The aim of this thesis is, as I explained in 
Chapter Two, "a reasoned refutation of all metaphysical views"33 in order to 
prepare ourselves for the attainment of ffi (bodhi). I am not aiming to create a 
certain metaphysical view. Rather, I am suggesting a view which contradicts 
existing quantum interpretations that assume some of space, time, fundamental 
substance and causation to be intrinsic to ;J\l~ (nirvana) .. 
5.3. Conclusion 
We assume the reality to be spatio-temporal, because the reality appears to be 
spatio-temporal. But according to ~ (siinyata), the concept of space and time are 
merely tools that enable us to simplify the complex affair of reality, yet concepts 
of space and time do not reflect the true nature of the mind-independent reality. In 
order to defend this idea I looked into modem physics of relativity theory and 
quantum physics. The special relativity suggests that there is no definite flaw of 
time, and time and space are interwoven and cannot be discussed separately. This 
obviously contradict our concept of time. The quantum entanglement indicates 
that three-dimensional space may not be intrinsic to the mind-independent reality. 
Many quantum interpretations faced the difficulty of explaining why and how the 
quantum entanglement happens. But once we regard the distance in 
three-dimensional Euclidian space to be not absolute but relative, it is easy to 
33 Chakrabarti, Arindam (1995), "Metaphysics in India" in Kim, Jaegwon & Sosa, Ernest (eds.), A 
Companion to Metaphysics, (Oxford; Blackwell), p.319. 
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explain the quantum entanglement, which occurs faster than the speed of light. 
As I explained at the beginning, the aim of this chapter is to establish a 
framework in which to discuss bare substance in Chapter Five and causation in 
Chapter Six. 
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6. 
Substance 
This chapter explores the question of what kind or kinds of fundamental 
element or substance compose reality. In history, there have been many candidates 
for the fundamental elements. Both Empedocles of Ancient Greece and Ajita 
Kesakambala of India thought earth, water, fire and air were fundamental 
elements. Cartesian dualism thought there were two kinds of substance; material 
substance and mental substance. Many modern thinkers believe physical 
substance to be the only kind of substance there is. Quantum physics suggests 
fundamental elements to the probability wave or/and quantum particle. If we 
apply the idea of ~ (sfulyata), all our beliefs in existence of those fundamental 
elements or substances are i1 (maya) and iliiJ (viparyasa). No such things 
exist in ~~ (nirvana) and they are simply how we perceive reality to be. 
Among all these candidates for genuine substance, I will concentrate on what we 
perceive as mental and physical substance, and aim to conclude that neither of 
what we perceive as physical nor as mental substance is genuine substance. 
As in previous chapters, in order to prove that what we perceive as mental 
substance and as physical substance are ~ (siinya), I use ~fi}iJ~)i (prasanga). 
I argue ~ (sfulyata) of what we perceive to be substance by illustrating the 
implausibility of theories that make positive claims about what kind of thing a 
genuine substance is or are. 
In order to avoid making sentences unnecessarily long, I will use "physical 
substance" and "mental substance" to describe "what we perceive as physical 
substance" and "what we perceive as mental substance" and distinguish from 
"genuine substance". Therefore it has to be emphasised here that mental substance 
or physical substance does not directly imply that they are genuine fundamental 
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substance unless it is stated so. 
6.1. Definition of substance. 
Throughout the history of philosophy, the term substance has been defined in 
many different and often contradictory ways. Therefore, in order to avoid 
misunderstanding, I would like to clarify the definition of substance. There are 
two meanings for substance. We . have already looked at the first meaning in 
Chapter Four (section 4.3.1.); substratum as a defmer of numerical identity. The 
second meaning is as a basic building block of existence. The substance in the 
first sense defmes how many things are there, while the latter concerns what kinds 
of things are there. In other words, the former concerns whether the universe is 
consist of single all encompassed being or a composite of individuals, whereas the 
latter deals with legitimacy of material substance, physical substance and so forth 
to be genuine substance. These two defmitions are not directly linked because 
there are three possible combinations of the two. The first is that there are many 
substances but they are all of one and the same kind. The second is that there are 
many substances and they belong to two or more different kinds. The third is that 
there is only one substance therefore there is only one kind. I have already dealt 
with the first meaning of substance in Chapter Four therefore the main concern of 
this chapter is to explore the second meaning. 
Aristotle 1 recognised various kinds of "to be" (and later Hoffman and 
Rosencrantz2 recognised at least eleven different kinds of "to be"). Among them, 
there is a special kind of "to be" that is being substance. The most widely 
accepted way of distinguishing substance from other kinds of being is that 
substance is the only thing that is ontologicaly independent. Ontological 
independence is the idea that other kinds of "to be" require something other than 
themselves to inhere or exhibit them, whereas substance does not depend its 
existence on anything else but itself. According to Hussere, the basic definition of 
1 Aristotle, Book Zeta, 1028 al0-al5. I use an interpretation by Bostock, David. (1994), Aristotle 
Metaphysics- Books Z and H -, (Oxford; Clarendmi). 
2 Hoffman & Rosenkrantz (1997), Substance- Its nature and existence-, (London; Routledge), 
r.46-so. 
Husserl, E. (1901), Logical investigation, Findlay, J.N. (trans.), (1970), (London; Routledge & 
Kegan Paul) 
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the term "ontological independence" is as followed; x is said to be ontologically 
independent from y, iff (if and only if) x can exist without the existence of y. 
Resulting from the above definition, x is said to be a substance, iff x does not 
require anything else but itself to exist. Most, if not all criticisms against the 
ontological independence of substance can be avoided by strengthening and 
clarifying exactly what is meant by "ontological independence". I will look at 
three particular criticisms in order to identify the weakness of the basic definition 
of ontological independence and put forward a plausible, strong and agreeable 
definition of the term. The first problem of the definition of substance is that any 
complex organic being, such as we humans and animals, can not fulfil the criteria 
of substance. As Kripke 4 puts forward, every human must have originated from 
other pre-existing individuals, such as parents, egg and sperm. I could not be here 
if my parents had not existed or my parents' parents. This means that every human 
being or any living being fails to satisfy the criteria of ontological independence. 
Furthermore, nothing in the universe can be classified as substance, if modem 
scientists are right about the big bang or super strings. Everything that exists 
depends upon the big bang or super strings to have created the universe within 
which everything exists. This means that nothing in the universe satisfies the 
criteria of substance since nothing could exist without the universe. This problem 
Kripke proposed can be dismissed by distinguishing strong and weak ontological 
independence. The weak ontological dependence is historical dependence, like the 
case of the child and the parents. Once a child is born, his or her existence is not 
ontologically dependent on the parents, because the child can continue to exist 
even after the parents' death. The strong ontological dependency is that x is said to 
be ontologically dependent on y, iff annihilation of x necessarily coincides with 
y's annihilation. According to this definition of strong ontological independence, a 
child does not onto logically depend on his or her parents, since the parent's death 
does not necessarily result in the child's death. 
The second problem of the basic definition of ontological independence is 
mentioned by Hoffman and Rosenkrantz; 
4 Kripke, Saul. (1972) "Naming and Necessity" in Davidson, D. & Harman, G. (eds.) Semantics of 
Natural Language, (Dordrecht; Reidel). 
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Wives are substances, as are both widows and wives to be. However, 
if a wife (widow, wife to be) exists, then this entails that another 
substance exists (did exit, will exist), namely a husband. 5 
By the definition of these terms, there cannot be a wife without a husband and a 
husband without a wife. Some philosophers, therefore, argue that neither wife nor 
husband can be substance. This sort of criticism can be dismissed as level 
confusion. It is level confusion because being a wife and being an individual who 
is referred to as a wife are not the same thing. A woman's existence does not 
depend on being a wife, since she could continue to exist even after she ceases to 
be a wife. This means that, although her existence as a wife depends on an 
existence of a man as a husband, her existence as an individual does not depend 
on a man who is referred to as her husband, therefore she is ontological 
independent. 
The third problem about ontological dependence is that it is often mixed up 
with causal dependence. Seventeenth century philosophers such as Spinoza and 
Leibniz included causal independence into their definition of substance. 
According to causal independence, for x to be a substance, x should not be 
causally influenced by any other substance or being. In other words, the individual 
substances should not causally interfere with each other. However, the inclusion 
of causal independency only creates unnecessary problems. For Spinoza, the only 
thing that can fulfil the criteria of substance was God (in his sense the universe as 
a whole). For Leibniz, it forced him to establish an idea known as "pre-established 
harmony of monads". Causal independency is not a necessary part of ontological 
independence. It is possible for two objects to causally interact without 
ontologically dependent on each other. For example, although I causally interact 
with my car (the car takes me to where I want to go and the car moves because I 
drive), but the annihilation of my car does not necessary coincide with my 
annihilation and vice versa. According to these above clarifications, mental 
substance is a genuine substance if and only if its existence does not necessarily 
coincide with the existence of anything. Similarly, physical substance is a genuine 
5 Hoffman, J. & Rosenkrantz, G (1997), Substance - Its nature and existence -, (London; 
Routledge), p.44. 
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substance if and only if its existence does not necessarily coincide with the 
existence of anything else. 
6.2. Theories of substance 
This section (section 6.2) examines major theories that assume mental 
substance and/or physical substance to be genuine substance. In order to argue 
that both mental and physical substance are ~ (sfulya), I aim to demonstrate 
philosophical implausibility of these theories. 
6.2.1. Ontological Idealism 
Ontological idealism is an idea that there is only one kind of substance, 
mental substance, and there is no reason to believe in the existence of physical 
substance. Ontological idealism is related to Berkeley as well as the Yogacara 
school of Buddhism (!ili1JDfi~). Berkeley's idea is represented by the famous 
"esse est percipi (to exist is to be perceived)6". 
so long as they are not perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or 
that of any created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or 
else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit 7• 
The same idea was held 1400 years prior to Berkley by the Yogacara school of 
Buddhism. They believed in "vijfiiinaviida" which is a principle that whatever we 
experience and comprehend exists only in our mind and it is our mistake to think 
there is anything other than what we conceive. 
Ontological idealism is derived from epistemological idealism which was 
mentioned in Chapter One. Epistemological idealism is the notion that all we can 
comprehend is limited to what is in our mind and we are not capable of 
comprehending anything else other than via a corresponding idea or concept. In 
other words what we perceive as physical substances or phenomena are in fact 
6 Berkeley, George. (1734), A Treatise Concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, Principle 
3. 
7 Berkeley, George. (1734), ibid., Principle 7. 
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merely ideas. This was supported by a thought experiment devised by Bradley8: If 
we think of a physical object and take away everything we know about the object 
which relates to sensation, thought, memory and other mental aspects, we are left 
with a mere blank. This gives rise to a doubt about the existence of physical 
substance. In fact Berkley thought it was a mistake to assume the existence of 
physical substance that "there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which 
perceives. "9 
This doubt about the existence of physical substance leads also to an idea that 
mental substance is a genuine fundamental substance, because it suggests a 
possibility of body-less-mind, i.e. the ontological independence of mind from body. 
Epistemological idealism showed a possible scenario of reality where mind exists 
but physical substance does not exist at all. We are sure about the existence of 
mind, but we cannot be equally certain about the existence of physical body. If 
this suspicious is true, the annihilation of body does not necessarily coincide with 
annihilation of body. To play devil's advocate, if mind is ontologically depended 
upon body, then the existence of mind must necessarily coincide with the 
existence of body, and annihilation of body necessarily leads to the annihilation of 
mind. Therefore, if mental substance were not a genuine fundamental substance it 
is not possible for mind to exist without body. Since epistemological idealism 
illustrates a possible scenario where the mind could exist without physical 
substance, the mental substance must be a genuine substance. Although the 
ontological idealism heavily depends upon the epistemological idealism, the two 
have to be distinguished, as the latter does not necessarily imply the former. In 
other words, one can accept epistemological realism without admitting to 
ontological idealism; even though the directly comprehensible is limited to an 
idea, it is possible to assume the existence of physical world and a physical 
substance behind and beyond mental world. 
The first problem of ontological idealism is that it can only speculate, but 
unable to prove that there is no physical substance at all. As I stated above, 
epistemological idealism does not imply ontological idealism. Epistemological 
idealism is like a double-edged sword. It indicates that there is no evidence to 
8 Bradley, F.H. (1930), Appearance and Reality, (Oxford; Clarendon), Chapter 14. 
9 Berkeley, George. ( 1734 ), ibid., Principle I 0. 
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prove that physical substance exists yet at the same time, we could also conclude 
that there is no evidence to prove that there is no physical entity or physical 
substance. It is, however, wrong to accuse Berkeley and Yogacara of this flaw, as 
their intention was to make us question our belief in physical reality or physical 
substance as a genuine substance, rather than positively denying the existence of 
physical substance. 
The second problem of ontological idealism is that it implies solipsism. The 
reasoning ontological idealism employs to question the existence of the physical 
world can also lead to the possibility that there is nothing other than my mind, 
since that is only thing I have direct access to. Other than my own mind, the 
whole world and everything I believe to exist may be my own creation, as I stated 
in section 1.1.1. The solipsism is a problem because it leads to the defeatism that 
renders any philosophical or scientific enquiry pointless. 
The third problem is that ontological idealism faces the difficulty of 
explaining the orderly arrangement of the physical world, in terms of both 
causation and the continual existence of physical objects. Ontological idealism 
argues that everything we think or we know about the physical world or physical 
objects can be reduced to our sensory experience. If the theory were correct, a 
copy of Zen text Shobogenzo in front of me is nothing more than a bundle of 
ideas, memories, visual sensation and tactile sensation, so that the book disappears 
when I look away. It is, however, hard to accept such an idea as plausible. Every 
time I open the text, the passages are there in the right order. If the text and its 
contents were merely aspects of my mind, since I am a forgetful person, it would 
surprise me that the passage was not jumbled up as it is in my memory. Similarly 
it is difficult to explain the regularity and universality of physical causation, if 
physical causation is not real. Even for an observer who has no knowledge of 
astrophysics, the stars move according to the law of universal gravity and the 
colour of a star follows the law of emission spectroscopy. Ontological idealism 
faces difficulty in explaining how celestial movement could be so regular if it is 
reliant on experience. Berkeley argued that objects continue to exist when not 
perceived by our finite minds, because they are perceived by God, and it is God 
who bestows the regularity. For modem thinkers, this explanation based on the 
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existence of God is not a plausible solution. 
The fifth problem is one related to the body-less-mind argument. Because 
dualism also uses the same argument, and the problem is directly related to the 
plausibility of physicalism, I will discuss this later. 
6.2.2. Dualism 
Dualism is the idea that there are two kinds of substance; mental substance 
and physical substance. Although the idea is strongly related to Descartes, I will 
present the most plausible form of dualism rather than that of Descartes 10• There 
are four reasons for people to believe in dualism. The first is ontological 
independence between mental and physical substance. It is easy to understand 
physical substance to be ontologically independent from the fact that objects such 
as a chair, an apple or a book can be composed of physical substance alone 
without any mental substance necessarily accompanying them. An argument for 
the ontological independence of mental substance is similar to the body-less-mind 
argument mentioned in the previous section. Descartes' famous "cogito, ergo sum 
(I think therefore I am)" proved the existence of his mind (if the mind did not 
exist, then thinking would not be possible), but the ability to think does not prove 
the existence of body. The existence of mind is "clear and distinct" because it is 
self-evident, but the existence of body is not as "clear and distinct" as mind, 
because its existence is not self-evident and there is room for doubt. When 
Descartes was thinking about himself, he could be sure that he was a mental 
substance of a thinking entity, but there was no proof that he was also a physical 
substance. This proves that the existence of physical substance does not necessary 
coincide with the existence of mental substance. According to the definition of 
substance, this makes mental substance to be ontologically independent from 
physical substance, therefore it is a genuine substance. 
The second reason to support dualism is the two distinct ways for all things to 
exist. Physical substance exists in the three-dimensional physical domain, but 
10 Descarte's own view is different from the widely accepted dualism. Descartes believed that 
there were three kinds of bare substance; in addition to the two there is a perfect substance God. 
Descartes also took a monistic view on physical substance. He thought that there was only one 
physical substance, and that individual physical entities were all modes or finite aspects of this 
single physical substance. These two ideas are not necessarily included in modem dualism. 
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mind does not exists in this domain. This does not mean that mind does not exist, 
it is just that the mind seems to exist in a non-physical domain. This suggests that 
there are at least two different ways for a thing to exist; in a physical domain or in 
a non-physical domain. If there are two distinct ways to exist, there must be two 
distinct kinds of substance that actualise the existence. One is a physically 
extended substance which exists in a physical domain and the other is mental 
substance that exists in a non-physical domain. Because physical substance is not 
capable of existing in a non-physical domain in the same way that mental 
substance is not capable of existing in a physical domain, they must be defined as 
distinct. 
In addition to the above two philosophical arguments, there are two 
sentimental reasons to believe in dualism. Firstly dualism is popular because it 
accords with our common language and conception. In our everyday life, we feel 
body and mind (or body and soul) to be two distinct things. For example you may 
say "my body was tired but my spirit was high" believing physical exhaustion is 
not necessarily connected to mental weariness. We distinguish psychological 
trauma from physical injury. These common conceptions lead us to assume that 
mind and body are different and distinct. Otherwise, bodily and mental exhaustion 
would concur and physical injuries would result in similar psychological trauma. 
Secondly, many people believe in dualism because religions often imply a 
mind/body distinction. Without ontological independence of mind from body, 
religions face a difficulty in explaining life-after-death, reincarnation, final 
judgement, spirits and so forth. Aquinas11 thought, since human beings were 
individuated by matter during life but lacked it after death, human individual 
could retain identity and individuality thanks to the individuality of the immaterial 
body (i.e. soul). 
The most well known problem of dualism is the causal connection between 
mind and body which is often known as the mind-body problem. It is easy to see 
how two physical entities such as a snooker ball and the table interact each other, 
since they follow the same laws and rules of physics. The mind works and 
interacts with other minds according to the mental process observed by 
11 Aquinas St. Thomas, "Soul in Human Being," in McDermott, Timothy (ed. & trans.) (1993), 
Thomas Aquinas Selected Philosophical Writings (Oxford; Oxford Univ. Press), p.l85. 
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psychology, sociology and anthropology. The problem is explaining how two 
kinds of substance that follow different sets of laws and rules can influence each 
other. Every day and every minute, my mind and body interact with each other. 
Sense organs of my physical body trigger mental experience. My mind commands 
my physical body to move in a certain way. Moreover, to make the matter worse, 
both the physical causal chain and the mental causal chain seem to be closed and 
there is no room for one to interfere with the other. Developments in physiology 
and neuroscience reveal that brain cells and nervous systems are nothing more 
than simple physical entities whose behaviour can be explained using 
physico-chemical laws, and there is no room for intention, desire and other mental 
activity to influence the working of cells. This implies that there cannot be any 
causal interaction between mind and body. Dualism normally presents two 
possible replies to the mind-body problem; occasionalism and parallelism. They 
are however not plausible enough to rescue dualism from the mind-body 
problem12• 
Zen would disagree with dualism smce it implies the clear distinction 
between animate and inanimate objects. According to dualism, everyday objects13 
can be divided into two kinds; animate and inanimate objects. The former is 
capable of possessing thought and consciousness because it is composed of both 
12 Occasionalism is an idea or a belief that God continuously interferes with reality. Because 
supporters of occasionalism accept the objection that mental and physical substance do not follow 
the laws, they cannot directly interact with each other. Instead, mind and body interact through the 
medium of God. The problem of occasionalism is that it relies too heavily on the existence of God. 
In order to explain simple everyday tasks substance dualism has to rely on the constant mediation 
of God between mental substance and physical substance. Personally, I think that if God is 
omnipotent then he will make things easier for himself, so that he does not have to constantly 
interfere with every tiny matter. Parallelism also accepts the criticism that because mind and body 
follow two separate sets of laws, they cannot interact with each other. Parallelism argues that even 
though it appears to have certain connections, there is no causal interaction between mind and 
body. According to parallelism, mind and body are like two clocks that have been set to the same 
time. Although there is no causal interaction between them, they continue to indicate the same time 
and chime simultaneously as if they are somehow connected. The problem of parallelism is the 
difficulty of explaining how two kinds of bare substance can co-ordinate so precisely with each 
other. Parallelism implies that my mental decision to pick up a glass of orange juice has nothing to 
do with my arm actually picking the glass up. My arm reaches out regardless of my mental 
decision, and the dehydration of my body has nothing to do ~!h, my feding of ~fl:st. In ()rder to 
expUiin this problem, parallelism must rely on either an omnipotent God who set two kinds of 
substance so precisely at the beginning of the world or coincidence on a cosmic scale. Neither 
explanation is satisfactorily plausible. 
13 I am excluding angels and body-less- souls, since I do not believe they should be discussed 
alongside animate and inanimate objects. 
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mental and physical substance, whereas the latter is not capable of possessing 
thoughts and consciousness, because it is made up only of physical substance. We 
have already seen several arguments that are related to the idea that 
animate/inanimate distinction is ~ (siinya). In Chapter One and Three, we 
learned that any A or not-A distinction is ~ (siinya). 1bis should include the 
qualitative division between animates and inanimate objects. Such a distinction is 
not intrinsic to the mind-independent reality (~-; nirvana), and it is ~ l\ 
(samskrta), a product of human invention. 1bis contradicts with what dualists 
imply. They believe that an object is composed of either one or two substances, so 
that the distinction between animate and inanimate objects must be clear and 
distinct. In order to clarifying the implausibility of the animate/inanimate 
distinction to be intrinsic to ~ • (nirvana), I will divide it into three 
sub-problems; synchronic, revolutionary and developmental problems of 
animate/inanimate distinction. The synchronic problem is the problem of judging 
which organic object is an animate object and which object is not. We assume a 
hierarchy of objects according to mental capacity and organic complexity. 
[Fig 6.1.] Hierarchy of organisms 
H an ing 
D phin 
Horse 
Rodent 
Amphibian 
ird Reptiles 
Arthropods Protochorda 
Mollusc 
Coelenterat 
Algae Lichen Fern 
Gas Liquid Mineral 
Dualism implies a sharp division between animate and inanimate objects, because 
objects are made out of either physical substance alone or physical substance as 
well as mental substance, with no middle ground. In other words, dualism implies 
a definite boundary in the above hierarchy. It believes animals to be animate 
objects and plants to be inanimate objects, therefore the animate/inanimate 
boundary must lay somewhere between the two. But where precisely is the 
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division? Does an insect (arthropod) or a jellyfish (coelentrate) possess thought or 
consciousness? What about a sponge (phylum porifera) or a sea cucumber 
(holothurian)? Are these animate objects capable of possessing thought or are they 
inanimate object like plants or minerals that are not capable of possessing any 
form of consciousness? Contrary to what dualism implies there seems to be no 
definite distinction between the animate and inanimate objects. 
According to the Darwinian theory of evolution, even a complex organism 
that is capable of possessing thought and consciousness evolved from a simple 
cell organism which did not possess consciousness. This means there must have 
been a distinct point in evolutionary history when inanimate objects became 
animate objects. Like the synchronic problem of the animate/inanimate distinction, 
if dualism were true, then such a turning point in evolution must be definite, since 
objects are composed of either physical substance alone or a combination of 
physical and mental substance. It is, however, implausible to think that one 
generation of organism consisting only of physical substance produced a next 
generation which was composed of mental substance as well as physical 
substance. This is the second problem of the animate/inanimate distinction which 
I call 'the evolution problem'. 
The third problem of the animate/inanimate distinction is the problem of at 
which point in pregnancy the foetus becomes an animate object capable of 
emotion, thought and consciousness. A fertilised egg begins cell division, and 
gradually develops a spine, nerve system, and brain, and by the end of pregnancy 
a complete infant is formed. After the birth, the baby changes into a child and then 
into a fully grown adult. We consider the adult human, child and baby to be 
animate objects that are capable of possessing thought and consciousness. 
According to dualism, this defines them as being composed of mental and 
physical substance. Whereas we consider the sperm, egg or newly fertilised egg to 
be composed solely of physical substance, because we do not believe that they are 
capable of any mental activity. This suggests that there must be a definite point in 
biological development where the simple inanimate entity made out of only 
physical substance becomes an animated complex organism consisting of both 
physical and mental substance. According to what dualism suggests, such timing 
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should be very definite. 
I agree that it is possible to take a pantheistic position (that all objects are 
made out of both mental and physical substance), but this defeats the whole point 
of substance dualism, which attempts to deal with unresolved issues: Why are 
certain objects such as a human and a dolphin capable of possessing 
consciousness while other objects such as a plant, a rock or a table are not? Why 
do animate objects behave differently from inanimate object that only follow 
physical causation? By introducing the idea that there are two kinds of substance 
the dualist explains these differences. Therefore to say that everything is 
composed two kinds of substance bring back the original question of why certain 
objects are capable of possessing consciousness and thought while others are not. 
Fourthly, dualism was popular since it is compatible with religious belief. It 
allows the possibility of life-after-death and spirit. However since religious beliefs 
are no longer taken for granted, the compatibility to religious belief cannot be 
used to defend plausibility of dualism. 
The fmal problem of dualism is common to ontological idealism which is the 
problem related to the body-less-mind. Both dualism and ontological idealism 
assume mental substance to be a genuine substance based on body-less-mind 
argument (e.g. the possibility that the existence of mind does not necessarily 
coincide with the existence of physical body). The problem is that both dualism 
and ontological idealisms fail to distinguish what is imaginary and what is actual. 
We can imagine a body-less-mind but it does not mean mind can actually exist 
without body. The body-less-mind is an imaginary entity rather than an actual 
entity. We can imagine a unicorn or a goblin, but that does not mean the unicorn 
and the goblin exist at the same ontological level to actual objects such as you, me, 
a table, a rock or a river. In the same way, even if we can imagine the mind as 
being ontologically independent, it does not means that this is actually the case. 
The body-less-mind argument can speculates but never proves mental substance 
to be a genuine substance. Physicalism, which is examined in the next section, 
provides evidence to deny such speculation. 
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6.2.3. Physicalism 
Physicalism is the idea that physical substance is the only kind of substance 
there is, and what we perceive as mental substance ontologically depends upon 
physical substance (i.e. mental substance is not a genuine substance). The term 
"physicalism" covers diverse theories of mind including behaviourism, type/type 
identity theory, token/token identity theory, eliminativism, anomalous monism, 
functionalism and so forth. This thesis does not deal with these theories separately, 
because their difference concerns the relation between mental state and physical 
state or between mental event and physical event. What I am interested here is the 
underlining assumption that these different kinds physicalism share. They all 
assume physical substance to be only genuine substance and mental substance 
ontologically depends upon physical substance. 
Physicalism is popular because it conforms with findings from physiology, 
neurology and so forth that the physical causal chain is closed. In Horgan's words, 
"[physicalism believes] the human body is a causally complete 
physico-chemical system; although the body is highly susceptible to 
external causal influence, all physical events in the body, and all bodily 
movements, are in principle fully explainable in physico-chemical 
terms. 14" 
This means there is no scientific evidence that the mind has any causal influence 
upon our state of mind and body. This is why most physicalisms support 
epiphenomenalism which considers mind to be a non-causal by-product of a 
physical process. It assumes that although physical processes of the brain trigger 
and alter mental states, the brain process is a mere physico-chemical change of the 
brain and it is not influenced by mental activity. For example, although I think my 
feeling of thirst (S 1) causes a desire to drink a glass of orange juice on a table (82), 
there is no direct causal connection between the feeling and the desire. The whole 
process can be explained as dehydration of the body which sends neuro-electric 
signals to the brain and these signals change state of the brain without being 
14 Horgan, Terence E. (1995), "Physicalism (1)", in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind 
(paperback edt.), (Oxford; Blackwel), p.47l-478. 
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affected by any mental state. 
[Fig.6.2.] Epiphenomenalism 
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Correspondent 
As Broad15 describes, epiphenomenalism thinks that either a mental state does 
not function at all as a causal factor (causally inert), or it participates in causation 
by virtue of its corresponding physical state. This leads to a problem known as 
"intentionality". Epiphenomenalism implies that the mind has no causal role in 
both physical and mental activity. In other words, although we perceive ourselves 
to be free agents, we do not have free will at all. We are no different from 
inanimate objects whose behaviour is solely influenced by physical causation. 
Functionalism is the physicalist's answer to problems derives from 
epiphenomenalism. Functionalism regards mental states as having a certain causal 
role. Functionalism, as its name suggests, defines a mental state in terms of the 
function of its physical entity. The way a mental state causally influences 
behaviour and a subsequent mental state can be explained using the working of 
the "Turing machine"16 which is the basis of a modem computer. 
[Fig.6.3] Turing machine 
I I 
2 
Mind and body interact like the software and hardware of the computer. Software 
15 Broad, C.D. (1925), The Mind and Its Place in Nature, (London; Routledge & Kegan Paul), 
E.473. 
6 Turing Alan M. (1950), "Computing machinery and intelligence", in Mind, vol.59, p.433-460. 
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determines the state of a computer and how it reacts to an input. If the machine is 
in the state Sl and receives the input/, it gives the output OJ and goes into the 
state 82. When the machine receives the identical input/, if the machine is in the 
different state 82, the outcome is 02, and 83. This illustrates how mental states 
have a causal role and not a causally inert one as other theories of physicalism 
imply. Functionalism is still physicalism with regard to substance, since it believes 
mind or mental state ontologically depend on body (physical entity). To use the 
comparison with computer, software still requires a physical body to exist, in a 
form of a floppy disk, a CD-Rom, or a hard drive. In other words, mind cannot 
exist without physical body. 
Although functionalism set out to solve the problem of epiphenomenalism, it 
still has failed to solve the problem of intention. The problem of intention which 
functionalism faces can be illustrated by the "Chinese Box" thought experiment 
devised by Searle 17• What the Chinese box represents is how a computer functions. 
A computer follows instruction without comprehending what it is doing. If an 
animated object is simply an organic computer as functionalism assumes, then 
how the object feels, thinks, knows or intends does not influence the outcome at 
all, as the Chinese box experiment demonstrates. 
The second problem physicalism encounters is epistemological idealism. As 
we saw in the ontological idealism, we have no direct access to a physical entity 
and physical substance. All we experience or comprehend are merely aspects of 
the mind. So there is no independent reason for us to believe that physical 
substance actually exists, and the only reason the physicalist can give is that we 
perceive the world to be physical. This makes physicalism to be a mere 
speculation like ontological idealism. 
The third problem concerns an assumption that physicalism is based upon. 
17 Imagine a box which contains an English man who has no knowledge of the Chinese language. 
A series of questions written with Chinese characters are posted through a small opening of the 
box. His task is to write answers, also in Chinese and send them out. If he is equipped with a book 
which includes all the possible questions and their answers, by matching a Chinese character on 
the question card with an answer in the book, he can give a correct answer without understafiding 
Chillese'-charaeters on either the question- card nor· the answer card. For a -chiriese observer 
standing outside the box posting in a series of questions, the person in the box appears to 
comprehend Chinese, and he cannot tell that the man in the box does not know a word in Chinese. 
(in Searle, John. (1980) "Mind, brains, and programs" in Behavioral and Brain Science, Vol.3, 
p.417-24.) 
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Physicalism assumes physical causation to be close and complete (i.e. causal 
determinism). This leads physicalists to conclude that regardless of how 
complicated an object is, the behaviour and existence of any object can be 
explained solely in terms of physical causation and substance, and there is no 
room for any other substance or causation. If physical causation is closed and 
complete even human behaviour is ultimately m accordance with 
physico-chemical causation. This assumption is based on classical physics which 
has been proven to be wrong by Quantum physics. Quantum physics such as 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and Schrodinger's wave function (section 
5.2.1.2) indicate that contrary to what classical physics assumes, physical 
causation is neither close nor complete. In fact there is even a possibility for no 
causation to exist at all, and everything happens at random. I will discuss ~ 
(siinyaHi) of physical causation in the next chapter, but there is a doubt to the 
legitimacy of the assumption, upon which physicalism is based. 
The final problem for physicalism is again related to quantum physics. 
According to quantum physics, what we perceive as a physical substance may not 
be physical at all. In other words, quantum physics suggests that such a substance 
may not even exist. Traditionally, physical substance is defined in contrast to 
mental substance. Physical substance follows physical causation and has defmite 
dynamic values such as having mass (being three-dimensionally extended), 
having location (existing in three-dimensional space), having momentum and 
having energy, whereas mental substance follows non-physical causation (mental 
causation) and has no dynamic values, no mass, no location in three-dimensional 
space, no momentum and no energy. What quantum physics suggests is that what 
are regarded as physical substances do not satisfy the traditional criteria of 
physical substance. As I stated earlier Schrodinger's wave function and 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle indicate that physical causation cannot explain 
the behaviour of what are perceive as physical substance (i.e. physical substance 
does not follow physical causation). The wave/particle duality (section 5.2.1.1 ), 
the tunnelling effect (section 5.2.1.2) and the quantum entanglement (section 
5.2.1.3) show that what we perceive as physical substance does not have defmite 
dynamic values. To play devil's advocate, if physical substance has defmite 
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dynamic values, a photon would not create an interference pattern, an electron 
which does not have sufficient momentum could not pass through the potential 
barrier and two entangled particles could not have instant communication between 
them. These quantum phenomena are possible only because physical substance 
does not have definite dynamic values. What is perceived as physical substance 
cannot be what physicalists call physical substance, since it does not follow 
physical causation and has no definite dynamic values. The way to solve this 
problem is to apply Zen's concept of ~ {siinyata) which states that whatever we 
experience and comprehend is not the way the mind-independent reality (~j;R; 
nirvana) actually is. Whatever we comprehend as physical substance is~ (sunya), 
so that it is not physical at all. 
6.3. ~ (siinyata) of physical and mental substance 
I have so far analysed theories that postulate mental and/or physical substance 
in order to examine the possibility for what we comprehend as mental and/or 
physical substance to be a genuine substance. The analysis of these theories 
supports the view that neither substance is a genuine substance. What we 
comprehend as mental substance is unlikely to be genuine substance, since the 
body-less-mind argument, which, both ontological idealism and dualism employ, 
does not satisfy philosophical plausibility. The argument is only adequate enough 
to speculate but fail to prove ontological independence of mental substance. 
Implausibility of mental substance to be genuine substance also derives from two 
further arguments. One is the third argument against ontological idealism; it is 
difficult for ontological idealism to explain the orderly nature of what we perceive 
as the external world. The other is falling into solipsism (see section 6.2.1 ). If 
everything I comprehend was a mere aspect of my mind, then there would be no 
reason to refute solipsism. Dualism, the other theory which assume mental 
substance to be genuine substance, also turned out to be not plausible since it 
leads to the mind-body problem and the problem of animate/inanimate distinction. 
Without introducing highly implausible explanations, such as occasionalism and 
parallelism, dualism cannot fully explain the mind-body interaction that occurs all 
the time. Moreover, the animate/inanimate distinction that dualism implies is 
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impossible to defend as it opposes the ~ (siinyata) of qualitative divisions 
mentioned in Chapter Three. 
To consider what we perceive as physical substance to be genuine substance 
also raise problems. The problems are exactly as mentioned in arguments against 
physicalism. As epistemological idealism suggests, because what we can directly 
experience or comprehend is limited to what appear to our mind, we can only 
speculate the existence of physical substance in the mind-independent reality and 
there is no solid reason to believe that physical substance actually exists. More 
damagingly, science which is supposed to support the existence of physical 
substance actually contradicts its existence. It is not possible to explain the 
wave/particle duality, the tunnelling effect or the quantum entanglement if what 
we define as physical substance is genuine substance. A more plausible 
explanation is that matter is not physical, and we just perceive as physical. Matter 
does not follow what we perceive as physical causation, it has no dynamic values 
such as mass, location and momentum. It suggests that physicality of matter might 
be merely how we perceive substance to be and it is not part of the intrinsic nature 
of genuine substance. 
These denial of both mental and physical substance coincides with Zen's 
concept of ~ (siinyata). According to ~ (siinyata), whatever we, the 
unenlightened, understand, is not the way the mind-independent reality (~-; 
nirvana) actually is. This should include our understanding of everything to be 
made out of mental substance and/or physical substance. They are simply ways 
we perceive the world to be, and they do not exist in the mind-independent reality. 
Moreover, according to ~ (siinyata), no division or distinction exists in the 
mind-independent reality (~-; nirvana), so that any dualistic understanding only 
leads to i1 (maya) and UiJIJ (viparyasa). All western theories examined above 
think of substance in terms of a distinction between physical or not-physical, and 
the distinction between mental or not-mental. If the concept of ~ (siinyata) is 
applied to the topic of substance, the genuine substance is neither physical nor 
not-physical and neither mental nor not mental. The genuine substance is neither 
mental nor physical, and exists behind and beyond mental and physical domains. 
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In other words, mental and physical arise from being perceived by us. In Shaner's 
words; 
Body and mind can be interpreted as distinct entities only by 
reflectively abstracting mental and physical aspects of a person's 
original pre-reflective experience. 18 
This interpretation of substance based on the concept of ~ ( siinyata) can be 
described as hi-epiphenomenalism. It is an idea that mind and body are both 
epiphenomena, causally inert effects of something which is neither physical or 
mental. Hi-epiphenomenalism has advantages to solving several problems that 
theories of substance examined above. Firstly hi-epiphenomenalism can 
successfully explain how mind and body are in unison without having a direct 
causal relation between them. The mental state (M) and the physical state (P) 
coincide because they are two aspects of one and the same substance (K). We 
cannot experience genuine substance (K) but only as metal phenomena (M) or as 
physical phenomena (P). 
[Fig.6.4.] X ®- --® Samsara (the relative reality) 
-------~---~-------------------
® Nirvana (the mind-independent reality) 
The relation between a state of the genuine substance, physical phenomena and 
mental phenomena is similar to the relation between the dancer and two shadows I 
described in the previous chapter (section 5.2.2.4). The two phenomena can 
coincide without having apparent direct causal connection between them. 
This interpretation not only solves the problem of mind-body interaction, but 
it can also explain why both mental and physical causal chains seem to be closed 
and mutually exclusive. According to the above interpretation, there is no direct 
18 Shaner, David E. (1985), "The bodymind experience in Dogen's ShObOgellZO: 
phenomenological perspective" in Philosophy East and West, vol.35, p.17. 
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causal connection between physical states and there is no direct causal connection 
between mental states. Because what we perceive as mental causation and 
physical causation are explained as pseudo causation, they are something we 
falsely assume causation to be. 
[Fig.6.5.], Hi-epiphenomenalism 
pseudo-physical causation 
------------------------'l 
pseudo-mental causation 
true causation 
So far we have examined the relation between mind and body, but 
hi-epiphenomenalism is also capable of solving the problems that were addressed 
in Chapter Five, such as the dual nature of basic elements (section 5.2.1.1) and 
quantum entanglement (section 5.2.1.3). To consider physical substance to be ~ 
(sunya), there is no need to postulate the collapse of wave function. It considers 
wave and particle nature to be two distinct ways for us to comprehend what we 
perceive as physical. In other words, what we perceive as physical can be 
subdivided into understanding as wave and as particle. 
[Fig.6.6] Mind, wave and particle. 
Physical Mental 
ee ~~ (samsiira; phenomenal) 
~ll;l (nirvana; noumenal) 
Wave, particle and mental phenomena are three distinct ways for us to understand 
one and the same genuine . substance, and it explains why there are close 
co-relations between them and yet they cannot be reduced to one another. They 
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are mutually exclusive because they follow three different sets of laws and 
principle. Mental substance is shaped by psychological and social processes. 
Matter waves follow Schrodinger's wave equation. Particles follow Newtonian 
mechanics and special relativity theory. What this suggests is related to the 
Flatlander argument which we saw in Chapter One (section.1.2.1) that what we 
comprehend is only a limited aspect of reality which forces us to make incorrect 
assumptions of reality. Wave, particle and mental are not true natures of reality but 
human perspectives. This opens up a possibility for multi-manifestations 
depending on perspective and the limitation of a percipient. 
Assuming the existence of a single kind of substance is an un-Buddhist-like 
idea. It contradicts with the idea of ~ (siinyata) to affirm the existence of 
anything in ~l£ (nirvana). The idea of mind and body to be fundamentally one 
and the same thing came from a concept of ~ (ch'ilki) which is widely 
employed in many far eastern philosophy and religions. ~ (ch'ilki) is normally 
translated as "life force" but it applies not only to animate objects but also to 
inanimate objects. It is fundamental force that governs everything that exist 
including both mind and body. The idea of ~ (ch'ilki) derives not from 
Buddhism but from Taoism and Japanese pantheism. As it was mentioned in the 
Introduction, Chinese Taoism and Japanese pantheism had as much influence on 
Zen as Indian Buddhism did. The idea of ~ (ch'ilki) was, therefore, 
incorporated into Zen. Since~ (ch'ilki) is understood to be force that govern 
everything that happens, I will explain and defend the idea of ~ (ch'ilki) in the 
next chapter which deals with causation and determinism. 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the possibility of what we think as fundamental 
building blocks of universe to be ~ (siinya). Candidates for genuine substance 
are mental and physical substance and as we saw in section 3.2.1.1, quantum 
physics suggests that physical substance to be divided further into wave and 
particle. The problem is that these candidates are irreconcilable, yet as the 
mind-body problem (section 6.2.2) and wave-particle duality (section 5.2.1.1) 
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indicate they are all closely related. This chapter examined plausibility of these 
candidates and concluded that they are all ~ (sfulyata). They are all just the 
ways we perceive substance to be and are not the way substance actually is. This 
can be related to Chapter Three which dealt with ~ (siinyata) of qualitative 
division. The divisions between mind and body and between wave and particle are 
~ ~ (samskrta) products of human invention useful for sorting out and 
simplifying what we experience and comprehend. I proposed an solutions of 
mental substance, the probability wave, and quantum particle to be three different 
ways of comprehending one and the same underline substance. It is an idea 
inspired by far-eastern concept of ~ (ki). In the next chapter, I will explore and 
defend the idea of ~ (ki) in order to clarify what Zen think of mind and body. 
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7 
Causation and determinism 
Causation and determinism are popular and the most discussed topics not 
only in the context of philosophy but also in a much wider context. From ancient 
times, people have wondered why things happen at all and why things happen this 
way and not that way. There have been many ideas and theories that aim to 
provide answers to above the questions. According to Zen, all these theories that 
claim to answer the questions are ~ (sfulya; empty) and fil~ (prapaiica; 
erroneous ideas). In other words, what we perceived or comprehend as causation 
and determinism are ~ '{g s (nama-riipas; concepts) that are ~ (sfulya; empty), 
and they do not reflect the intrinsic nature of ~jj& (nirvana; the mind-independet 
reality). Chapter Five and Six already mentioned some aspects of causation and 
determinism in contexts of quantum physics and the mind-body [causal] problem. 
Chapter Five demonstrated the inability of what we perceive as physical causation 
to explain quantum phenomena. Chapter Six discussed a possibility of both a 
physical state and a mental state to be epiphenomena thereby they are both 
causally inert. Since these arguments were mentioned in previous chapters, I can 
keep this chapter short and precise by referring to other chapters. In order to argue 
~ (sfulyata) of what we understand as causation, this chapter demonstrate the 
implausibility of commonly held views on causation and determinism. In order to 
understand the differences between various theories, let us firstly look at what 
causation and determinism are. 
7.1. Causation and determinism 
Causation is an act of one event (a cause) which influences or brings about an 
another event (an effect). There are fundamentally two kinds of causal relations; 
219 
Causation and determinism 
necessary and contingent causation. If the relation between a cause (Cl) and an 
effect (El) is said to be a necessary one, then the occurrence of Cl necessarily 
entails the instance of El (i.e. when C1 occurs E1 cannot fail to happen). If the 
relation is said to be contingent, even if C 1 happens E 1 may not occur (i.e. E 1 
does not necessarily follow C 1 ). 
[Fig.7.1.] Necessary and causal causation 
Necessary causal connection Contingent causal connection 
< El Cl not-E1 
In other words, if the relation is a necessary one, then there is only one possible 
outcome, and the effect cannot fail to happen. Whereas if the relation is contingent, 
then there are two possible outcomes the effect can happen or not happen. 
The distinction between contingent and necessary causation are strongly 
related to determinis..m. Determinism is the idea that, without any exception, what 
actually happens is only what could have happened, and it is not possible for 
reality to have been otherwise. If all causations are necessary causation, then the 
world is deterministic, since there is only one possible present state of the 
universe and there is only one possible state of the future. Whereas if there is even 
one contingent causation, it leads to indeterminism, since there are two possible 
future states of the universe as the results of the contingent causation. Causal 
determinism is related to classics physics. Many people believed the causal 
deterministic picture of the universe because of the success of Newtonian 
mechanics. As we saw in the section 5.2.1.2, the discovery of quantum physics, 
however, changed all that. The tunneling effect, Heisenberg's uncertainty theory 
and Shrodinger's wave function suggests the classic physics to be wrong. In the 
light of quantum physics, there are three options regarding causation and 
determinism. The first one is to maintain causal determinism by supporting hidden 
valuable theories (section.5.2.2.2.). The second option is causal indeterminism; 
admitting everything that happens has a cause, but some causations are contingent 
therefore the world is not deterministic. The third option is non-causal 
indeterminism, the idea that the world is indeterministic because everything 
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happens at random and things happen without a cause. Although strict 
determinism is strongly related to causation, causation is not a necessary part of 
determinism. In other words, the world can be deterministic without the existence 
of any causation. It is possible to imagine non-causal determinism of 
occasionalistic-fatalism that God has predetermined everything that happen and 
God is a sole cause of everything. According to such a theory there is no actual 
causation existing between two events which we perceive as a cause and an effect, 
yet there is only one possible state of the world chosen by God. There is also 
eastern karmatic fatalism which believes what happens in this life is 
predetermined by actions in the previous life. I admit that these theories are not 
non-causal determinism in strict sense. Firstly they are not exactly non-causal 
theories, because even though there may not be a causal relation between what we 
perceive as a cause and what we perceive as an effect, there are other kinds of 
causation, between God or moral conduct in the previous life and what happen in 
this life. It is also difficult to consider them as determinism, since neither theories 
conform to the definition of determinism that there can only be one possible state 
of the world. Especially karmatic fatalism leaves room for us to make conscious 
decision about whether to carry out or not to carry out certain moral action. The 
ability to make a conscious decision implies that the possibility for the future to be 
more than one. Yet, they cannot be recognised as indeterminism, for they do not 
think everything happens at random in the way non-causal indeterminism of 
quantum physics suggest. If I may suggest such categories, they are semi-causal 
semi-determinims. In order to defend the idea of both causation and determinism 
to be ~ (siinya), I will demonstrate the above four positions to be implausible. 
7.2. Theories of causation and determinism 
7 .2.1.Karmatic causation 
The idea of karmatic causation was widely accepted in Indian philosophies, 
religions and some branches of Buddhism, but that is not the reason this thesis 
aims to demonstrate its implausibility. In fact there is no need to disprove 
karmatic causation since there is no rational reason that support the idea and it had 
been dismissed as a matter of faith. The motive for disproving karmatic causation 
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is to eliminate misattribution of the idea to Madhyamika (~ifl.~) and to Zen. 
Although many schools of Buddhism accepted the idea of karmatic causation, 
Madhyamika and Zen rejected the idea because it was not coherent with ~ 
(siinyata). The aim of this section is to demonstrate how and why karmatic 
causation is not compatible with Madhyamaie and Zen. 
The word "karma" is well-known even in western culture, but the word itself 
only means "action" or "action according to motive". What is commonly known 
as "karma" is actually karma-niyama (karmic law). But to make the matter 
simpler in his thesis I will use the term "karma (.)" in the way commonly used. 
Karma is specific kind of causation which connects the intended human action 
and it consequence. It represents an idea that moral acts inevitably entails 
consequences. 
Concepts of karma and rebirth are widely used in Indian religions and 
philosophy in order to explain the difference and unfairness in the condition or the 
fortune of people's life. We are trapped in the cycle of birth and death called 
bhavacakra (taB .. ; the Wheel of Life) which consists of six1 modes of existence 
called sad-gati (Ali). The six modes of existence are deva (;R; the gods), ashura 
(lfliJ{IjJI; titans), pudgala (A; humans), tiryanc (ri~; animal and insect), preta 
(ti.m; hungry ghosts) and naraka (it!!~; creatures in hell). Which mode of 
existence a person is reborn into is determined by karma. Karma is an idea that a 
person with good deeds will be rewarded in the next life to be born in better 
conditions, whereas a person with wrong doing will be reborn as a lower form of 
life such as an animal or an insect in a future life. 
Although the above idea of karma and rebirth was popular among Indian 
philosophies and religions, and accepted by some schools of Buddhism, it is a 
mistake to attribute the idea to Madhyamika and Zen. They openly rejected karma 
as ~ (siinya) based on two reasons. Firstly the idea of rebirth is difficult to be 
combined with the concept ofMR (anatman; Non-Self) and ~ (siinyata) of ~ 
~ (jat-marana; birth and death) that were described in the Chapter Four. Many 
1 Among Hinduism and Buddhism, there are different opinions about how many levels or classes 
of existence. But the Popular Buddhism of China and Japan believe it to be six. 
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solutions were proposed to make them compatible, but they failed to satisfy the 
economy of theory, the third criteria I propose to measure plausibility (section 
2.2.2). Trying to combine the idea of rebirth and M ~ (anatman) creates 
unnecessary complications and the philosophically implausibility. It is therefore 
more reasonable to reject the idea of rebirth as an irrational idea. More 
importantly, affirming the existence of karmatic causation is against the idea of 
~ {sfinyata). ~ {siinyata) states that everything we believe to exist is i1 
(maya) or liii!J (viparyasa) and it is not intrinsic to ~)i£ (nirvana). I will come 
back to demonstrate this point later when I elucidate Zen's position concerning 
causation and determinism (section 7.3.1). 
It is believed that karma and rebirth were included into Buddhism not because 
they are an essential part of Buddha's teaching but because they were popular 
concepts predated to the birth of Buddhism. As I mentioned in the Introduction, 
historically Buddhism developed by absorbing ideas from other philosophy and 
religions, this was why it was unavoidable for Buddhism to be influenced by the 
popular idea of karma. 
Instead of understanding karma as supernatural causation, we can accept it 
simply as an useful and down-to-earth concept (~1S; nama-rtipa) that is ~ 
(siinya; empty). It is useful because it makes people behave morally. Such 
interpretation of karmatic causation was provided by Coward2 who compared 
Pataiijali's Yoga-sutra with Freud and Jung. He described karma as "a memory 
trace recorded in the unconscious by any action or thought a person has done", 
and defends the idea by giving psychological and neurological explanation as to 
how past thought and action influences future thought and behaviour. According 
to him, karma is a causal relation between action and the feeling of guilt or regret, 
and vice versa. The committing morally wrong action generates feelings of guilt 
and regret. These feelings of guilt and regret then create the motivation not to 
repeat the same action in the future. Such interpretation, however, requires further 
studies, since the psychology of memory has improved from the time of Freud and 
Jung. Although such study interests me, unfortunately there is no space in this 
2 Coward, Harold G (1983), "Psychology and karma", in Philosophy East and West, vol.33, 
p.49-60. 
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thesis to introduce modem theories of memory such as by Tulving3, Baddeley4, 
and so forth. I would like to leave it to my future study. 
Althought Zen does not believe in actual karmatic causation that exists 
between action in the past life and reward or punishment in this life, at least the !6 
'fS (nama-riipa), a concept, of such causation is a useful instrument to encourage 
unenlightened people to behave morally and avoid causing harm and suffering. In 
this sense, it may be possible to accept the !6 'fS (nama-riipa; concept), of karma 
(~) not as a truth but as a mere useful instrument, and is thereby ~ (siinya; 
empty). 
7.2.2.Causal determinism 
Causal determinism derived from the success of classic physics. From 
empirical evidence available at the time, classic physics made two assumptions; 
all causations are physical causation and all physical causation are necessary 
causations. These assumptions lead to a conclusion that all causations are 
necessary causation thereby the world can only be the way it is and it is 
impossible for the world to be other than what it is. It is, however, undeniable that 
some causal relations seem to be contingent, since the same event does not 
necessarily entail the same effect all the time. Imagine a simple causal connection 
between striking a match (Ca) and starting fire (Ea). If there is a lack of oxygen, 
if the match is damp, if the wind is blowing strongly, and so forth, then striking a 
match (Ca) does not cause fire (Ea). To defend against this sort of example, causal 
determinism takes a holistic approach; we must consider the state of the entire 
universe to be a cause of every event. James wrote; 
It [determinism] professes that those parts of the universe already laid 
down ... appoint and decree what other parts should be. The future has 
no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the past we call the 
present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future 
3 Tulving E. (1985), "How many memory systems are there?", in American Psychologist, vol.40, 
r.3s5-398. 
Baddeley, A.D. (1990), Human Memory, (Hove, Sussex: Lawrence Erlbaum). 
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complement other than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The 
whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest into an 
absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no equivocation or 
shadow of turning. 5 
In this way, causal connections between two particular events in isolation may 
appear contingent, but given the state of the entire universe, there could only be 
one outcome. 
As I listed m the Chapter Five, classic physics failed to explain the 
wave/particle duality (section 5.2.1.1), quantum uncertainty represented by the 
Schrodinger's wave function and Heisenberg's uncertain principle (section 
5.2.1.2), the tunnelling effect (section 5.2.1.2) and quantum entanglement (section 
5.2.1.3). Causal determinism tried to overcome the failures of classic physics by 
employing an argument proposed by Laplance. Laplance blamed our limited 
mental capacity and sensory perception to be reasons why some causations appear 
to be contingent. 
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect 
of its anterior state and as the cause of the one that is to follow. Given 
for one instant as intelligence which could comprehend all the force 
by which nature is animated and the respective situation of all the 
beings who composed it - an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit 
these data to analysis - it would embrace in the same formula the 
movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the 
lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the 
past, would be present to its eyes. 6 
If we had sufficient mental capacity and sensory ability, we would understand 
everything is causally determined. There are plenty of examples that illustrate the 
5 James, William. (1897), Burkhardt, F.H. (ed.), (1979), The Will to Believe; and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy, (Cambridge, M.A., U.S.A.; Harvard Univ. Press), p.150. 
6 Laplance, P. (1814),A Philosophical Essay on Probability, this quote comes from the English 
translation by Truscott, E. W. & Emory, F. L. (1951), (N.Y.; Dover), p.3-4. 
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above point. The most well-known example is Maxwell-Boltzmann's kinetic 
theory of gas. Maxwell-Boltzmann's kinetic theory of gas describes the behaviour 
of gas particles using probability. Even though each particle behave in causally 
determined manner, it is not possible for a human being to measure the location 
and momentum of every particle, therefore the only description we can give is a 
probabilistic description. In the same way, the hidden variable theories believe 
that we can only give probabilistic descriptions of quantum phenomena simply 
because we are not capable of knowing everything that influences the outcome. 
Even though causal determinism overcomes failure of classic physics to 
explain quantum physics, it faces at least two further problems. The first problem 
concerns the first assumption classic physics made; the assumption that all 
causation to be physical causation. Throughout Part Three, I argued repeatedly 
that physicality of ~- (nirvana) to be ~ (siinya), i.e. we perceive il\i• 
(nirvana) to be physical, but ~~ (nirvana) is unlikely to be physical. The 
wave/particle duality (section 5.2.1.1, 5.2.2.4, 6.2.3, & 6.3.) and the quantum 
entanglement (section 5.2.1.3, 5.2.2.4, 6.2.3 & 6.3) demonstrated difficulty of 
considering three-dimensional space to intrinsic to the mind-independent reality. 
If the three-dimensional physical domain within which physical causation is taken 
place is ~ (siinya), then how can physical causation be genuine causation. 
Moreover, the tunnelling effects (section 5.2.1.2, & 5.2.2.4) and the wave/particle 
duality (section 5.2.1.1, 5.2.2.4, 6.2.3, & 6.3) indicate what we perceive as 
physical substance is unlikely to be genuine substance. Since physical causation is 
normally understood as force that works upon physical substance, if physical 
substance is ~ (siinya), then physical causation cannot be genuine causation. 
These arguments goes against the assumption which causal determinism is based 
upon. They suggests physical causation, too, is ~ (siinya). If physical causation 
is ~ (siinya), then even what we understand as physical causations are all 
necessary causation, it does not lead to an conclusion that il\i~ (nirvana) is 
deterministic. 
The second problem is that there is no reason other than the success of 
Newtonian mechanics to support causal determinism. It is normally believed that 
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causal determinism was supported by the success of Newtonian mechanics, but 
the process may have been the other way round. The success of Newtonian 
mechanics inspired the belief in causal determinism. This suspicion can be 
supported by the fact that causal determinism did not exist before Newtonian 
mechanics. Before Newtonian mechanics, there were various fatalisms that 
believed thing happen for reason. As I explained earlier in section 7.1, fatalisms 
are not determinism in the strict sense, since they did not commit to the idea that 
the state of the world cannot be anything other than what it is, and there is only 
one possible future derives from the current state. This indicates causal 
determinism as we know is only possible in conjunction with Newtonian 
mechanics. The discovery of quantum phenomena proved that the world is not as 
Newtonian mechanics describes. Since Newtonian mechanics no longer enjoys 
empirical adequacy, I believe there is no reason to support the causal determinism 
at all, other than as a sentiment towards classical physics. 
7.2.3. Causal and non-causal determinism 
If the success of classic physics inspired causal determinism, the failure of 
classic physics and the success of modem physics indicate the world to be 
indeterministic. According to causal determinism, if the condition remains 
unchanged, regardless of how many times the same experiment is repeated, the 
outcomes are always the same. Contrary to such expectation, quantum phenomena, 
such as the double-slits experiment (section 5 .2.1.1) and the tunneling effects 
(section 5.2.1.2) show that even under an identical condition, outcomes vary. 
Causal determinism blamed our finite mental and sensory capacity for the failure 
of classic physics to explain why things happen at all and why things happen this 
way and not that way at the quantum level. On the contrary, modem physics such 
as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and Schrodinger's wave function suggests 
that the failure of classic physics is due to the fact that reality is indeterministic. 
According to the uncertainty principle and the wave function, even if the 
condition remains identical there will always be inconsistency in outcomes. They 
advocate that the difference between what we consider as a necessary connection 
and what we consider as contingent causation is a degree of probability or 
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frequency of constant conjunction and there is no necessary causation exists. For 
example, we believe that unless some other force is working, if I hold a mug and 
release it in midair, it always falls to the floor. But according to modem physics, 
there is a possibility for the mug not to fall and afloat in midair. Only reason we 
do not normally observe such occurrence is because the possibility for that to 
happen is so diminutive. In order for the mug to float in mid air, not only one 
particle but the majority of particles that compose the mug must move against 
gravity. If we suppose that the probability of a single particle to behave against 
gravitation is 5% and the number of particles required to float the mug is one 
million, then probability of the mug stay in mid air is 0.05I.ooo.ooo;t which is almost 
0. This is why even if it is possible for the mug to levitate, it is unlike for us to 
encounter such an occasion. Quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics reveal 
every causation to be contingent, and that in turn shows reality to be 
indeterministic. 
Regarding causation, there are two possible positions modern physics can 
take. One is causal indeterminism which believes nothing happens without 
causation but all causation are contingent. In other words, although it denies 
determinism, still believes in the existence of causation. The other is non-causal 
indeterminism which rejects not only determinism but also causation as well. To 
put it another way, it is an idea that things happen at random and things happen 
without anything causing them to happen. Those who support the latter provide 
nucleus decay as evidence for the existence of uncaused event. An unstable 
isotope or a molecule with a large nucleus discharges radiation by nucleus decay 
in order to turn stable. Experiments with natural and synthetic molecules prove 
that even under the identical environment we cannot predict when a nucleus will 
decay. Nucleus decay can happen within two seconds or ten thousand years. The 
time it takes for an unstable nucleus to decay is totally at random. It is true that the 
cause of the decay is its unstable nucleus, but there seems to be no actual cause 
that triggers the decay at the specific point in time. This suggests that, at quantum 
level, not every event has a cause, i.e. things can happen without anything causing 
them to happen. 
The problem with indeterminism which modern physics implies is the same 
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problem faced by causal determinism. The problem is they only consider physical 
causation to be a candidate for a genuine causation. So that when physical 
causation turns out to be contingent, they reached an conclusion that the world is 
causal in deterministic. And when they cannot fmd physical cause to an event, 
then they conclude that there is no causation at all. It is, however, possible that 
there is causation other than physical causation. As I illustrated in section 6.3, 
physical causation may be physical manifestation and not genuine causation, so 
that even though an event happened without a physical cause, it does not mean it 
happened without a cause. As we have seen in the previous section, the 
mind-body problem, the wave/particle duality, quantum entanglement, the 
tunneling effect suggests both a physical domain within which physical causation 
takes place and physical substance upon which physical causation works are ~ 
(sunya). If they are both g;g (siinya), then physical causation must also be ~ 
(sunya). As we have seen in the previous chapter (section 6.3), it is more plausible 
to think that what we perceive as physical causation is just the way we perceive 
the world to be and it is not the genuine causation. In the next section I will 
examine the possibility of physical causation to be g;g (siinya). 
7.3. ~ (siinyati) of what we perceive as causation 
7.3 .1. ~ (siinyata) of causation 
So far I have concentrated on ~ (siinya) of physical causation. This is 
because the whole topic of causation and determinism is often regarded separately 
to mental causation. In this thesis I would like to avoid whole issue of 
compatibility between determinism and free will since it would take up too much 
space and it is not main concern in this thesis. What I would do instead is to 
briefly demonstrate ~ (siinyata) of mental causation; implausibility for the 
mental causation to be genuine causation. If we consider mental causation to be 
genuine causation, two problems arise. They are the problem of 
animate/inanimate division and the contradiction to the idea of -~ (anatman; 
Non-Self). 
Both believes m mental causation and in animate/inanimate distinction 
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derived from an idea that an animate object is capable of behaving differently 
from an inanimate object whose behaviour is regulated solely by physical 
causation, because its behaviour is conditioned not only by physical causation but 
also by mental causation. The animate/inanimate distinction was mentioned in 
several places. The Copenhagen interpretation (section 5.2.2.1) and dualism 
(section 6.2.2.) suggested the existence of such a distinction. For the Copenhagen 
interpretation, the distinction matches with the distinction between objects capable 
of collapsing a wave function and objects that are not capable. For dualism; 
animate objects are composed of two kinds of substance (mental and physical 
substance) whereas inanimate object consists of only physical substance. 
Existence of such division was rejected on two basis. One is the claim that was 
made in the Chapter Three that every qualitative division is ~~ (samskrta), a 
product ofhuman invention, thereby it is~ (sU.nya). The second is what we saw 
in section 6.2.2 as objections against dualism. Assuming animate/inanimate 
distinction to actually exists leading to synchronic, revolutionary and development 
problems. These suggested that there is no animate/inanimate distinction, so that 
there is no need for the existence of mental causation which differentiates animate 
object from inanimate object. 
To consider mental causation to be genuine causation contradicts with the 
idea of ~ (sfinyata) as well as the idea of -~ (anatman; Non-Self). Mental 
causation can only directly interact with one's own body. The only way a mind 
can interact with anything else is through a physical body. For example in order 
for my mind to interact with other minds, I have to create sound using my voice 
box, or writing and typing words using my hands. This implies the subject/object 
division. The domain where mental causation works directly can be defmed as an 
individual and the domain outside that scope is others or environment. In other 
words, the mental causation implies an idea of genuine individual (~; atman). 
This obviously contradict with the conclusion of Chapter Four that numerical 
division between self (an individual in a first person sense) and its environment is 
~ (sU.nya). 
Like ~ (sU.nyata) of physical causation that was demonstrated earlier, we 
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can assume that what we perceive as mental causation is also ~ (sfinya). Zen 
thinks that what we perceive or comprehend as causal relations are ~ (siinya), in 
the sense that they do not exist in the mind-independent reality (~~; nirvana); 
they are just ways we perceive reality to be. 
The universe viewed as a whole is nirvana, viewed as a process it is 
the samsara. Having regard to causes and conditions, we have the 
phenomenal world; this same world, when causes and conditions are 
disregared, it is called the nirvana. 7 
Loy interprets this as a position that "causal connections are something that we 
superimpose upon the world we experience. "8 and what we comprehend as causal 
connection does not exist in the mind-independent reality. Garfield identifies 
Hume, Wittgenstein, Nagfujuna and Candrak:Irti to share the same idea that causal 
explanation is grounded on the regularity we perceive and not "a fundamental 
causal power that causes have to bring about their effects - a necessary 
connection. "9 He describes the process of founding causation upon regularity as 
"sceptical inversion10". We, the unenlightened, falsely assume that our idea(~~; 
nama-riipa) of causation derives from actual causation exists in ~~ (nirvana). 
But, smce we are not capable of comprehending the world as it really is, the actual 
process is the other way round. Our need to find a pattern and regularity gives rise 
to the idea of causation and makes us believe in false causation. In other words, 
not the actual causation but the regularity rises our false belief in causation. We do 
this because ~ ~ (nama-riipa) of causation is a useful tool which enables us to 
predict and analyse events. We invent ~ ~ (nama-riipa) of causation in order to 
sort out and simplify what we experience and comprehend. Like any other ~ ~ s 
(nama-riipas), causation is, therefore, ~ ~ (samskrta; a product of human 
7 Miidhyamaka Kiirlka, XXV, 9. 
8 Loy David. (1983), "The difference between samsara and nirvana", in Philosophy East and West, 
vol.33, p.361. 
9 Garfield, Joy L. (1990), "Epoche and Sfulyata; Skepticism East and West", in Philosophy East 
and West, vol.40, p.285-307. · 
10 Garfield, Joy L. (1990), ibid. p.292. 
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invention) and M§11 (asvabhava; not intrinsic to nirvana). 
This Zen idea of what we comprehend as causation to be ~ (sfulya) does 
not, however, directly leads to non-causal indeterminism. As I explained in 
Chapter One (section 1.3.1), the concept of ~ (sfulyata) is tfli! (madhyama); 
the middle way expressed as A and not-A or neither A nor not-A. It is against the 
concept of ~ (sfulyata) to see the world in terms of causal or not-causal and 
deterministic or indeterministic, since such distinctions are applicable only to mt 
E (samsara; the relative reality) and not applicable to mi~ (nirvana; the 
mind-independent reality). What this means is that Zen only denies the existence 
of what we comprehend as causation in mi~ (nirvana) but it neither affirm nor 
deny existence of actual causation in mi~ (nirvan). To put another way, it is 
possible that causation actually exist in mi~ (nirvan), but such causation is not 
anything like what we comprehend as causation. Affirming a possible existence of 
causation of the unknowable kind seems to contradict with the idea of gg 
(sfulyta), but it is widely accepted in China and Japan, therefore it is not an alien 
concept for Zen. As I mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, Chinese Taoist 
and Japanese pantheism suggests the existence of ~ (ch'ilki), force that governs 
the universe and everything that exists within. 
7.3.2. ~ (ch'ilki) and gg (sfulyata) 
The idea of ~ (ch'ilki) originated not in Buddhism but in Chinese Taoism 
and Japanese pantheism. ~ (ch'ilki) is understood as force or hidden causation 
that governs everything that happens in the universe. In Japan and China, the way 
~ (ch'ilki) works is described as i! (Tao; the Way). In other words, i! (Tao) 
is the way the mind-independent reality is. It has to be noted that although 
Japanese sense of ~ (ch'ilki) derived from Chinese one, there are certain 
differences between the two. This is due to the fact that when the concept was 
introduced to Japan, it was combined with a pantheistic view native to Japan. 
Japanese pantheism denies animate/inanimate distinction and believes in the 
existence of a force that is common to all objects. Although the idea of ~ 
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(ch'ilki) naturally fits into this Japanese belief, this made ~ (ki) to be something 
to be embraced rather than the Chinese sense of ~ (ch'i) which is something we 
can intentionally alter. Moreover a Chinese idea of Jl (li) as an opposing yet 
inseparable element from ~ (ch'i) was dismissed in Japan. In order to 
distinguish the two I will use "ch'i" for the Chinese concept and "ki" for Japanese 
concept, and when it is applicable to both I use "ch'ilki". 
Despite believing in the existence of a single causation that underline both 
what we perceive as mental and physical causation seems to contradict with the 
concept of ~ (siinyata), I still believe ~ (siinyata) and ~ (ki) to be 
compatible. I will compare ~ (ki) and ~ (siinyata) relating several topics and 
illustrates the existence of parallel between them, in order to prove that they are 
not contradicting concepts as they appear to be on surfa~e. The topics I look in are 
indescribability, mind-body problem, animate/inanimate distinction and M ~ 
(anatman). 
Firstly, according to ~ (siinyata), whatever causation or substance that 
exists in ~;1£ (nirvana) is indescribable, therefore we cannot neither affirm or 
negate what genuine causation and substance are. ~ (ki) and ~ (tao) does not 
contradict with ~ (siinyata) because they are considered indescribable. In other 
words, they are beyond the capability of any ~ 1S (nama-riipa) and beyond A 
and not-A duality. ~tift (Tao Te Ching) 11 a text of ~¥$( (Taoism) which 
studies the Way(~; Tao) of ~ (ch'i) starts with the following line 
The Tao which can be spoken is not eternal Tao. 
This indescribablility of ~ (ch'i) and ~ (tao) makes them compatible with ~ 
(slinyata), but ironically it denies any possibility for me to define exactly what ~ 
(ch'i/ki) is. I, however, attempt to clarify its meaning as much as I can. 
In the previous chapter (section 6.3), as a solution to the mind-body problem, 
11 Traditionally it is believe that the text was written by ~T (Lao Tzu) around 6th century B.C. 
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I mentioned mental and physical causation are ~ (siinya) and they are 
epiphenomena of the underline causation that is neither physical nor mental. ~ 
(ki/ch'i) this description. ~ (ki) is understood to be an underline force that 
governs both mind and body. In China and Japan, this close links between mind, 
body and ~ (ki) is taken for granted. The links are the foundation of eastern 
medicine12 and martial arts13• Their understanding of the link did not derive from 
intellectual understanding but through i* f' (Jp; taitoku), learning through 
experience without help of intellectual understanding. People found existence of 
~ (ch'ilki) and how it is related to both body and mind through practicing 
medicine and martial arts. For example a martial artist Ueshiba14 states that; 
I saw clearly that human beings must unite mind and body and the ki 
that connects the two and then achieve harmony with the activity of all 
things in the universe. 
By virtue of the subtle working of ki we harmonize mind and body 
and the relationship between individual and the universe. 15 
The above description fits with arguments for causation to be ~ {siinya). Firstly, 
~ (ch'ilki) is neither physical not mental but it commands both mind and body. 
In other words, physical and mental causations are ~ ~ (samskrta), products of 
human inventions and there is no such causations exists in J.XM! (nirvana). 
Secondly, despite the above, we can perceive it only as physical or mental 
causation. Thirdly, ~ (ch'ilki) is compatible with gg (sunyata) of 
animate/inanimate distinction. gg {siinyata) of the animate/inanimate distinction 
has been discussed in many places. Chapter Two argued that all qualitative 
divisions are ~ (siinya), so that the animate/inanimate distinction must also be 
12 Eastern medicine including"• (acupuncture), nil± (acupressure; shiatu) and It~ (reiki). 
13 Martial arts such as lj]~ (Kong-Fu), '€i~ii (Aikido), ~lj] (Chi-Gong) and XIH~ 
(Tai-chi), all emphasise the importance of ~ (ch'ilki). 
14 A son ofMorihei Ueshiba who is the founder of Japanese martial art, Aikido. 
15 Ueshiba, KisshOmaru. (1987), The Spirit of Aikido, (Tokyo; Kodansha International), p.24. 
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~ (siinya). Schrodinger's cat (section 5.2.2.1) demonstrated that the 
animate/inanimate distinction the Copenhagen interpretation assumes is absurd 
and not plausible. The synchronic, the revolutionary and the developmental 
problems of animate/inanimate distinction examined in the section 6.2.2 as 
criticisms against dualism illustrated implausibility of such a distinction. The 
previous section of this chapter illustrated that the distinction between physical 
and mental causation to be ~ (siinya). The idea of ~ (ki) agrees with ~ 
( siinyaHi) that animate/inanimate distinction is a human invention and there is no 
such distinction that exists in reality. We believe that some different force is 
working on animate object in order for them to behave differently from inanimate 
objects. However, according to the idea of ~ (ki), everything including animate 
and inanimate objects follows the same force and no other force is involved. It is 
therefore our misapprehension to believe in animate/inanimate distinction. 
Fourthly, the idea of ~ (ch'ilki) not being a mental force is also compatible with 
the idea of M ~ (anatman; Non-Self). According to Taoism and Japanese 
pantheism, ~ (ch'i/ki) is a force that connects an individual with its 
environment since it can flow freely between the individuals and between 
individual and its environment. This is consistent with the fundamental idea of 
Taoism and Japanese pantheism. In far-eastern arts, medicine, politics, martial arts, 
harmonising with the existing flow of ~ (ch'i/ki) are important as it is believed 
that whatever harmonises with iA (tao; the way ~ (ch'i/ki) flows) can flourish 
and whatever goes against iA (tao) would soon perish. By harmonising ourselves 
with ~ (tao) we can tap into and amplify our ~ (ch'i/ki) beyond our personal 
limits. How the harmonising and the flourishing is related can be explained 
recalling the example of the river and the pond. If what we perceive as an 
individual is a section of flowing river, an individual who defies iA (tao) is the 
same as a section of river trying to go against the flow, it creates a turmoil and 
difficulties. These ideas of~ ( chi/ki) and il (tao) are obviously compatible with 
-~ (anatman; Non-Self) and ~ (siinyata) of numerical division mentioned in 
the Chapter Four as well as ~ (siinyata) of mental causation mentioned in the 
previous section. 
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These arguments above indicates that although the idea of ~ (ki) assumes 
the existence of a single underline causation, it does not contradict with the 
principle of gg (sfinyatii). It is in fact gg (sfinyatii) and ~ (ch'ilki) are 
compatible and not a contradicting concepts. To summarise, ~ (ch'ilki) is an 
energy or force that governs the universe and everything that exists. ~ (ch'ilki) 
is neither physical nor mental in its true nature. Unfortunately, explaining ~ 
( ch'ilki) is almost regarded as taboo, thereby I could not provide any literary 
evidence to support my claim. It is true that many books on martial arts, feng-shui 
and acupuncture, mention it, but they only discuss how to manipulate or go with 
the flow of ~ (ch'ilki) and never explain exactly what it is. 
Conclusion 
This chapter was set out to argue that both causation and determinism are gg 
(sfulya). What we comprehend as causation is not genuine causation that may or 
may not exist in ~ ;J;l (nirvana). Our apprehension of causation is ~ ~ 
(samskrta), a product of human invention, and it is ~ fS (nama-riipa). It is ~ fS 
(nama-riipa) we invent based on constant conjunction, so that we can fmd certain 
regularity in order to carry out everyday tasks. In other words, causation is ~ fS 
(nama-riipa) which is useful but gg (siinya) like any other metaphysical concepts 
we invent. Zen believes the existence of underline causation called ~ (ki). The 
ideas of gg (sfulyata) and ~ (ki) suggest the world to be neither strictly 
deterministic not indeterministic. Not deterministic, since classic physics which 
the idea of strict determinism derives from is no longer plausible. It is not 
inderterminstic neither in the way quantum physics suggests. Because of the 
existence of underline causation ~ (ki), things does not happen without cause 
and things does not happen totally at random. Things happen according to 
causation of ~ (ki) but the causation of ~ (ki) does not imply determinism 
since there is no reason to believe ~ (ki) to be necessary causation. 
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8. 
Practical implications of Zen 
Metaphysics 
So far we have seen Zen's position in relation to main metaphysical topics. If 
my interest in Zen were purely metaphysical, then this would be the end of the 
thesis. But as I stated in Introduction, the motive for me to take up this project was 
to clarify the underlining Zen metaphysics in order to make sense of otherwise 
appears to be puzzling, irrational or the illogical nature of Zen. In this chapter, I 
would like to briefly demonstrate some practical implications of these 
metaphysical concepts. I must emphasise that this chapter is the indication to my 
future project and functions as a taster to the potential impacts of Zen 
metaphysics. 
8.1. Implications of M~ (anatman; Non-Self) 
The Chapter Four discussed M~ (anatman; Non-Self), the idea that all 
numerical divisions are gg (sunya). It was established that all numerical divisions 
are ::fir»., (samskrta), products of human invention, and there is no philosophical 
or scientific basis for numerical divisions between what we consider as self (an 
individual in the first person sense) and the environment and between things that 
we consider to be individuals. The practical implication of M~ (anatman; 
Non-Self) can be illustrated by the fact that comprehension of -~ (anatman; 
Non-Self) naturally brings about llBMm,l) (catvary-apramanani1). The concept 
of llBft:fi,j) (catvary-apramanani) is known as' the Four Abodes.' The first is 
1 The same idea is also known as IZE:Jiti± (catviiro-brahmavihiirii.h). 
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~ (maitn) which means to provide ~ (sukha; joy) to others. The second is ~ 
(karuna); to eliminate or prevent ~ ( duhkha; suffering) of others. The third is 
~ (mudita); not to feel envy and rejoicing in the good fortune of others. The 
fourth is ~ (upeksa) is impartiality to treat everyone equally and fairly. Zen 
believes that when one grasps the concept of M~ (anatman; Non-Self), he can 
no longer fmd any reason to behave aggressively or unfairly towards others, 
because he realises that an unfair self-centred attitude or having conflicts with 
others are absurd and pointless. For example, benefiting from unfair distribution 
of goods by prioritising the self is like my right hand stealing from my left hand. 
Having conflict with others is like my left hand hitting my right hand. The 
enlightened do not carry out what we normally consider to be morally wrong 
attitudes and conducts not because it is against the moral code, but because they 
would find those attitudes and behaviours to be absurd and pointless. Realisation 
of M~ (anatman; Non-Self) not only takes away any reason to be selfish or 
negative towards others, it gives reason to be kind and caring towards everyone. 
For those who understand -~ (anatman; Non-Self), others and self are one and 
the same thing, so that he can love and care for others in the same way he loves 
and cares about himself. In other words, those who comprehend -~ (anatman; 
Non-Self) would naturally behave kindly to others, and are never abusive, 
offensive or unfair towards others. 
Other metaphysical concepts we looked at can also contribute to the 29M:i: 
•I) (catvary-apramanani). The ~ (siinyata) of natural kinds that we looked at in 
Chapter Three which leads us to realise that there are no actual divisions that 
define race, community, nationality and so forth. These discriminations are the 
foundations of all conflicts, racism and war. If we understand there is no 
objectively legitimate division between races, nationalities, and communities, then 
there is no conflict of interest, therefore people can live in harmony without 
causing ~ (duhkha; suffering) to each other. The ~ (sfmyata) of qualitative 
division (Chapter 3), the ~ (siinyata) of mental and physical substance (section 
6.3) and the ~ (sfmyata) of physical causation and mental causation (section 
7.3.1) lead to the ~ (siinyata) of animate/inanimate division, that there is no 
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difference between hwnan, other animate objects and inanimate objects. When 
one understands this he can apply ll!UII••L' (catvary-apramanani) not only to 
fellow hwnan beings but also to everything that exists including other creatures, 
plants, inanimate objects and the environment. In other words, comprehension of 
~ (sfulyata) makes a person realise being selfish or hostile toward others hwnan, 
all animate and inanimate objects and environment are absurd and pointless and 
therefore gives foundation to the motivation towards kindliness and caring equally 
towards everything including the environment. 
Despite what the term of -~ (aniitman; Non-Self) suggests, Zen ethics is 
not a denial of self but is an expansion of self. In Zen, love and care toward self, 
others and everything that exist are all equally important. It does not prioritise one 
over another. This is the idea called 13 "J"H~ (sviirtha-pariirtha2; benefit of self 
is other) and is considered to be the ideal state in Mahayana Buddhism (::*:JH1 
~). Zen believes love and care of the entire universe must start with love and care 
of self. Love and care of the self means taking good care of oneself by a having 
healthy lifestyle and diet, and not abusing one's own body and mind. Once one 
has managed to look after himself, then he can expand the same degree of love 
and care toward the immediate environment and whoever is close to him, such as 
close friends and family. If that is again successful, then he could expand the same 
degree of love and care towards the wider society and the environment. Zen 
believes in this expansion of love and care of the self, because if one cannot take 
good care of himself, he cannot take care of other people and -his environment. 
One has to start with something that is manageable. From a practical point of view, 
this is an effective method. If one tries to take care of wider society and the 
environment, he is destined to fail the task, and as a result he would be 
disappointed and dispirited to take care of others and the environment. Suppose 
there are 400 people in a particular society which includes 50 people who are 
interested to live according to Zen ethics. It is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for a single individual to employ the same degree of love and care that 
he employs to himself, toward all 400 people. It is, however, possible to apply the 
2 E1 "J (sviirtha) means benefit for oneself and "lit!! (paratha) is benefit for others. 
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same degree of love and care of self toward just eight people who are his 
immediate friends and family. If each one of all fifty people succeeded to take 
care of eight people, all 400 people in the society would be well looked after. 
Whereas with the first method, all fifty people failed to achieve the way of Zen. 
8.2. ~ (siinyata) of qualitative division and moral codes 
Chapter Three established the ~ (sfinyata) of qualitative divisions. What we 
comprehend as qualitative divisions do not exist in ~ ~ (nirvana; the 
mind-independent reality), instead, they are ~ ~ (samskrta) that reflect human 
values of preference, convenience and social consensus. Zen thinks the qualitative 
division between morally right and wrong should also be ~ (sfulya). The idea 
that there is no definite division between right and wrong was expressed in 
Dharmapada3 and Suttanipiida 4. In both texts, Buddha was defined as one who 
eliminated (or exceed) the division between papa (~; moral wrong) and punya 
(If; moral right). As we saw in the Chapter Three, realist theories failed to defend 
the idea that qualitative identity is defined by objects themselves and not by us. In 
the same way, it is difficult and implausible to imagine that all morally right 
actions exemplify the one and the same universal, or share an essential property in 
common or have an overall similarity or a network of similarities. 
The idea that the qualitative division between right and wrong is ~ (siinya) 
and the existence of moral codes and rules in Buddhism seem to contradict with 
each other. In Buddhism, there are ll9 tJ! 5! ( catvari-samgraha-vatiini; four 
moral conducts) 5 1i ~ (pafica-sila; five precepts) 6 , ~ (vinaya) and other 
moral codes and rules. How can one deny the qualitative division between right 
and wrong and yet accept moral codes and rules that define the qualitative 
3 Dharmapada fj!'fj]ftt 39. 
4 Suttanipiida, 520. 
5 lmtli! (catviiri-samgraha-vatiini; four moral conducts) comprise with comprise with I) ;(fi1Jf§ 
(diina; generosity), 2) §!Blt (priya-vadyata; kind wards), 3) "Jft (artha-kriya; to think of not 
only own benefit but also others) and 4) 161$ (samana-arthata; sympathy). 
6 1iftl (pallca-sna; five precepts) consists of I) ~lt~Hl (not kill or harm living being), 2) ~ 
G~Hl (not take what is not rightly yours), 3) ~$;ill (avoid sexual misconduct), 4) ~~Blt 
Hl (abstain from false speech) and 5) ~!X5fill (not take alcohol). 
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division? The answer may be found in the idea of ~ (sO.nyata). Like everything 
else, morally right and wrong are ~ 'fS s (nama-riipas), tools according to which 
we can divide the world in order to simplify what we experience and comprehend. 
In other words, Zen considers moral codes and values to be merely tools to 
encourage people to behave. The following story ofTanzan illustrates this point. 
=Muddy Road = 
Tanzan and Ekido were once travelling together down a muddy road. A 
heavy rain was still falling 
Coming around a bend, they met a lovely girl in a silk kimono and sash, 
unable to cross the intersection. 
"Come on, girl," said Tanzan at once. Lifting her in his arms, he carried 
her over the mud. 
Ekido did not speak again until that night when they reached a lodging 
temple. Then he no longer could restrain himself. 'We monks don't go 
near females,' he told Tanzan, 'especially not young and lovely ones. 
It is dangerous. Why did you do that?' I left the girl there,' said Tanzan. 
'Are you still carrying her?' 7 
This is an example of how the qualitative division between right and wrong is 
defined with a practical implication in mind. It is considered morally wrong for 
monks to have any physical contact. But Tanzan understood the purpose of the 
moral guideline (not to have physical contact with a member of opposite sex) is to 
save monks from falling into temptation. Since his action would not lead him to 
temptation, Tanzan acted against the moral guideline. 
The moral codes and rules that exist in Zen are useful tools for the 
unenlightened. As I expressed in the previous section (section 8.1 ), once the 
person comprehends M~ (anatman; Non-Self) he does not require any reason to 
carry out JDaft:iA:,, (catvary-apramanani). On the contrary, for the unenlightened 
who have not comprehended M~ (anatman), these behaviour do not come 
7 Reps, Paul. (1957), Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, (London; Penguin Arkana), p.28 
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naturally, so that they require moral codes and guidelines. As I expressed in 
Chapter Seven (section 7.2.1), karmatic causation cannot be used to encourage the 
unenlightened to follow llB MtiA) ( catvary-apramanani). So only possible way 
for the unenlightened to follow the way of the enlightened is by illustrating the 
absurdity of their action. There are many examples of how the enlightened Zen 
masters gave help and opportunities to those who behave wrongly. I will give two 
well-known examples; 
=The Thief Who Became a Disciple= 
One evening as Shichiri Kojun was reciting sutras a thief with a sharp 
sword entered, demanding either his money or his life. Shichiri told 
him : 'Do not disturb me. You can find the money in that drawer.' 
Then he resumed his recitation. A little while afterwards he stopped 
and called : ' Don't take it all. I need some to pay taxes with 
tomorrow.' The intruder gathered up most of the money and started to 
leave. 'Thank a person when you receive a gift,' Shichiri added. The 
man thanked him and made off. 
A few days afterwards the fellow was caught and confessed, among 
others, the offence against Shichiri. When Shichiri was called as a 
witness he said : 'This man is no thief, at least as far as I am 
concerned. I gave him the money and he thanked me for it.' 
After he had finished his prison term, the man went to Shichiri and 
became his disciple. 8 
=Right and Wrong= 
When Bankei9 held his seclusion weeks of meditation, pupils from 
many parts of Japan came to attend. During one of those gatherings a 
pupil was caught stealing. The matter was reported to Bankei with 
the request that the culprit be expelled. Bankei ignored the case. 
Later the pupil was caught in a similar act, and again Bankei 
8 Reps, Paul. (1957), ibid. p.49. 
9 1Ut7f<~ (Bankei-Eitaku)(l622-1693) Japanese priest in -~~ (Rinzai School of Zen). 
243 
Practical implications of Zen metaphysics 
disregarded the matter. This angered the other pupils, who drew up a 
petition asking for the dismissal of the thief, stating that otherwise 
they would leave as a body. When Bankei had read the petition he 
called everyone before him. 'You are wise brothers,' he told them. 
'You know what is right and what is not right. You may go 
somewhere else to study if you wish, but this poor brother does not 
even know right from wrong. Who will teach him if I do not? I am 
going to keep him here even if all the rest of you leave.' A torrent of 
tears cleansed the face of the brother who had stolen. All desire to 
steal had vanished. 10 
In the above cases, culprits changed their behaviour, not because they were 
compelled or they feared punishment. They changed their behaviour because they 
understood the negative implications of the ways they behaved, and decided 
themselves that they would no longer behave in such a way. Zen believes that the 
motive to change behaviour must come from within, the change has to be sincere 
and voluntary. If one is forced or compelled to behave in one way, then, when 
there is no obligation or the presence of watchful eyes, the person would not 
behave in the same morally right way. To make people behave in the way of the 
enlightened all the time they have to sincerely understand why they behave in one 
way (being kind and caring) and not the other (stealing, being nasty to others). 
What this section indicated was the ~ (siinyatii) of the qualitative division 
between what is morally right and wrong, but the division between right and 
wrong is a ~ ~ (nama-riipa), a tool useful for the unenlightened. 
8.3. ~ (ki) and harmonisation with the universe 
Although the ~ (siinyatii) of time and space do not have a direct application 
to our everyday life, as we saw in Part Three, it leads to the ~ (siinyata) of 
mental and physical substance (the Chapter Six) as well as the ~ (siinyatii) of 
causation and determinism. The ~ (siinyata) of substance and causation creates 
10 Reps, Paul. (ed.) (1957), Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, (London; Penguin Books), p.49. 
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the possibility for the existence of ~ (ki). This is fundamental to far-eastern 
philosophy, medicine and the martial arts. Far-eastern philosophy, medicine and 
martial arts are not often taken seriously because they rely upon the concept of ~ 
(ki), the force in which western philosophers do not believe exists. In the west, 
such causation is not taken seriously, because western philosophy generally think 
causation to be either physical or mental. By demonstrating the possible existence 
of~ (ki), I hope in future that far-eastern philosophy, medicine and martial arts 
may be taken seriously. I believe far-eastern philosophy, medicine and martial arts 
have much to offer to western culture. By indicating the possibility of ~ (ki), I 
hope it becomes less difficult for western people to accept this far-eastern 
knowledge. 
8.4. Conclusion 
Let me summarise the practical implications of the various metaphysical 
ideas I looked at in this thesis. The comprehension of 1ml!t (anatman; Non-Self) 
encourages a person to be kind and caring equally towards fellow human beings, 
other creatures, plants, inanimate objects, and discourages him to be abusive, 
offensive or unfair toward others and the environment. The ~ (siinyata) of 
qualitative division has many implications. Some I examined in this chapter were, 
the ~ ( siinyata) of moral right and wrong, the eradication of racism and conflicts 
between social groups, making people to be compassionate equally towards 
animate and inanimate objects, the ~ (siinyata) of the mind/body division. The 
~ (siinyata) of causation and determinism rejected karmatic causation. The~ 
(sunyata) of mind/body division implied, Mitt (anatman), the ~ (siinyata) of 
animate/inanimate division, and therefore the possibility of ~ (ki). 
As I explained, this chapter is a brief taster of my next potential project, to 
study the practical implications of Zen metaphysics. I included this chapter to 
demonstrate the impacts Zen metaphysics has on Zen ethics. 
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Let me clarify again the aims of this thesis to see whether I have fulfilled 
what I set out to achieve. 
Aim 1: To make Zen accessible to western philosophers. 
Aim 2: To clarify the Metaphysical position of Zen. 
Aim 3: To prepare myself and the reader for the attainment of 
enlightenment by refuting the existing metaphysical 
views. 
In the Introduction and in Chapter Two I expressed the aims of this project and 
why I chose them. This thesis set out aiming to make Zen accessible to western 
philosophers. The motive for me to take up this project was my realisation that 
despite the fact that Zen offers interesting and valid accounts of diverse topics in 
philosophy, it has been mainly studied under a confmed category of eastern 
philosophy. Zen is treated in this way, because it suffers from the misapprehension 
that Zen is an illogical and irrational mysticism. My project is to remove such 
misapprehension and to make Zen accessible to western philosophers so that in 
future Zen ideas are studied not only in a narrow category of eastern philosophy 
but also in other branches of philosophy such as ethics, political philosophy, 
philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and so forth. 
In order to achieve the Aim 1, I rejected widely used traditional approaches 
(literally study and comparative study) and employed a unique method. The 
difference between my method and the traditional approach can be clarified by 
dividing philosophy into two parts, the idea and the argument that supports the 
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idea. Literal study is often used to defend the author's interpretation of Zen by 
comparing his idea and argument with ideas and arguments found in past literature. 
Although such an approach gives a deep understanding of Zen, it is not 
appropriate for the aim of this thesis. This is because the past literature referred to 
are texts in Indian philosophy and/or Buddhism. This makes Zen inaccessible to 
western philosophers who are not familiar with eastern philosophical texts. The 
second traditional approach is the comparative study which tries to find 
similarities and parallels between Zen ideas and arguments on the one hand and 
western ideas and arguments on the other. The problem of this approach is that the 
Zen it presents tends to be the Zen of past literature. Not many comparisons were 
made between modern Zen literature and western philosophy. Moreover, I 
strongly believe that if the Zen idea is plausible then it should be able to stand on 
its own feet, and there is no need for it to be compared to existing western ideas in 
order to illustrate its plausibility. This is why I employed the method of defending 
Zen ideas using established western arguments. I got rid of the Zen arguments to 
see whether I can come to the same conclusion through arguments from western 
philosophy. In other words, I aimed to reach eastern ideas from western arguments. 
For example, I defended the idea of M =1l (anatrnan; Non-Self) without 
mentioning a~ (pratitya-samutpada; mutual dependence) and 3i.. (five 
skandha; five aggregates of an individual). I defended the idea by demonstrating 
the difficulty and implausibility of believing a definite numerical identity and 
arguing against western theories such as substratum theory and sortal dependency 
theory. This made Zen's metaphysical position more comprehensible to western 
philosophers as well as proving the plausibility of such an idea without relying on 
compatibility with traditional Zen arguments. 
Zen has many aspects which were considered for the purpose of this exercise 
but this thesis has concentrated purely on the metaphysical aspect of Zen. Zen 
metaphysics was chosen since I believe it is not possible to understand other 
aspects of Zen without understanding its fundamental view of the world. In fact 
what appear to be the irrational and illogical behaviors and statements of Zen 
masters make sense once Zen metaphysics is understood. To clarify Zen's 
metaphysical position, I utilized the concept of ~ (slinyata) which is regarded as 
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a core concept of Zen and Madhyamaka. This was the second aim of this thesis; to 
reveal Zen metaphysics in term of ~ (siinyata). In order to clarify the 
metaphysics of Zen, the Part One was dedicated to the explanation of ~ 
(sfulyata). ~ (sfulyata) expresses the idea that everything we experience and 
comprehend is il (maya; illusion) and l!lif!J (viparyasa; misapprehension), so 
that whatever we experience and comprehend is ~ 1.i (samskrta; a product of 
human invention) and MU3~ (asvabhava; not intrinsic to ~~ (nirvana; the 
mind-independent reality)). Once I established what ~ (sfulyata) is, then the rest 
of thesis examined the applicability of ~ (siinyata) to fundamental topics in 
metaphysics to see whether Zen metaphysics is or is not plausible. Part Two 
explored ~ (sfulyata) of the divisions according to which things are judged to be 
the same or different. More specifically Chapter Three looked at ~ (siinyata) of 
what we comprehend as natural kinds, in order to demonstrate the ~ (siinyata) 
of qualitative division. Chapter Four analysed the ~ (sfulyatii) of numerical 
division which directly relates to the idea of MR (anatman; Non-Self). What 
these two chapters have shown was the judgement of being the same or different 
is relative to our human values and there is no definite sense of being the same or 
different. The thesis evaluated the ~ (sfulyata) of time and space in Chapter Five. 
The idea of ~ (sfulyata) suggests spatio-temporality is just the way we perceive 
reality to be without Jj~ (nirvana; the mind-independent reality) actually being 
spatio-temporal. I defend this possibility using modem physics which proves that 
if there are anything that can be called space and time in ;Ei~ (nirvana), they are 
not like anything we think of as being space and time. Chapter Six dealt with the 
question of what is or are the substance or the fundamental building blocks that 
compose reality and everything that exists. Classical philosophy proposed mental 
and physical substance to be candidates for genuine substance. Quantum physics 
suggests that the candidates for fundamental elements are the probability wave 
and the quantum particle. By introducing the idea of ~ (sfulyatii) and ~ (ki), I 
proposed a solution that what we perceive as mental substance, physical substance, 
the probability wave and the quantum particle are just way we perceive things to 
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be and they are not genuine substance. Chapter Seven looked at causation and 
determinism and concluded that ~ (ki), the underline causation, is neither a 
mental nor a physical causation. This leads to the understanding that what we 
consider as causation and determinism are ~ (siinya). The universe is not 
deterministic in the sense of there is only one possible state of the universe, but at 
the same time it is not indeterministic as if things happen in a totally random 
manner. 
The third aim of this thesis is to prepare myself and the readers to attain iii 
(bodhi; the enlightenment). m (bodhi) is truly realising that everything we 
experience and comprehend is i1 (maya; illusion) and ti ftiJ (viparyasa; 
misapprehension). According to Zen, such understanding enables us to make 
peace with our experience and knowledge that do not correspond to ~. 
(nirvana; the mind-independent reality) as well as it liberates us from !f 
( duhkha; suffering). As I explained in Chapter Two, the only way to attain M 
(bodhi) is by carrying out the reasoned refutation of all existing metaphysical 
views. This was why it was important to deny all existing views regarding the 
main metaphysical topics such as qualitative and numerical identity, time and 
space, substance and causation. I hope I sufficiently proved all these existing 
metaphysical beliefs to be ~ (siinya), so that the thesis enabled myself and the 
reader to be ready to take the next step, the attainment of M (bodhi). Because of 
the nature of ~ ( siinyata), it is not possible to make a positive affmnation about 
what the metaphysical view of Zen is. This was why the thesis used ~~~;! 
(prasanga) which is a method of disproving rivalling ideas and doctrines by 
showing how their premises lead to undesirable and implausible conclusions. 
Such a method suited the third aim of this thesis, that is to reject existing 
metaphysical theories by demonstrating their implausibility. 
I believe that I have achieved all three aims in this thesis. I have clarified the 
metaphysical view of Zen in a manner comprehensible to western philosophers 
and proved the implausibility of existing metaphysical views that chiim to 
describe mind-independent reality. 
In order to prove that Zen is a coherent system of philosophically plausible 
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thoughts, the thesis covered diverse metaphysical topics. Regrettably, because of 
the word limit of Ph.D. thesis, I could not cover each of these topics in depth. I 
especially regret not carrying out ~;iJit$ (prasanga) against various theories 
in philosophy of language when I defined ~ (sfulyata), ~ '@. (nama-Iiipa) and 
tP i! (madhyama). At the time I thought the meanings of these concepts would 
come clear in the course of the thesis. However unfortunately they did not become 
as clear as I would have wished. 
The project I took up in this thesis is the frrst of three potential projects I 
have in my mind. The next potential project is to explain how the metaphysical 
view of Zen shapes Zen ethics. This I briefly illustrated in the Chapter Eight. I 
would like to expand it further to clarify Zen's position regarding ethics. An 
additional project could be related to the application of Zen metaphysics and 
ethics to the fundamental understanding of eastern martial arts. Obviously ethics 
is a crucial factor in the study of martial arts in order to prevent the abuse of 
power. Zen metaphysics offers a framework by which the underlining power of 
~ (ki) can be united and utilised in the move towards harmony in mind, body 
and environment. 
Let me finish this thesis by providing explanations to the opening parables I 
started this thesis with. 
= The moon cannot be stolen = 
Ryokan, a Zen master, lived in the simplest kind of life in a little 
hut at the foot of mountain. One evening, a theif visited the hut 
only to discover there was nothing in it to steal. Ryokan returned 
and caught him. 'You may have come a long way to visit me,' he 
told the prowler, 'and you should not return empty-handed. Please 
take my clothes as a gift.' The thief was bewildered. He took the 
clothes and slunk away. Ryokan sat naked, watching the moon. 
'Poor fellow,' he mused, 'I wish I could give this beautiful 
moon.' 1 
1 Rep, Paul (ed.) (1957), Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, (London; Penguin Books Ltd.), p.23 
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= Nansen cuts the cat in two= 
Nansen saw the monks of the eastern and western halls fighting 
over a cat. He seized the cat and told the monks: 'If any of you say 
a good word [give an immediate expression of his Zen], you can 
save the cat.' No one answered. So Nansen boldly cleaved the cat 
into two pieces. 
That evening Joshu returned and Namsen told him about this. 
Joshu at once removed his sandals and, placing on his head 
walked out. Nansei said : 'If you had been there, you could have 
saved the cat. '2 
There can be two reasons as to why Ryokan gave away his clothes to the thief and 
still wished he could have given more. Firstly as we saw in Chapter Three and 
Eight (section 8.2), there is no moral right and wrong in Zen. Therefore he did not 
judge the thief's action. Secondly the concept of stealing implies existence of two 
distinct individuals; a victim and a offender. This obviously opposes the idea of 
M~ (anatman; Non-Self). For Ryokan there was neither a victim nor a offender, 
therefore the act of stealing made no sense to him. There was no individual whose 
possession was taken from and there was no individual who stole from the former. 
Nansen's cat is related to ineffability of ultimate truth and M:ft (anatman). The 
Joshu's act of placing his sandals on his head signified the impossibility to express 
supreme knowledge and the silliness of Nansen's request to describing the 
indescribable. Nansen, therefore, expected an answer to his question to be absurd 
and non-sense. He made a ridiculous threat to show the foolishness of fighting 
over the cat which did not belong to anyone in the first place. But none of his 
students, other than Joshu, got the irony of the statement he was making. 
Therefore, he ended up chopping the cat in half. 
2 The story was recorded in ftMOO (Gateless Gate). this exact passage is quoted from Rep, Paul 
: (ed.) (1957) Zen Flesh, Zen Bones; (London; Penguine Book Ltd), p.l05 
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Definitions I present here are how Ch'an/Zen use these terms, therefore there are some inconsistencies 
between definitions I present here and how original Sanskrit terms are defined. 
A 
abhidharma Skt ~ Commentaries of Buddhist teachings. 
abhiita Skt lit~ False understanding or misapprehension. 
ai-go Jp •m Japanese translation of priya-vadyatii. 
iilj1va Skt $ Livelihood. :iE$ (samyag- iirjiva); right livelihood or honest 
living. The fifth path of J\IEii (iirya-miirga; eightfold path). 
anabhilaya Skt ::f'iiJ~ Indescribable. The idea that truth cannot be put into words. 
anatman Skt -~ Non-Self. The denial of objective/subjective distinction as well 
as numerical division between ordinary objects. 
anitya Skt flft1it Impermanence or ever-changing. It is the first of Tri/alcyat;za 
asura Skt l!iiJ.JI Demigod or titan. 
arhat Skt l!iiJJI;J The enlightened. The different between arhat and buddha is that 
the former attained the enlightenment thought following 
teachings of another, whereas the latter did so through own 
effort. Zen believes arhat is not truly enlightened one. 
artha-kriya Skt 
'Jfi To think of not only own benefit but also others. One of !!Btl 
$; (four samgraha-vastiimi; four moral conducts). 
arya- Skt ~ Prefix which means "noble". Such as arya-pudgala (noble 
person) and araya-satya (noble truth). 
arya-~taflga-marga Skt 1\:iEii Eightfold Path of how to reach i!H21i!allJ1 (nirvana). The 
or iirya-miirga fourth truth of 1!9~~ (araya-satya; four noble truth). 
arya-satya Skt ~~ See catur-iirya-satya 
asamskrta Skt -~ Not conditioned or created by human. It is the way reality 
actually is. 
~taflga- Skt J\ Eight; the prefix that denotes number eight 
asvabhava Skt fl!t131i Not being an intrinsic property. An idea that whatever property 
we assume to exist is projected by us and not reside in an object 
itself. 
iitman Skt ~ Self, or ordinary individual objects and entities. See aniitman. 
avidyii Skt fMP.ij Ignorance. The first of + -~*1 (twelve pratitya-samutpada; 
dependent origination). 
ayatana Skt ~ 1. Twelve sense spheres; in Buddhist psychology there are 
twelve iiyatana consist of 6 indriyas (6 sense organs incl. mind) 
and corresponding 6 vi~yas (6 sense attributes). 1. six places of 
entry. Counting each combination of sense and object of 
sensory experience as one, there are six. 
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B 
bhi~u Skt J:t.li Buddhist monk who cast away all earthly possessions and 
joined a samgha (Buddhist community). 
bhi~r Skt J:t.liJE Buddhist nun who cast away all earthly possessions and joined 
a samgha (Buddhist community). 
bhava-cakra Skt fa Jig! The Wheel of Life. Continuous cycle of birth and death until the 
moment of the enlightenment. 
bhiivanii-prajftii Skt ~- True realisation. Understanding that arise from within. 
bodhi Skt/P ffit5itt The enlightenment. Synonyms to piiramitii (to reach the other 
shore), vimoksa (liberation). 
Bodhidharma Skt illl Indian monk who brought the origin of • (Ch'an/Zen) to 
China. Many stories that related to him are believed to be 
fiction. 
bodhisattva Skt iHi The enlightened who delay to reach enlightenment in order to 
enlightened others. 
bon Jp :tit Japanese translation of Brahman. 
Brahman Skt :tit Ultimate reality in Hinduism. According to Samkara Brahman 
and iitman are one and the same, thereby forms the concept of 
Aniitman (Non-Self) 
buddha Skt ikll't: The enlightened; anyone who attained bod hi (the 
enlightenment). It sometime refers Gautama-Buddha who is 
believe to be the founder of Buddhism. 
c 
cakra Skt • Wheel, as in bhiiva-cakra. 
c~us Skt DR Eye or visual. C~us-indriya; eyes as one of 1\ m (six 
indriyas; six sense organs). C~us-vijftiina; vison as one of 1\ 
~ (six vijiftiina; six kinds of experience). 
catur-iirya-satya Skt llY~mti Four Noble Truths. It is consist of 'l!iit (dukha-satya; life is 
full of suffering), ~mti (tr~Q.ii-satya; craving cause suffering), 
iitit (nirodha-satya; it is possible to escape from suffering), 
iiit (miirga-satya; the way to liberate from suffering is 
through iirya-~taflga-miirga). 
catvaro- Skt 1m Prefix that denote number four. 
catviiro-samgraha-vastu Skt llYHH! See samgraha-vastu. 
catvary-apramiiniini Skt 1m fllt:lbf.\ The Four Abodes; maitri (to provide joy and comfort), karunii 
(to eliminate or prevent duhkha), muditii (to rejoice other's 
fortune) and upeksii (to treat everyone equally). 
Ch'an Ch • A school of Buddhism developed in China around the 7tb 
century. It encourages abandotiing all 'texts and to attain the 
enlightenment through meditation or direct realisation. 
chi Ch 1d The force that governs everything. In far eastern philosophy, it 
underlines both mental and physical causation. 
chi-e Jp till Japanese translation of prajilii. 
262 
Glossary 
citta Skt 1(,\ Mind or related to the function of mind. 
citna-prajftii Skt ms Understanding derives from analytical understanding of the 
enlightenment. 
ChU-chin Ch fAR!£ Chinese Ch'an monk who cut a boy's finger to help the boy to 
attain the enlightenment. 
D 
diina Skt :tfim!i Generosity or giving. One of ~ad-piiramitii (six perfections) and 
also one of catviiro-samgraha-vastu (four moral conducts) 
Daruma Jp ilfft Japanese pronunciation ofBodhidharma. 
deva Skt ~ A deity. According to the Popular Buddhism, good deed will be 
rewarded by being reborn to be devas. 
dharma Skt $ There are three distinct meanings to the world. 1. The natural 
order or law of the universe. 2. Since the aim of Buddhism is to 
be in harmony with the natural law, the term also denotes the 
totality of Buddhist teaching. 3. One of six vi~ayas (attribute of 
mental experience) 
dhatu-loka Skt 7\.!Jf. Spheres or domains within samsiira. There are eighteen spheres 
corresponding to six indriyas (six sense organs), six vi~ayas (six 
kinds of experience) and six vijiftiinas (six attributes of 
experience). 
dhyiina Skt 
*' 
The original meaning was a state of deep meditation, but the 
word was translated as *4! (Ch 'an,'Zen) to inspire the idea of 
casting away all texts and attaining the enlightenment just 
through meditation. 
do or dou Jp im: 1. Japanese translation of Chinese Taoist's term tao. 2. Japanese 
translation of Sanskrit word miirga. 
Dogen or Dougen Jp )i::n:; The founder of fllfiil~ (Soto school of Zen) in Japane. The 
author of WlE$11flill] (ShObougenzo) 
do-ji or dou-ji Jp fii.l. Japanese translation of a Sanskrit term samiina-arthatii. 
d~ti Skt ~ Views, comprehension and opinion. lE~ (samyak- dr~fi); 
right way or collect way of understanding. One of 1\lEim: 
(iirya-miirga; eightfold path). 
dviidl!Sa- Skt += Prefix that denotes number twelve. As in 
dviidasanga-pratftya-samutpiida (twelve dependent origination) 
or in dviidaSayataniini (twelve entries). 
duhkha Skt ~ Suffering. Although it is normally translated as "suffering", the 
concept includes "dissatisfaction". Buddhism thinks it is 
unavoidable state of samsiira. The first of l!B~&iti 
( iirya-a~tmtga-satya; four noble truth) and one of.= Ill 
(tri-laqana; three marks of Buddhist). In Japanese Zen there 
are eight in total. Four basic duhkha are; ~ Gati; to be born), 
~ Gara; aging), 18i (illness) and JE (marana; death). In 
addition to the above, fJHfl ~ ~ (to meet somebody one 
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hates), !'I~IM'lf (parting from loved ones), ;jt~~i!i (not 
getting what one desires), .lillltllii (to be attached to self as 
an individual). Buddhism thinks these duhkha derives from 
ignorance (avidyii.). 
E 
e Jp B Japanese translation of paramitli understanding. 
Eightfold path En J\iEii See lirya-mlirga (lirya-~{anga-mlirga). 
F 
furyuu-monji Jp ~trjC:¥: Indescribable. The enlightenment cannot be attained through 
words. 
G 
ga Jp ¥l Japanese translation of litman. 
gaki Jp •• Japanese translation of preta. 
gan Jp DR Japanese translation of calcyus. 
gandha-vi~aya ~±l Odour or sent. One of 1\±l (six vi~ayas; six attributes of 
experience). 
Gautama-Buddha Skt ~)!!!! I 1AIIt I The person who is believed to be the founder of Buddhism. 
~- I ~ill!!$ Gautama refers a name of the clan he belonged to. Before 
IE! attaining the enlightenment, he was known as 
Gautama-Siddhartha. 
ghriina Skt • Nose. One of 1\. (six indriyas) 
gou Jp :il Japanese translation of karma. 
gu-chi Jp :'ftjfi Japanese translation of moha. 
gunshou Jp til~ Japanese translation ofjantu. 
Gutei Jp «tlllf Japanese translation of the name of Chinese Ch'an monk. 
gyoor gyou Jp ft Japanese translation of samskiira. 
H 
Heart Sutra En •l)ft The shortened name (last two letters) of IJ«iiJ®:ffiltH~~'i) 
ft (Mahii.-prajftii.-pii.ramitii.-siitra). 
hu-se Jp :ffiliffi Japanese translation of dana. 
I 
i Jp .-. Japanese translation of manas. Ail. 
idampratyayii. Skt dttitt Mutual dependence. A synonym to pratftya-samutplida. 
Nothing has intrinsic property. 
indriya Skt • Things from which experience derives. Six indriyas are g 
(mana; mind) and five sense organs. It is part of + =~ 
(twelve ii.yatana; twelve entrires) and of + )\7:;:,W. (eighteen 
dhii.tu-loka; eighteen spheres). 
264 
Glossary 
in-nen Japanese translation of pratitya-samtupiida. 
J 
jaku-metu Jp •• Japanese translation ofnirviina 
jantu Skt nt~IIB~ Collective term for living beings. lin (Dougen) translated as 
"miscellaneous beings" including non-living beings. 
jati Skt ~ Birth. But also the moment when anything come into being or 
when anything happen. It is the llth link in +=llil& (twelve 
pratitya-samutpiida; twelve dependent origination). 
ji Jp ~ Japanese translation of srotra. 
jara-marllQ.a Skt ~JE Jam (old age) and marllQ.a (death). It represents the deepest fear 
in anyone's life, thereby one of the major w (dukha; 
suffering). The last link of + =llil& (twelve 
pratitya-samutpiida; twelve dependent origination). 
jihvii Skt i5' Tongue or of tongue. Jihva-indriyas; tongue as one of ~m, 
(six indriyas; six sense organs). Jihva- vijftiina; taste as one of 
~- (six vijftiina; six kinds of experience). 
K 
kai Jp ~ Japanese translation ofloka 
karma Skt §l The originally meant "action with intent". But it is a widely 
or karma-niyama used shortened word for karma-niyama (karmatic law) which 
present the idea that good deep will make one's next life better. 
kay a Skt !it Body or bodily. Kaya-indriya; body as one of ~ m_ (six 
indriyas; six sense organs). Kaya-vijftiina; bodyly sensation as 
one of ~- (six vijftiina; six kinds of experience). 
ken Jp ji Japanese translation of dr~fi. 
ken-shou Jp jift Japanese translation of bodhi. 
ki Jp ~ Japanese translation of Chinese term chi. 
koan Jp ~* Zen question or statement often referred as "Zen riddles". A 
question is given to a Zen student in order to prevent his or her 
mind wonder. 
kokuu Jp ~~~ Japanese translation of akiiSa. 
kon Jp m Japanese translation of indriyas. 
kou Jp w Japanese translation of gandha. 
ksanti Skt ~~ Patience. One of ~- (six-piiramitii; six accomplishment); one 
of things we must have in order to be enlightened. 
L 
lalcylQa Skt Erl/.=.Erl Mark I Three Marks. Three marks or characteristics of 
ortri-l~na everything that exist. They are fllt'iit (anitya; impernanence), 
W (duhkha; suffering) and fllt:ft (anatrnan; Non-Self). 
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loka Skt ff World or universe. In Hinduism and other branches of 
Buddhism, it is believed that in other lokas gods and devas live. 
In Zen, the term is used as dhiitu-loka to indicate different 
aspects of samsiira corresponding to different sensory organs 
and sensory experience. 
M 
rna Jp IJI Japanese translation of miira. 
madhyamii-ratipat Skt tPii The Middle Way. Originally, it indicated the idea the 
enlightenment can be attained only by the moderate way. In 
Madhyamaka tradition, it is understood as the idea that truth lies 
between two extremes. A synonym to siinyatii (A and not-A). 
man as Skt ~ Mind or of mind. Manas-indriyas; mind as a source of mental 
activity (one of 1\ m (six indriyas; six sense organs)). 
Manas-vijfiiina; mental awareness as one of 1\.BQl (six vijiliinas; 
six kinds of experience). 
mara Skt IJI Devil or demon. Etymologically the term originated in JE 
(maraQa). One who tried to tempt Siddhartha-Gotama is known 
as JEIJI (Miira-piipiyas). 
maraQa Skt JE Death. As in =lJE Qarii-maraQa; old age and death). The last 
link of +=t;S~f!l (twelve pratitya-samutpada; twelve 
dependent origination). One of the strongest source of i!l' 
( dukha; suffering). 
miirga Skt ii Way or path which leads to the enlightenment. As in J'..:iEii 
(iirya-~taflga-miirga; eightfold path). 
maya Skt i1 Illusion. The idea that whatever we assume to experience and 
know is siinya (empty). It is not true to the way the 
mind-independent reality actually is. 
mei Jp lfP Japanese translation of iijfva. 
mei-shiki Jp ~~ Japanese translation of niima-riipa. 
moha Pali ~go Mundane knowledge as oppose to t'li (prajflii; the ultimate 
knowledge). 
muga Jp 111t¥l Japanese translation of the word anatrnan. 
mujou Jp fftt'ilt Japanese translation of the word anitya (impermanence). It is 
the first of Trila/cyaf)a 
Mumonkan Jp ffttP,M Japanese translation of Wu-men kuan. 
mu-myo Jp 1iltllJl Japanese translation of avidyii.. 
N 
Niigiirjuna Jp ~~ Indian Buddhist monk who is believed to found Madhyamika 
school. His work on Siinyatii strongly influenced Zen. 
niima-rupa Skt ~~ Concept. Object or content of mental state. 
Nan-ch'uan P'u-ytlan Ch mJRfilli Chinese Ch'an monk (748-834 A. C.) 
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Nansen Jp JfiJRfilli Japanese translation of the above Chinese monk Nan-ch'uan 
P'u-yUan. 
ne-han Jp ll. Japanese phonetic translation of nirvana. 
nidana skt m!M Causal link between condition and effect. In the Popular 
Buddhism, relations between + - ml M (twelve -
pratrtya-samutpada; twelve dependent origination). 
nirodha Skt ililiit The idea that cessation of 'l5' (dukha; suffering) is possible. It 
is the third of I!!HWM (four catur-araya-satya; Four Noble 
truth). 
nirvana Skt iliitilil/ll~ The mind-independent reality or the world as it really is, as 
oppose to »>ffi (samsara). The Popular Buddhism considers it 
as a some sort of heaven where the enlightenment go and where 
'l5' ( duhkha; suffering) does not exist. 
nitya Skt "m'i! Permanence or everlasting. Craving for it generates 'l5' ( dukha; 
suffering), because everything is 11ft"m' (anitya; imparment) 
p 
paftca- Skt :n Prefix of number five. 
paftca-sJia Skt 3iJ!lt The Five Precepts. They are ::f~~JIIt (not to kill or harm 
living being), ::ffj(~JIIt (not to take what is not rightly yours), 
::f$~Hlt (to avoid sexual misconduct), ::f~mJ!It (not to tell 
a lie), ::t' iX lfi Jilt (not to take alcohol). They matches with 
samgraha-vastu. 
paramatha-satya Skt Jllijl Absolute truth. The way mind-independent reality actually is. It 
composes prajiiii. 
paramitii Skt 111./¥/lll l. fiJ-I¥; To be enlightened. The literal meaning of the word 
is "to get to the other shore", implying leaving this world 
(samsiira) to reach suffering-less world of nirvana. 2. ill; 
Accomplishment which leads to the enlightenment, as in "'ill 
(Sad-pilramitii; six accomplishments). 
pi taka Skt jij Collection of Buddhist teachings. ftil (siitra-pitaka), t!il 
(vinaya-pitaka) or Eft ill ( abhidharma-pitaka). Collection of 
three pitaka is known as .:=.ill (tripitaka; three pitakas). 
prajftii Skt ~-~- 1. The ultimate knowledge, or knowledge available only to the 
enlightened. The knowledge of the way the world really is. 2. 
Mental perfection as in one of .:=.~ (tisra-si~iih; three kinds 
of things to learn). 
Prajl'la-piiramitii-siitra Sky Alttr;~-~~~ One of the most important ft (siitra) in Mahayana Buddhism. 
- •t>ft It consists of onJy one paragraph. 
pratitya-samutpada Skt m!Wti~ Dependent origination. 1. It denotes the idea of how 'l5' 
(dukha; suffering) derives from 11ftlffl (avidyii; ignorance) 
through twelve steps (nidana). 2. Although it is often 
understood as "causal connection", in Miidhyamaka school, it 
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refers an idea that nothing has intrinsic property. A is depending 
upon not-A and not-A is depending upon A. 
preta Skt •• Hungry ghost or demon. In other branches of Buddhism, it is a 
state of being as a result of bad deed. 
priya-vadyata Skt liM To say kind wards to other and not to hart others with words. 
R 
rasa Skt ~ Taste. Rasa-vijflana; one of i'\il (six vijflana; six attributes of 
experience). 
rigyou Jp *'lfi Japanese translation of artha-kriyii. 
rin-ne Jp 
.JI§ Japanese translation of bhiiva-cakra. 
Rinzai-shu Jp -~~ Japanese school of Zen Buddhism founded by ~l§ (Eisai). 
ron Jp illb Japanese translation of abhidharma. 
roushi Jp ~JE Japanese translation ofjiirii-maraf}Q. 
rupa Skt f! Form or concept. 
Ryoukan Jp JUt Japanese Soto Zen monk (1758-1931). 
s 
sabda Skt § Sound or auditory. As in Sabda-vi~aya (auditory attribute); one 
of i'\il (six vi~ayas; six attributes of experience). 
~- Skt ...... Prefix that denote number six. As in ~ad-pii.ramita (i'\l!l; six J\ 
accomplishment) 
samadhi Skt 'IE! :flli'IE 1. Balanced state of mind through meditation. One of i'\lll 
(~ad-pii.ramita; six accomplishment) 2. The second of =~ 
(three s~iih; three divisions of J\.lEii (eight ii.rya-mii.rga; 
eightfold path)) comprised of lE*'f:il (sarnyak-vyiiyii.rna; right 
effort) lE ~ (samyak-smrti; attention) lE 'IE 
(sarnyak-samiidhi; right meditation) 
samana-arthata Skt 15']$ Sympathy. One of I!!H!Hl.i:(four samgraha-vastiimi; four moral 
conducts) 
samgraha-vastu Skt lmtJHZ: Four moral conducts. It comprise with comprise with :ffillffi 
or catvii.ro-sarngraha-vastu (dana; generosity), ~m (priya-vadyatii; kind wards), *'l fi 
(artha-kriyii; to think of not only own benefit but also others) 
and 15'1$ (samana-arthatii; sympathy). 
sarnjfia Skt ~ Thinking. mu (samjflii-skandha); mental state of thinking. 
One of nD (five skandha; what we are directly aware of). 
sarnsii.ra Skt 5Ui 1. In this Popular Buddhism, "this world" or "earch" where we 
live, as oppose to heavens (nirvana). 
2. In Zen, ''the relative reality" or "reality as we perceive" as 
opposed to i!Ul)tt~f! (nirvana; the mind-independent reality). 
3. Three nature of sarnsiira are 11ft'M' (anitya; impernanence), 
a= (dukha; suffering) and 11ft !It (aniitman; Non-Self). 
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Liberating from samsara is the aim of eastern philosophy and 
religion. 
samskiira Skt n Motive, volition or intention. 1. n a ( samskiira-skandha); 
mental state of motive and intention. One of 1i a (five 
skandha; what we are directly aware of). 2. The second link of 
/\:iEii (eight iirya-marga; eightfold path); how ill intension or 
misguided volition bring about 'IS' (dukha; suffering). 
samskrta Skt ~~ Conditioned or created. Whatever we assume to experience and 
comprehend is created or conditioned by us and not the way 
reality anyway is. 
samvtri-satya Skt mm Relative truth as opposes to paramiitha-satya. Since we are not 
capable of comprehending reality as it is, we invent truth as 
social consensus. 
samyak- Skt :iE A prefix that denotes "correct", "right" or "positive". It applied 
to all eight constituents of /\:iEii (eight iirya-miirga; eightfold 
path). 
sangtti Skt .a~ gatherings of Buddhist practitioners to recite teaching together, 
in order to compare and correct each follower remember ot 
understood. 
siintam-nirviina Skt ~~iliilfli There is calmness and peace in nirvana One of tri-laksana. 
sarva-dharmii-aniitmiinah Skt mu=rfl!t~ Everything which is samskrta is impermanent. One of 
tri-laksana. 
sarva-samskiira-anityiih Skt aftj!fl!t~ The absence of everything we perceive as an individual entity. 
One of tri-laksana. 
Sarviisti viida Skt ~-t7J~all I An influential school of Buddhism. Unlike Miidhyamaka and 
~~all I ~all Zen, it believes in svabhiiva (i.e. it took realist's view on 
phenomena) 
satori Jp ffi Japanese translation to bodhi. The term is used as a synonym to 
Jttt and ft¥~. 
satya Skt Mt Truth as in I!B~Mt (four araya-satya; four noble truth). 
sei Jp ~ Japanese translation ofjiiti. 
sesshin Jp tl,C.., A period of intense Zen meditation. 
shi Jp ~ Japanese translation of maraQa. 
shiki Jp 1! Japanese translation ofriipa 
shiki Jp m Japanese translation ofvijifiina. 
shin Jp li) Japanese translation of citta. 
shin Jp ~ Japanese translation of kiiya. 
shi-shoubou Jp I!Bflj! Japanese translation of samgraha-vastiimi. 
sho Jp ~ Japanese tran~lation of iiyatana. 
shu-jou Jp ~~ Japanese translation ofjantsu. 
sna Skt 3iltl 1ft 3llt Precepts or moral codes 1. One of =~ (three si~; three 
things to learn) as well as one of :1\lll (six piiramitii; six 
accomplishments). It consist of IE 3! (samyag-viic; positive 
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use of language) iE. (samyak-kanniira; right action) iEifti 
(samyak-ajiva; right livlihood) and iEM:lft (samyak-vyiiyiima; 
right intention). 2. nfll (paflca-sna; five precepts). 
skabdha Skt e Mental state or what we can be directly aware of. nil (five 
skandha) consists of 1!!11 (riipa-skandha; mental state which 
correspond with the external world), ~- (vedana-skandha; 
the mental sate concerning emotional feeling), me 
(samjftii-skandha; the mental state related to thinking), fill 
(samskiira-skandha; the mental state that represents motive or 
will), ~D (vijfiiina-skandha; the mental state of awareness or 
comprehension). All i1 (skabdhas) are composed of ~ 1!! 
(niima-riipa; concept). 
Soto-shii Jp 1ffal~ Japanese school of Zen Buddhism established by li::n; 
(Dogen). 
sou Jp m Japanese translation of samjna. 
spar8a Skt M 1. Mil (spar8a-skandha); tactile attributes, or attributes from 
sense of touch. One of n D (five skandha; what we are 
directly aware of). 2. Contact or desire that derives from 
contact. One of + =(;;51*1 (twelve pratitya-samutpiida; twelve 
dependent origination). 
srotra Skt :Q: Ear or auditory. 1. :Q:~ (srotra-indriya; ear) One of ~~ (six 
indriyas; six sense organs). 2. :Q:~ (srotra-vijfiiina; auditory 
experience). One of ~- (six vijfiiina; six kinds of 
experience). 
sruta-prajfiii Skt Bfl~ Apprehension derives from listening and reading about 
someone else's experience of the enlightenment. 
siitra Skt ft Any Buddhist's text which was originally believed to be words 
of Gotama-Buddha. A collection of siitras is known as 
siitras-pikata 
svabhiiha Skt 1311 Intrinsic nature or property. Miidhyamaka and Zen deny 
existence of intrinsic property. They think all properties to be 
samskrta (created or condition by percipient). 
T 
taitoku Jp f*tij To learn from experience rather than from intellectual 
understanding. 
tao Ch ii The way or true way of nature. 
Taoism Ch ii!fJ( A mixture of religion and philosophy indigenous to China. It is 
'· 
a stu!Iy of how to harmonise cosmic energy. Its idea strongly 
influenced the rise ofCh'an/Zen. 
tathagata Skt ~* The enlightened or people who comprehend ~ (tathiita; 
Suchness/the world as it really is). The word can be used as a 
synonym for ~lit: (buddha). 
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tathata Skt ~ Suchness or the way the world really is. 
tai Jp I* Japanese translation of the word satya, as in lmJiM (four 
araya-satya; four noble truth). 
tei Jp ~ Japanese translation of samiidhi. 
ten-tou or ten-dou Jp lliill Japanese translation ofviparyiisa. 
tisra-si~iih Skt 
.::.!!F Three things to learn (in order to attain the enlightenment). 
Three divisions of J\.:iEii (eight arya-miirga; eightfold path). 
They are :Ill (sila; precepts), ~ (samiidhi; right state of mind) 
and B: (prajflii; mental perfection). 
tri-l~ana Skt See lak~na 
tmm Skt ~~ Craving. 1. UUil'i; one of lmJiBil'i (four araya-satya; four noble 
truth). The idea that craving for everything to remain the same 
( 'W; ii nitya) generates ~ (dukhal; suffering), because 
everything is impermanent (fllt'W;; anitya). 2. ~; the eight link 
of +=~ti (twelve pratitya-samutpiida; twelve dependent 
origination). 
u 
upeksa Skt ~ Calmness and not being influenced by ego and craving. One of 
catiiry -apramiiniini. 
v 
vac Skt Hi a a Language or use of language. :iEm (samyak-vac); positive use 
oflanguage and avoiding lying and slandering. 
vendanii Skt :§¥: 1. :W:D (vendafia-skandha); mental state of emotion. One of 
li.D (five skandha; what we are directly aware ot). 2. The 
seventh link of +=~ti (twelve pratitya-samutpiida; twelve 
dependent origination). Sensory experience causes emotional 
attachment which leads to craving. 
vijflana Skt m Experience. There are six of them. DRm ( cak~us-vijfiana; 
visual experience), ll m (ghrana-vij Ilana; auditory 
experience), a.m (ghriina-vijfiana; olfactory experience), 15 
m (jihva-vijflana; taste experience), !itm (kaya-vijfliina; 
tactility experience or bodily sensation), and gm 
(manas-vijfliina; experience of thought and emotion). They 
corresponds with 7\Jl (six vi~ayas; six attributes). 
vimo~a Skt M.!Bi Liberation or liberation from ~ (dukha; suffering) or from lilt 
fi (samsiira). The synonyms for ffi (bodhi) and £11 18l It¢ 
(pariimitii). 
vinaya Skt fl Buddhist texts that contain monastic codes of conduct and 
practices. A collection of vinayas is called ... 
(vinaya-pikata). 
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viparyasa Skt liM Misapprehension or seeing opposite of the way reality is. 
Epistemological scepticism. 
vtrya Skt Mil Effort or diligence. Effort to pursue correct end is one of J\1E 
ii (eight iirya-miirga; eightfold path) as well as one of ~lll 
(six piiramitii; six accomplishments). 
vi~aya Skt :tl Attributes of experience. There are six of attributes. 'fS :tl 
(riipa-vi~ayas; form (colour and shape)), it:tl (sabda-vi~ayas; 
sound), tftl (gadha-vi~ayas; smell), '*±l (rasa-vi~ayas; 
taste), Ml:tl (spar8a-vi~ayas; shape, texture, hotness, coldness, 
etc.), and 5$; :tl (dharma-vi~ayas; mental properties and 
feeling).They correspond to ~- (six vijt'iana; six kinds of 
experience). 
w 
Wei-hin C'ing-yilan Ch .-mmm- Chinese Ch'an monk. 
Wu-men Huai-hai Ch i33tiljfij Chinese Ch'an monk (1183-1260). He wrote • r, oo a 
compilation of ~~ (koan). 
Wu-menkuan Ch •r,oo Gateless Gate. A collection of ~~ (koan) complied by 831: 
iijfij (Wu-men Huai-hai). 
z I zou I Jp lilt I Japanese translation ofpitaka I 
3 
!~ana Skt Three marks. They are 1l!t 'W; (anitya; impermanence), i!i 
or tri-l~ana (dukha; suffering) and -~ (anatman) 
si~a Skt =~ See sik~a (tisra- si~a) 
or tisra- si~ 
Three divisions of J\ 1E ii En =~ See sik~a (tisra- s~a) 
(eight -iirya-miirga; eightfold 
path) 
Three marks (ofsamsiira) En Seel~na 
4 
iirya-satya Skt 1!9~~ See arya-satya (iirya-~taflga-satya) 
(iirya-~ga-satya) 
four noble truth En 1!9~~ See iirya-satya (iirya-~aflga-satya) 
four moral conducts En I!BUH! See sarngraha-vastiimi (catravi- samgraha-vastumi). 
samgraha-vaslilmi Skt I!BUH! See samgraha-vastilmi (catravi- samgraha-vastumi). 
or catriivi- sarngraha-vastiimi 
5 
five precepts En jiftlt Seesila 
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five mental states En :na See skandha. 
paftca-sna Skt 3iflt See sna. 
skanda Skt a See skandha. 
6 
ayatana Skt ~ See ayatana 2. 
indriyas Skt m See indriya. 
piiramitii Skt JJl See paramita 2. 
six accomplishment En ~- See paramita 2. 
six attributes of experience En ~it See vi~aya. 
six sense organs En ~m See indriya. 
six place of entrance En ~ See ayatana 2. 
six kinds of experience En ~!ftl See vijfiana. 
vijtiana Skt • See vijtiana. 
vi~aya Skt it See vi~aya. 
8 
arya-mii.rga Skt J\.iEii See arya-marga. 
eightfold path En J\.iEii See arya-mii.rga. 
12 
ayatana Skt ~ See ayatana 1. 
dependent origination En ~~*!~ See pratitya-samutpada. 
pratitya-samutpada Skt ~-/*!~ See pratitya-samutpada. 
twelve places of entry En ~ See ayatana 1. 
18 
dhatu-loka Skt 1;.!}1. See dhatu-loka 
eighteen sphere En + J\1;.!}1. See dhatu-loka 
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